The Meaning and Function of Social Norms

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-278
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers

This chapter argues that a social norm affirms the realization of a possibility. This notion does without a justificatory element because the concept is supposed to be used to describe, not evaluate, social practice. The concept does without a criterion of success, a measure for a norm being established. Finally, the concept does without the threat of sanctions. Every norm carries with it a specific sanction. Norms create a tension with reality, which they seek to bring into harmony with themselves. The more successful a norm is in terms of being in accord with the course of events, the less obvious it becomes what noticeably distinguishes the norm from this very course of events. This is why normative orders deploy numerous instruments for securing their own distinguishability. It is only in this distinguishability from reality that norms find their achievement, thereby fulfilling a number of different functions. But, as this chapter shows, social norms are just as irreducible to a certain function as appropriate descriptions are.

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Hindriks

Abstract Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs.


Author(s):  
Luka Burazin

This chapter claims that legal systems are abstract institutional artifacts and that as such they existentially or ontologically depend on collective intentionality in the form of (a we-mode) collective recognition. It argues that this recognition, as a social practice accompanied with its participants’ particular attitude toward it, constitutes a social norm by which a group of people collectively imposes an institutional status of officials or make it the case that an institutional status of legal system exists. It further claims that legal systems often emerge gradually from standing rudimentary pre-legal practices which may be said to create the context in which social norms of recognition can emerge. Finally, it argues that the actual existence of a legal system depends on whether or not the content of collective recognition was largely successfully realized, which is manifested precisely in people actually using a legal system, i.e., in their social (legal) practices.


Author(s):  
Orsolya Száraz

The Institute of Hungarian Literary and Cultural Studies at the University of Debrecen formed a research group in 2010 in order to launch the research of Hungarian realms of memory. This paper was written within the frameworks of the research group. Its basic hypothesis is that the identification of Hungary as the Bastion of Christendom is an established part of Hungarian collective memory. This paper attempts to demonstrate the changes of this realm of memory, regarding its meaning and function, from its formation up to the present day.


Author(s):  
La Ode Sidu ◽  
La Ino ◽  
Nirmalasari

The article titled “Demonstrative Nouns of ini and aini in Muna Language.” The purpose of this article is to analyze the form, meaning, and function of ini and aini in Muna language. The method used is descriptive qualitative with distributional technique. This method is used to describe and analyze the form, meaning, and function of ini and aini. The results of the analysis found that the form of ini is a base or monomorpheme, while the form of aini is a derivative or polymorpheme which consists of morpheme a- and morpheme aini. In construction of phrase, clause, or sentence generally have the same meaning, namely ‘this’. For instance, O lambu ini damasoe and lambu aini damasoe the meaning is ‘The house will be sold.’ However, when it’s examined more closely, both forms of demonstrative ini and aini in distributional are not interchangeable. For instance, *O lambu aini damasoe dan *Lambu ini damasoe. Both of constructions are ungrammatical caused by form ini has a meaning ‘this’, while form aini means ‘which this’. The bound morpheme a- in aini has a function as a noun marker which pointed in article ini called relative noun marker. Thus, demonstrative aini can stand alone as a minor sentence in the answer sentence, e.g., Question: Hamai bokuku kabasa? ‘Where is my reading book?’ Answer: Aini! ‘This’ < (Here is it!). Demonstrative aini when substituted with ini, the construction became ungrammatical, e.g., Question: Hamai bokuku kabasa? ‘Where is my reading book?’ Answer: *ini. Hereafter, the form ini cannot be formed in more complexes, whereas the form aini can be formed again with another bound morpheme, such as: ainihakanau ‘This is me’, ainihako ‘This is you’, ainihakoomu ‘These are you’, ainihae ‘This is he’, ainihada ‘These are they’, and ainihakasami ‘These are we’.


Author(s):  
Erik Gray

Love begets poetry; poetry begets love. These two propositions have seemed evident to thinkers and poets across the Western literary tradition. Plato writes that “anyone that love touches instantly becomes a poet.” And even today, when poetry has largely disappeared from the mainstream of popular culture, it retains its romantic associations. But why should this be so—what are the connections between poetry and erotic love that lead us to associate them so strongly with one another? An examination of different theories of both love and poetry across the centuries reveals that the connection between them is not merely an accident of cultural history—the result of our having grown up hearing, or hearing about, love poetry—but something more intrinsic. Even as definitions of them have changed, the two phenomena have consistently been described in parallel terms. Love is characterized by paradox. Above all, it is both necessarily public, because interpersonal, and intensely private; hence it both requires expression and resists it. In poetry, especially lyric poetry, which features its own characteristic paradoxes and silences, love finds a natural outlet. This study considers both the theories and the love poems themselves, bringing together a wide range of examples from different eras in order to examine the major structures that love and poetry share. It does not aim to be a comprehensive history of Western love poetry, but an investigation into the meaning and function of recurrent tropes, forms, and images employed by poets to express and describe erotic love.


Author(s):  
Sharon D. Welch

Assaults on truth and divisions about the nature of wise governance are not momentary political challenges, unique to particular moments in history. Rather, they demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in human reasoning and core dangers in ways of construing both individual freedom and cohesive communities. It will remain an ongoing challenge to learn to deal rationally with what is an intrinsic irrationality in human cognition and with what is an intrinsic tendency toward domination and violence in human collectivities. In times of intense social divisions, it is vital to consider the ways in which humanism might function as the social norm by, paradoxically, functioning in a way different from other social norms. Humanism is not the declaration that a certain set of values or norms are universally valid. At its best and most creative, humanism is not limited to a particular set of norms, but is, rather, the commitment to a certain process in which norms are continuously created, critically evaluated, implemented, sustained or revised. Humanism is a process of connection, perception, implementation, and critique, and it applies this process as much to itself as to other traditions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Samidi Khalim

Islam Kejawen here is meant as Islam as practiced in the Kingdom of Java. A reflection of Islam Kejawen can be seen in the works of literature written by the kingdom poets. This paper raises thoughts of Kraton Surakarta poet, Ngabehi Sastrawijaya, who lived during the reign of Paku Buwana III and Paku Buwana IV. The works of Sastrawijaya analyzed are Suluk Sajatining Salat and Suluk Salat Sarengat Tarekat Hakekat Makripat stored in the library of the Kingdom of Surakarta Museum, Museum Sasana Pustaka. This article analyzes the text to reveal both the meaning and function of the suluk for Islam Kejawen practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-194
Author(s):  
Joanne Dono ◽  
Caroline Miller ◽  
Kerry Ettridge ◽  
Carlene Wilson

Abstract A systematic scoping review of anti-smoking mass media campaign literature provided opportunity to explore how social normative theories and constructs are used to influence smoking cessation. Synthesis of findings was constrained by significant heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the results indicate that a broader conceptualization of social norm is worthy of further exploration. Perceptions of what others think and do contributed in multiple ways to the relationship between anti-smoking messaging and quitting outcomes. Furthermore, integrating research on social norms, social identity and communication may improve understanding of why quitting intentions are enhanced in some circumstances but reactance and counter-arguing responses corresponding to lower quitting intentions occur in others. Integrating a broader theoretical understanding of normative influences into campaign development and evaluation may prove useful in demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach in behaviour change campaigns.


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