The Delineation of the History of Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 67-75
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter assesses the proper delineation of the object of the study of the historian of philosophy, which has always been a problem, however one conceived of this study and whatever conception of philosophy one may have had. It considers how the historian can know what belongs to his history and what does not without presuming to know, without taking a position on the philosophical question, what philosophy is. One reason why this is an enormous subject is that the history of philosophy is but one aspect of general history, a strand of developments within general history, in any case so closely intertwined with other developments in general history, or with the development of other social factors, that in order to have a complete understanding of the history of philosophy one will also have to take into account all these connections and dependencies. The chapter deals with this problem by distinguishing between an internal and an external history of philosophy. The internal history of philosophy will be the history of philosophy accounted for, as far as this is possible in terms of purely philosophical considerations, rather than by factors and developments outside philosophy.

2021 ◽  
pp. 76-84
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter addresses the internal history of philosophy. This is the history of philosophy explained in terms of the philosophical enterprise itself, as it is conceived and pursued at each time; that is, the history of philosophy explained in terms of the actual philosophical considerations that made philosophy evolve the way it did, to the extent that the history can be explained this way. It can be called ‘internal’ because it tries, as far as possible, to explain the course of development in terms of considerations internal to philosophy, as opposed to factors outside philosophy; for instance, social pressures of some kind or another. In contrast to the internal history of philosophy, one may call a history of philosophy ‘external’ if it describes and explains the history of philosophy insofar as it is shaped by social factors outside philosophy. This distinction is not supposed to be exhaustive of all work on the history of philosophy, though it could easily be redefined to be exhaustive by just subsuming everything that does not belong to the internal history (e.g. psychological or biological studies) under the heading of ‘external history’.


Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

Why is history more central to the study of philosophy than of mathematics or science? ‘Using the history of philosophy’ argues for the importance of history for giving students ideas to build on, whereas mathematics and science tend to focus on new ideas. Alan Turing invented his universal computing machines in response to a philosophical question. History gives us evidence of whether ideas were any good, through accounts of contemporary support or opposition, and how they have fared since. The battle of ideas between religious and scientific world views has been fought within philosophy. Has contemporary philosophy absorbed all the significant insights of earlier work?


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Davide Sparti

Obwohl jede menschliche Handlung mit einem gewissen Grad an Improvisation erfolgt, gibt es kulturelle Praktiken, bei denen Improvisation eine überwiegende Rolle spielt. Um das Risiko zu vermeiden, einen zu breiten Begriff von Improvisation zu übernehmen, konzentriere ich mich im vorliegenden Beitrag auf den Jazz. Meine zentrale Frage lautet, wie Improvisation verstanden werden muss. Mein Vorgehen ist folgendes: Ich beginne mit einem Vergleich von Improvisation und Komposition, damit die Spezifizität der Improvisation erklärt werden kann. Danach wende ich mich dem Thema der Originalität als Merkmal der Improvisation zu. Zum Schluss führe ich den Begriff affordance ein, um die kollektive und zirkuläre Logik eines Solos zu analysieren. Paradigmatisch wird der Jazzmusiker mit dem Engel der Geschichte verglichen, der nur auf das Vergangene blickt, während er der Zukunft den Rücken zugekehrt hat, und lediglich ihr zugetrieben wird. Weder kann der Improvisierende das Material der Vergangenheit vernachlässigen noch seine genuine Tätigkeit, das Improvisieren in der Gegenwart und für die Zukunft, aufgeben: Er visiert die Zukunft trotz ihrer Unvorhersehbarkeit über die Vermittlung der Vergangenheit an.<br><br>While improvised behavior is so much a part of human existence as to be one of its fundamental realities, in order to avoid the risk of defining the act of improvising too broadly, my focus here will be upon one of the activities most explicitly centered around improvisation – that is, upon jazz. My contribution, as Wittgenstein would say, has a »grammatical« design to it: it proposes to clarify the significance of the term »improvisation.« The task of clarifying the cases in which one may legitimately speak of improvisation consists first of all in reflecting upon the conditions that make the practice possible. This does not consist of calling forth mysterious, esoteric processes that take place in the unconscious, or in the minds of musicians, but rather in paying attention to the criteria that are satisfied when one ascribes to an act the concept of improvisation. In the second part of my contribution, I reflect upon the logic that governs the construction of an improvised performance. As I argue, in playing upon that which has already emerged in the music, in discovering the future as they go on (as a consequence of what they do), jazz players call to mind the angel in the famous painting by Klee that Walter Benjamin analyzed in his Theses on the History of Philosophy: while pulled towards the future, its eyes are turned back towards the past.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document