From Psychology to Philosophy
Calls to develop a framework for ‘non-ideal epistemology’ have recently gained traction in philosophical discourse, but little detail has yet been offered as to what this might involve. This chapter aims to remedy this shortcoming, both as a broader theoretical development and with specific view toward the epistemology of prejudice. Specifically,this chapter develops the notion of non-ideal epistemology along two dimensions. Along one dimension, constraints arising from distinctive capacity limitations of the human mind (“endogenous non-ideality”) are considered. In another dimension, constraints arising from specific limitations on the information environments that epistemic agents are forced to operate within (“exogenous non-ideality”) are considered. Taking a non-ideal approach to epistemology does not, however, mean giving up on epistemic normativity altogether: to the contrary, this chapter argues that non-ideal epistemology provides the only way for such norms to provide a genuine critical grip on human cognition at all.