The Impact of the European Court of Justice on Neighbouring Countries

This book explores the impact of the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) outside the borders of the EU on the legal systems of countries in the European neighbourhood. Considering that ‘export’ of some of the acquis communautaire to neighbouring countries appears to be an EU policy objective, and that legal approximation provisions are included in all of the EU’s agreements with these countries, one must ask whether this objective applies also to EU case law, or only to written laws and regulations. If actual harmonization of rules and standards is desired, the rules must be interpreted and implemented similarly to how this is done in the EU. And where CJEU judgments are cited and followed in neighbouring countries, what are the factors bringing about such influence? Is it a result of these international obligations of legal approximation, or are other, more unilateral and spontaneous modes of influence of CJEU judgments at work, such as territorial extension or the ‘Brussels Effect’? We have brought together scholars from the countries involved who have each explored, documented, and analysed the extent of citing of CJEU judgments in their respective country and assessed what influence such judgments have had on their legal systems. The contributions cover the legal systems of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Russia, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine, and also the Eurasian Economic Union. There are also chapters on the modes of external influence of the CJEU, and on how the CJEU uses external sources.

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-486
Author(s):  
Elizaveta Samoilova

Abstract With all eyes on the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, another pandemic has been growing in the shadows: violence against women. The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention creates a legal framework in order to protect women against all forms of violence. Its ratification process, however, has faced considerable challenges, particularly in the Central and Eastern European Member States. This article discusses the basic elements of the Istanbul Convention, reflects on the ratification process in the EU and its Member States, and sets out the main legal issues raised in the European Parliament’s request for an opinion (A-1/19 of 22 November 2019) to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Special focus is put on the choice of the correct EU legal basis and the practices of ‘splitting’ and ‘common accord’. This article argues that the European Parliament’s request for an opinion provides the perfect opportunity for the Court of Justice of the European Union to further clarify the law and the practice of concluding mixed agreements by the EU and its Member States.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
Fabio Giuffrida

This contribution examines whether the principles laid down in M.A.S., M.B. (‘ Taricco II’) may play a role in some forthcoming decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In Scialdone, the Court will be asked to strike a balance between the effectiveness of national legislation on VAT offences and the principle of lex mitior. The key difference between Taricco and Scialdone lies in the fact that the lex mitior principle, unlike the regulation of the statute of limitation, falls within the scope of the principle of legality at the European level. Kolev concerns instead an alleged incompatibility between Article 325 TFEU and the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike Taricco, therefore, the CJEU will have to deal with national rules that form part of procedural criminal law. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the Court may reach a Taricco II-like conclusion (i.e. disapplication in theory, exception to the disapplication in practice), especially if the reasoning of the CJEU will rely on the importance of foreseeability and legal certainty in criminal matters. These same principles could lead the CJEU, in Menci, not to endorse the partial revirement of the European Court of Human Rights in the A. and B v. Norway ruling and, as a consequence, not to lower the EU standard of protection of the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence.


Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2019 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Roberto Reyes Izquierdo

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been a fundamental factor in the integration process of the European Union, in spite of the obstacles posed by the intergovernmental dynamics that have traditionally hindered the construction of a stronger, cohesive and more integrated Europe. Important principles such as direct effect or supremacy of EU law have been developed through ECJ rulings and case law, even when such principles were not literally foreseen in the foundational Treaties. Therefore, this paper argues that the role and power of the Court as an “indirect law-maker” have been essential for the construction of the European Union, and this has been possible due to the complexities and weaknesses of the legislative process involving the three main decision-makers: the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament.


Author(s):  
Fabiana Accardo

The purpose of this article is that to explain the impact of the landmark decision Schrems c. Data Protection Commissioner [Ireland] - delivered on 7 October 2015 (Case C-362/2014 EU) by the Court of Justice - on the European scenario. Starting from a brief analysis of the major outcomes originated from the pronunciation of the Court of Justice, then it tries to study the level of criticality that the Safe Harbor Agreement and the subsequently adequacy Commission decision 2000/520/EC – that has been invalidated with Schrems judgment – have provoked before this pronunciation on the matter of safeguarding personal privacy of european citizens when their personal data are transferred outside the European Union, in particular the reference is at the US context. Moreover it focuses on the most important aspects of the new EU-US agreement called Privacy Shield: it can be really considered the safer solution for data sharing in the light of the closer implementation of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679, which will take the place of the Directive 95 /46/CE on the EU data protection law?


Author(s):  
Anna Moskal

The co-respondent mechanism in the view of accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human RightsFor the past seventy years there have been discussions and activities on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. The ratio of the Union’s accession to the Convention is a need to harmonize the European system of protection of individual rights. There are numerous problems and obstacles to achieve this goal created by the specific, supra-national character of the Union sui generis. It requires the introduction of unique mechanisms and procedures that would allow an international organization such as the EU to become a party to the Convention. One such procedure is provided in art. 3 of the draft agreement, the co-respondent mechanism of the European Union and the Member State in proceedings under the European Court of Human Rights. The purpose of the article is to present the allegations of the Court of Justice, assess their validity and indicate possible future solutions regarding the co-respondent mechanism. After analyzing the European Commission’s request for an opinion on the compliance of the draft agreement with community law, the CJEU considered the draft as incompatible with EU law and listed ten issues that prevented the Union from joining the Convention in the proposed form. Among them, as many as three points refer to the corresponding mechanism and concern in particular the decision on the validity of the conclusions of the Union or a Member State by the Strasbourg Court, accepting joint liability and deciding on the division of responsibility between the Union and the Member State. In the article dogmatic method was used in order to analyze three aforementioned points. Due to the provision of art. 218 par. 11 p. 2 TFEU, the Commission is bound by the opinion of the Court of Justice, and that the presented draft agreement cannot constitute an international agreement allowing for the accession of the Union to the Convention in the proposed form.


2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Verena Murshetz

Recent developments regarding criminal matters within the European Union (EU) show a trend towards a supranational criminal competence, which could be realised before the entry into force of the European Constitution whose future is uncertain. The strongest indicators in this development are two judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), one that extends the powers of the European Community (EC) over the protection of the environment through criminal sanctions  and the other applying the principle of conforming interpretation to framework decisions . This trend is questionable though, as the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) does not confer a criminal competence upon the EC. The third pillar containing criminal matters is intergovernmental in nature. This article critically discusses the recent trend and presents arguments against an implied supranational criminal law within the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-61
Author(s):  
Tünde Tátrai

Understanding and implementing European public procurement directives does not mean that countries that joined the European Union at a later stage were immediately able to adjust to their logic. It is not necessarily a problem of skills; cumbersome and slow learning is due much more to cultural differences, and lack of practice and knowledge of the interpretation of law by the European Court of Justice. This article sums up the results of four surveys presenting the changes in Hungary’s public procurement culture over 10 years, which has a useful message for other more recent Member States.


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