Reasoning beyond Consequences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Trolley Problem ◽  
Doctrine Of Double Effect ◽  
Post Hoc

Experimental research demonstrates that moral judgment involves both conscious and unconscious reasoning or inference that is not mere post-hoc rationalization. The evidence suggests in particular that we treat as morally significant more than the consequences of a person’s actions, including characteristically deontological distinctions between: intentional vs. accidental outcomes, actions vs. omissions, and harming as a means vs. a byproduct (familiar from the Doctrine of Double Effect). And the relevant empirical evidence relies on more than responses to unrealistic moral dilemmas characteristic of the trolley problem. The result is an extremely minimal dual process model of moral judgment on which we at least compute both an action’s outcomes and the actor’s role in bringing them about. This view resembles the famous linguistic analogy (or moral grammar hypothesis) in only its least controversial aspects, particularly the emphasis on unconscious reasoning in moral cognition.

scholarly journals Medical ethics and the trolley problem

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Andrade
Keyword(s):  
Medical Ethics ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Trolley Problem ◽  
Ethical Challenges ◽  
Doctrine Of Double Effect ◽  
Life And Death ◽  
Ethical Decisions ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Alternative Scenarios

The so-called Trolley Problem was first discussed by Philippa Foot in 1967 as a way to test moral intuitions regarding the doctrine of double effect, Kantian principles and utilitarianism. Ever since, a great number of philosophers and psychologists have come up with alternative scenarios to further test intuitions and the relevance of conventional moral doctrines. Given that physicians routinely face moral decisions regarding life and death, the Trolley Problem should be considered of great importance in medical ethics. In this article, five “classic” trolley scenarios are discussed: the driver diverting the trolley, a bystander pulling a lever to divert the trolley, a fat man being thrown from a bridge to stop the trolley, a bystander pulling a lever to divert a trolley so that a fat man may be run over, and a bystander pulling a lever so that a fat man falls off from a bridge to stop the trolley. As these scenarios are discussed, relevant moral differences amongst them are addressed, and some of the applications in medical ethics are discussed. The article concludes that Trolley scenarios are not the ultimate criterion to make ethical decisions in difficult ethical challenges in medicine cases but they do serve as an initial intuitive guide.    

scholarly journals Iterative dilemmas demonstrate that there is more to sacrificial harm than utilitarianism and deontology.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dries Hannes Bostyn ◽  
Arne Roets
Keyword(s):  
Process Model ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Automatic Process ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Single Shot ◽  
Deliberative Process ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Do No Harm

When are sacrificial harms morally appropriate? The dual process model for moral cognition states that peoples’ judgments of sacrificial harm are driven by two competing processes: a fast, automatic process leading to deontological “do no harm” judgments, and a slower, deliberative process leading to utilitarian “minimize overall harm” judgments. Traditionally, research within moral psychology has investigated this issue by asking participants to render moral judgments on single-shot, sacrificial dilemmas. The present series of studies goes beyond this limitation by presenting participants with iterative versions of sacrificial dilemmas that involve the same set of targets across multiple iterations. Using this novel approach, and across four preregistered studies (n = 1538), we provide clear evidence that participants’ moral judgments are often motivated by a third, distinct moral concern that is not captured by the utilitarianism versus deontology dichotomy: a concern to spread out harm across all possible targets.

scholarly journals Beyond Moral Dilemmas: The Role of Reasoning in Five Categories of Utilitarian Judgment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Jaquet ◽  
Florian Cova
Keyword(s):  
Process Model ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Intuitive Reasoning ◽  
Dual Process Model ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Conscious Processes ◽  
Trolley Problems

Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people’s judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duty to help others, and the good justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene’s dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duty to help others.

scholarly journals Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Micaela Maria Zucchelli ◽  
Wouter Kool ◽  
Stephanie Campbell ◽  
Federico fFornasier ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Behavioral Performance ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Reasoning Abilities ◽  
Greater Good

Sacrificial moral dilemmas elicit a strong conflict between the motive not to personally harm someone and the competing motive to achieving the greater good, which is often described as the “utilitarian” response. Some prior research suggests that reasoning abilities and deliberative cognitive style are associated with endorsement of utilitarian solutions but, as has more recently been emphasized, both conceptual and methodological issues leave open the possibility that utilitarian responses are due instead to reduced emotional response to harm. Across eight studies, using self-report, behavioral performance, and neuroanatomical measures, we show that individual differences in reasoning ability and cognitive style of thinking are positively associated with a preference for utilitarian solutions, but bear no relationship to harm-relevant concerns. These findings support the dual process model of moral decision making and highlight the utility of process dissociation methods.

(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (9) ◽  
pp. 1303-1317
Author(s):  
Jacob Goldstein-Greenwood ◽  
Paul Conway ◽  
Amy Summerville ◽  
Brielle N. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Affective Processing ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Negative Feelings

Sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which opting to kill one person will save multiple others, are definitionally suboptimal: Someone dies either way. Decision-makers, then, may experience regret about these decisions. Past research distinguishes affective regret, negative feelings about a decision, from cognitive regret, thoughts about how a decision might have gone differently. Classic dual-process models of moral judgment suggest that affective processing drives characteristically deontological decisions to reject outcome-maximizing harm, whereas cognitive deliberation drives characteristically utilitarian decisions to endorse outcome-maximizing harm. Consistent with this model, we found that people who made or imagined making sacrificial utilitarian judgments reliably expressed relatively more affective regret and sometimes expressed relatively less cognitive regret than those who made or imagined making deontological dilemma judgments. In other words, people who endorsed causing harm to save lives generally felt more distressed about their decision, yet less inclined to change it, than people who rejected outcome-maximizing harm.

Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Greene
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Bright Future

Abstract In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

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