Plato’s “Two Worlds” Epistemology
How should we set about understanding epistêmê and doxa? Plato in fact offers us explicit instructions, in the famous “powers” argument of Republic V: he seems to say that each is to be defined as the cognition of a special kind of object. But there is a difficulty: over the past half-century, this interpretation—the “Two Worlds” or “Distinct Objects” reading—has been so widely questioned as to now be declared “outrageous.” The aim of this chapter is to shift the burden of proof onto those who reject that reading. I explain the debate, mount textual evidence and, through a survey of Plato scholarship over the past 2400 years, and a brief discussion of Distinct Objects epistemologies in other thinkers, argue that resistance to the Distinct Objects reading is motivated largely by the assumption that Plato must be talking about knowledge and belief as we understand them now.