Planning Positivism and Planning Natural Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Jay Stone

Scott Shapiro offers an elaboration and defense of “legal positivism,” in whichthe official acceptance of a planfigures as the central explanatory notion. Rich in both ambition and insight,Legalitycasts an edifying new light on the structure of positive law and its officialdom. As a defense of positivism, however, it exhibits the odd feature that its main claims will prove quite acceptable to the natural lawyer. Perhaps this betokens – what many have begun to suspect anyway – that our usual tests for classifying legal theories (as positivist or not) are, in the present state of discussion, no longer credible. In any case, my hope in the following remarks is to suggest how certain ambiguities inLegalitymight easily be resolved in favor of PlanningNatural Law. The Planning Theory of Law, in other words, is not proprietary to positivism.

Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-261
Author(s):  
Damir Banović

Summary This article deals with analytical jurisprudence topics presented in John Austin’s work, his predecessors, and its influence on the contemporary theory of law. The article analyses his analytical method, understanding of what the method implies, and its application in understanding law as a social phenomenon. Not only does the article analyse the law phenomenon, but it also presents his views on similar phenomena in law, such as international and constitutional law, the phenomenon of sovereignty and a sovereign, and the principle of general utility as one of the moral principles. His theory of law was one of the most significant theoretical approaches in England of the 19th century, and also constituted the baseline for new conceptions and the basis of critical analyses of later positive law theories. Moreover, his work provides a solid ground for explanations of individual branches of law, especially criminal law. Finally, the article also presents a critical analysis of his approach, useful and important findings, and the perspectives for further development of the theory of law, especially in the domain of his analytical, empirically oriented and descriptive method.


Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Perry

To understand H.L.A. Hart's general theory of law, it is helpful to distinguish between substantive and methodological legal positivism. Substantive legal positivism is the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and the content of law. Methodological legal positivism is the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral description of a particular social phenomenon, namely law. Methodological positivism holds, we might say, not that there is no necessary connection between morality and law, but rather that there is no connection, necessary or otherwise, between morality and legal theory. The respective claims of substantive and methodological positivism are, at least on the surface, logically independent. Hobbes and Bentham employed normative methodologies to defend versions of substantive positivism, and in modern times Michael Moore has developed what can be regarded as a variant of methodological positivism to defend a theory of natural law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Krishna Djaya Darumurti

AbstrakArtikel ini menganalisis isu filosofis tentang konsep kekuasaan diskresi pemerintah. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa teori hukum alam lebih memadai dibandingkan teori positivism yuridis dalam menjustifikasi dasar filosofis kekuasaan diskresi pemerintah. Dengan kekuasaan diskresi yang dimiliki, pemerintah adakalanya dapat bertindak menyimpangi undang-undang atau asas legalitas. Oleh karena itu, supaya terlegitimasi, tindakan demikian memerlukan justifikasi filosofis yang memadai. Teori hukum alam menjustifikasi kekuasaan diskresi pemerintah dengan mengajukan klaim bahwa diskresi adalah tuntutan hukum yang lebih tinggi dari hukum positif.AbstractThis article analyses the philosophical issue of the concept of discretionary power of the government. It is argued that natural law theory is better than legal positivism theory to justify the philosophical underpinning of the discretionary power of government. By its discretionary power, the government sometimes can take an action contrary to laws or legislation or principle of legality. To be legitimate, this action needs sufficient philosophical justification. Natural law theory justifies discretionary power of government by claiming that discretion is the demand of the higher law that is higher than the positive law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
STÉPHANE BAUZON

Justice is the name for a human characteristic that everyone feels spontaneously: what is fair or unfair in a social relationship. Animals do not have justice. The human reason (logos – λόγος) acts in order to reveal what is included in justice. Thus, as a participation in justice, the human conscience (logos) finds the law. Away from modern (and current) theories of natural law that sets rules either to be applied directly to social reality or to be individual powers to be opposed to positive law, the classical theory of law is a social quest directed toward doing the right thing. In the wake of Aristotle, classical natural law is a methodology (based on dialectics) to find justice in society. The etymology of dialectics, dia-lektos, teaches us that it signifies the exchange of words between different interlocutors. In this sense, dialectics is practiced every day by those gathering together, who receive advice relating to a given situation. Dialectic does not solely aim to persuade; but also tries to look for the natural law. Legal conclusions, notwithstanding the authority submitting them, are ultimately questionable. Having been born in dialectic, these conclusions remain as such. Nonetheless, their very existence gives the natural law, a fragmented expression of justice. Unlike morality, or the precepts of divine law, natural law is not given at all: it must be established through dialectic. Morality retains a reduced role, broadly limited to the discovery of natural law’s essence, for example by prohibiting murder from being accepted in principle. Still, such a moral prescription does not solve the problem to know who is guilty of murder. As a methodology, classical natural law acknowledges the contingency of social norms with regard to the distribution of common goods. As a process that attends to the common good available and the merits of people understood in a broad fashion as encompassing the resources they possess, classical natural law cannot a priori determine what specific rights or goods particular specific people should have. Adapting to reality is necessary: a dialogue is always established to amend the contours of justice. For this purpose, classical natural law is the methodology for justice to achieve its new forms, to distinguish new data from the social distribution of goods and responsibilities. The protection of the worker, of the minor or of the foreigner is of indisputable moral value, though its implementation follows the oscillations of time. However, as a moral horizon, seeking justice involves a perennial effort to recognise other humans as human.


Author(s):  
Benedikt Forschner

The paper deals with the use of philosophical arguments in Cicero's legal writings, in particular his forensic speeches. It tries to demonstrate that Cicero developed a unique, holistic theory of law, which is not based on a juxtaposition of natural law and positive law, but tries to deduce the nature of law from the nature of men. Even though this theory probably did not influence the writings of the later classical jurists in a direct way, Roman law was open enough for philosophical arguments to allow Cicero to make use of this theory within the legal discourse. Using examples from Cicero's forensic speeches, the paper demonstrates how Cicero refers to his philosophical concept in order to develop specifically legal arguments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
Dejan Stankovic

The contemporary natural law theory was grounded in the philosophical and the jurisprudential work of Australian legal and moral philosopher John Mitchell Finnis. He reaffirmed the natural law and also corrected some of false notions about it which were dominant through the history of legal philosophy. Finnis moral and legal philosophy could be understood by the specific theoretical figure - moral argument for law. This theoretical concept implies unity of two mutually connected moments which are necessary for a philosophical treatment of any socially relevant phenomena: methodological and epistemological as well as practical. The meeting point of these two philosophically relevant dimensions is theory of practical rationality exposed in the philosophy of John Mitchell Finnis. By grounding his concept of natural law on the theory of practical rationality, John Finnis historically contextualize it. He made some sort of specific anti metaphysical concept of natural law theory that is alternative to the classical natural law as well as to the legal positivism, which mainly exposed in the legal theories of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A Hart.


Author(s):  
Jens Zimmermann

‘Hermeneutics and law’ begins with natural law in Greco-Roman culture and God’s moral law of Christendom. It then explains legal positivism as espoused by John Austin (1790–1859) and the more democratic ideal of Herbert L. A. Hart (1907–92). For Hart, society operates two sets of legal rules: primary rules that tell us not to steal or not to kill, and secondary rules ‘of recognition’ by which primary positive law is recognized and applied in a regulated manner. Critics of legal positivism—legal realism and natural law—are discussed, before concluding that a legal judgment involves more than the mere application of rules. To judge is to interpret.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Callixte Kavuro

This article seeks to explore the limitation of the theory of full legal protection by illustrating with facts that the theory does not lack legal force, but rather that various concepts such as citizenship, national security, sovereignty, affirmative action, legal positivism, and democratic governance severely limit the application of theory. In particular, the limitation of full legal protection is analysed through the lens of legal positivism and the natural law doctrines whereby it is argued that the laws of South Africa are framed in the context of legal positivism which does not take cognisance of the moral values on which the natural law doctrine is based. As a result, the full legal protection of constitutional rights of refugees remains in theory. In order to convert this theory into an effective protection, it is argued that although the state has the power inherent in its sovereignty to design and frame laws as it deems best, South Africa should, with the natural law in mind, develop social transformative or remedial measures in such a way that extends constitutional socio-economic rights to refugees in a more favourable way. The article concludes by suggesting the manner in which the severe limitations imposed on the concept of full legal protection can conceptually and rationally be addressed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Palazzani

L’autore analizza nella prospettiva della filosofia del diritto la questione del rapporto tra diritto e morale nella Evangelium Vitae. In particolare si sofferma ad analizzare le teorie che tematizzano la neutralità del diritto (nella pretesa di separare il diritto dalla morale pluralistica), quali la teoria liberalelibertaria che identifica il diritto con la garanzia dell’autonomia individuale e la teoria democratico-procedurale che fa coincidere il diritto con il voto di maggioranza. Giovanni Paolo II critica i percorsi postmoderni del diritto, riprendendo sul piano filosofico e teologico la dottrina del diritto naturale (in contrapposizione al giuspositivismo), che riconosce nell’uomo i diritti inviolabili e la dignità intrinseca. Nell’orizzonte giusnaturalista, esiste un dovere morale da parte del cittadino a criticare e a non obbedire alle leggi ingiuste e da parte del giurista e del politico ad operare per abrogare, riformarle e riformularle, al fine di adeguare il diritto positivo alle esigenze intrinseche della natura umana. ---------- The author analysis the question of the relation between law and ethics in Evangelium Vitae in the perspective of the philosophy of law. In particular, it focuses on the theories that speak about neutrality of law (separating law from moral pluralism), such as libertarian-liberalism which identifies law with individual autonomy and procedural democracy which identifies law with opinions of majority. John Paul II criticizes postmodern patterns of law, reaffirming on philosophical and theological level the doctrine of natural law (against legal positivism) which recognises in human being the inviolable rights and intrinsic dignity. In this perspective, there is a moral duty on the part of citizen to criticize and not to obey to unjust laws and on the part of jurist and politician to work for an abolition, reform and reformulation of law, to adequate positive law to the intrinsic instances of human nature.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document