Indicators of Party Change

Author(s):  
Gideon Rahat ◽  
Ofer Kenig

The chapter examines nine of the chosen twelve indicators of party change. This group of nine contains widely used indicators and some that have been proposed and examined only by a few scholars. All these indicators examine the direct and the indirect links of parties with society. The indirect, mediated links include relationships between the extra-parliamentary organization and the “party in government” (party background of ministers and members of parliament); between the party and its members; and between parties and interest groups. The direct links with voters include voter attitudes toward parties (party identification), patterns of voter behavior (electoral volatility, electoral turnout), and the resulting party system (party system fragmentation, continuity of parties/emergence of new parties). The significance of each indicator is explained, its advantages and limitations are examined, and the trends over time for each one are presented.

Author(s):  
Emily J. Charnock

This conclusion highlights the importance of PACs in twentieth-century American political development. The emergence of partisan PACs, initially formed by major interest groups, played an important and neglected role in fostering the polarization of American politics—a phenomenon that has raised concern in recent decades. Seeking to reconfigure party politics around specific policy issues—more broadly, to realign the party system along an ideological dimension of conflict—these PACs helped make the parties more distinct and more deeply divided over time. They did so via electoral tools and tactics that are now ubiquitous in political life but are rarely probed in scholarship. A focus on PACs thus illuminates the very mechanisms through which party change was brought about, as much as its wider meaning. The book concludes with a consideration of contemporary US politics, in which PACs continue to play a prominent role.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Cyr ◽  
Nicolás Liendo

Political parties are not what they used to be. They evolve, often in response to external motivations, but also as a function of the historical time period in which they emerge. There are several determinants of party change and adaptation in Latin America. Most importantly, multiple exogenous forces, including a shift in the economic model, the adoption of decentralization policies, and the growing political voice of minoritized groups, have challenged parties to adapt for survival. While not all parties have successfully endured, some have employed diverse strategies to do so. To be sure, new parties also emerge as a function of exogenous challenges and opportunities. In Latin America, new parties have differed in form and in function from their predecessors. The emergence of new parties represents a second type of party change that must be contemplated. Overall, parties in the 21st century look quite different from their 20th-century counterpoints. Additionally, empirical measures suggest that the dynamics of party change vary across the region and also within countries across time. A novel concept, party survival, has been elaborated to address adaptation strategies that neither lead to continued electoral success at the national level nor end in full party collapse. Indeed, several countries in the region have faced at least one crisis of representation, wherein voters defected from existing parties to vote for new parties and politicians. A new research agenda, which examines the role of resources in provoking successful party emergence and adaptation over time, provides one fruitful explanation for why parties can survive a sudden and dramatic loss of national votes. Overall, knowledge of party change and adaptation has accumulated over time. It has also evolved with respect to nuance and sophistication. Still, there is much left to be learned about party change and adaptation, including the impact new parties will have on representation, governance, and democracy more generally.


Author(s):  
Michael Marsh

This chapter explores the extent to which the cleavages underlying voting behaviour in the Irish party system have changed since the 1970s. The divisions within the party system can be seen as between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, between Fianna Fáil and the rest, between Fine Gael and the rest (leaving aside Fianna Fáil), and between left and right. The basis for voting analysed are class, religion, party identification, and ideology. The weight of each on each division is traced over time. While the party system has clearly fragmented, and the left has grown in size, the importance of each of these factors has not changed significantly, either since the 1970s, or just since the economic crisis. Various explanations for the lack of change are discussed, including the persistence of candidate centred voting, localism, and how party competition has tended to obscure real policy differences.


1975 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-145
Author(s):  
Henry J. Jacek

I should like to comment on the fine article, “Party Loyalty and Electoral Volatility: A Study of the Canadian Party System,” by Paul M. Sniderman, H.D. Forbes, and Ian Melzer in the June 1974 (vii, no. 2) issue of this journal. This article should be a major corrective in the study of Canadian political parties. In addition, the authors provide a number of useful insights which should fruitfully guide future research on parties.In the beginning of their article they point out that there is a “consensus among students of Canadian politics on the functions of parties and the nature of voting in Canada,” which consensus they call “the textbook theory of party politics.” Among the elements of this theory, according to the authors, is the interpretation that both major, old-line Canadian parties, the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives, are brokerage parties, and are, therefore, indistinguishable. Although the authors present evidence that calls into serious question other aspects of the “textbook theory,” such as the supposed lack of validity of the concept of party identification in Canada and the purported high level of electoral volatility of the Canadian voter compared to the British and American voter, the authors at the end of their article still accept important elements of the “textbook theory.” Thus, on page 286 they incorporate into their conclusion the idea that “it is surely true… that the major parties advance very similar platforms and share the same overall economic ideology.”


Author(s):  
Miguel Carreras ◽  
Igor Acácio

Latin American political systems experience significant levels of institutional uncertainty and unpredictability. One of the main dimensions of this institutional and political instability is the high level of electoral volatility in the region. In the last 30 years, traditional parties that had competed successfully for several decades abruptly collapsed or weakened considerably in a number of Latin American countries. New parties (or electoral movements) and political outsiders have attracted considerable electoral support in several national and subnational elections in the region. Even when the main partisan actors remain the same from one election to the next, it is not uncommon to observe large vote swings from one established party to another. While some scholars and observers expected that the instability in electoral outcomes would decline as democracies aged and consolidated, electoral volatility has remained high in recent decades in many Latin American countries. However, in other Third Wave Latin American democracies (e.g., Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Uruguay), the patterns of interparty competition have been much more stable, which suggests we should avoid blanked generalizations about the level of party system institutionalization and volatility in the region. Cross-national variation in the stability of electoral outcomes has also motivated interesting scholarly work analyzing the causes and the consequences of high volatility in Latin American democracies. One of the major findings of this literature is that different forms of institutional discontinuity, such as the adoption of a new constitution, a significant enfranchisement, electoral system reforms, and irregular changes in the legislative branch (e.g., a dissolution of Congress) or in the executive branch (e.g., a presidential interruption), can result in higher volatility. Another major determinant of instability in electoral outcomes is the crisis of democratic representation experienced by several Latin American countries. When citizens are disenchanted with the poor performance and moral failures (e.g., corruption) of established political parties, they are more likely to support new parties or populist outsiders. Weak party system institutionalization and high electoral volatility have serious consequences for democratic governability. Institutionalized party systems with low electoral volatility promote consensus-building and more moderate policies because political parties are concerned about their long-term reputation and constrain the decisions of political leaders. In contrast, party systems with high volatility can lead to the rise of outsider presidents that have more radical policy preferences and are not constrained by strongly organized parties. Electoral volatility also undermines democratic representation. First, the fluidity of the party system complicates the task of voters when they want to hold the members of the incumbent party accountable for bad performance. Second, high instability in the patterns of interparty competition hinders citizens’ ability to navigate programmatic politics. Finally, electoral volatility augments the cognitive load required to vote and foments voter frustration, which can lead to higher rates of invalid voting.


2019 ◽  
pp. 50-73
Author(s):  
Edward Fieldhouse ◽  
Jane Green ◽  
Geoffrey Evans ◽  
Jonathan Mellon ◽  
Christopher Prosser ◽  
...  

In this chapter we show how the twin processes of partisan dealignment and party system fragmentation have underpinned the increase in electoral volatility. Fragmentation creates volatility because smaller parties consistently lose a much higher proportion of their voters between elections than the major parties. Partisan dealignment matters because there is a strong and consistent relationship between a voter’s level of partisanship and the likelihood of them switching parties at the next election. While this accounts for a substantial proportion of the trend in volatility, it is less clear why partisan identification has itself declined. We show a clear pattern of generational replacement in partisan identification, with newer cohorts entering with lower levels of partisanship and remaining relatively stable over time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mindaugas Jurkynas

AbstractThe article discusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania’s party system and electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader’s intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders’ political careers and their electoral activity. The L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. The protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice’s internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.


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