Nietzsche’s Meta-Axiology
Chapter 7 considers the status of the underlying values by which Nietzsche celebrates the flourishing of culture and rates certain kinds of lives highly. Does he regard this simply as his idiosyncratic preference, or does he take it to stand on a more secure foundation? The interpretation offered cuts against the grain of much of the best recent scholarship on Nietzsche, which sees him as doubtful that any values, including his own, might have privileged standing. For this reason, the approach taken in this chapter is primarily negative in character: it tries to undermine the basis for thinking that Nietzsche pulls the rug out from under his perfectionistic value commitments. The arguments for blanket value skepticism that have been attributed to Nietzsche, arguments that would undermine the pretensions of any values to enjoy meta-axiological privilege, are simply not anchored in decisive textual evidence.