Business Interests and State Autonomy in India

2020 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Rob Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Global Market ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
The Rich

Given the striking increases in the wealth and stature of India’s private sector over the past quarter century, we may expect its role to have changed from that outlined The Political Economy of India (PEDI). Such a conclusion is incorrect. First, despite the considerable deregulation of the Indian economy that has taken place, state elites still enjoy significant autonomy in policymaking. Second, while industrial capital has expanded faster than the other two dominant propriety classes, the rich farmers and professionals have developed in ways that make them formidable political counterweights to industrial capital. Third, although the state elite’s vision of ‘the national interest’ has evolved toward embracing private capital and the global market, the extent of big business hegemony over public discourse and policy should not be overstated.

Political Economy Approaches

2019 ◽  
pp. 124-131
Author(s):  
Frank Bönker
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Economics And Politics

This chapter discusses two strands of transformation research that focus on the interaction of economics and politics and start from the assumption of rational, self-interested actors. The political economy of policy reform approach deals with the political preconditions for successful large-scale economic reforms. It emerged from the analysis of economic reforms in developing countries in the 1980s, played a major role in the analysis—and the design—of economic reforms in postcommunist transition countries in the 1990s, but has lost importance since. The second strand of transformation research discussed in the chapter addresses the economic origins of democracy and dictatorship. Two distinct yet complementary approaches can be identified—one focusing on the struggle between the rich and the poor, the other emphasizing conflicts between the governing elite and the citizens.

scholarly journals THE PROTECTION OF THE RICH AGAINST THE POOR: THE POLITICS OF ADAM SMITH’S POLITICAL ECONOMY

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Culture ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
General Attitude ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Natural Forms ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Point Of Departure

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.

Class Politics, American-Style

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Waddell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Political Science ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

The Political Economy of the Market

2020 ◽  
pp. 57-69
Author(s):  
Itir Ozer-Imer ◽  
Derya Guler Aydin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Static Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Market Process ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Dynamic Framework ◽  
Modern Period ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Social Concerns

In the modern period, there are two concerns regarding the nature of the market. One is associated with market structures that involve solely the economic sphere and exclude all other factors including historical, social, and institutional ones. Hence, it conducts a static analysis, while the other relates the market process with all the aforementioned factors in addition to the economic ones, and therefore, combines economic and non-economic spheres, and the analysis becomes dynamic. This chapter scrutinizes the conceptualization of the market; that is whether the market is considered as a “structure” or a “process”. With this consideration, authors relate the conceptualization of the market with the type of competition. When the market is regarded as a “process”, it is possible to claim that market becomes an “institution”. Thus, by taking the market as an institution and considering competition within a dynamic framework, the emergent economic theoretical structure provides an in-depth, comprehensive, analytical, and novel approach to real economic and social concerns.

Political Economy of the Green Innovations in the Construction Industry

2021 ◽  
pp. 527-546
Author(s):  
Begum Sertyesilisik
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Environmental Footprint ◽  
Industry Needs

Green innovations are important in enhancing sustainability performance of the industries and of their outputs. They can influence the carbon emissions, energy efficiency of the industries affecting global green trade, and energy policies. Construction industry is one of the main industries contributing to the global economy and sustainable development. It has, however, bigger environmental footprint than majority of the other industries. Green innovations can contribute to the reduction in the environmental footprint of the construction industry. For this reason, green innovation in the construction industry needs to be supported by the effective policies. This chapter aims to introduce and investigate the political economy of the green innovations in the construction industry. This chapter emphasizes that the effectiveness of the green innovations in the construction industry can be fostered by effective political economy and strategies.

Constellations of Power and Authority in the Political Economy of Illegal Timber Extraction in BTAD, Assam

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 146-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anwesha Dutta ◽  
Bert Suykens
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Field Research ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Commodity Chain ◽  
Wildlife Protection ◽  
Authority Structure ◽  
Timber Trade ◽  
Preferential Access ◽  
Power And Authority

This article seeks to comprehend the way the illegal timber economy in the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Council (BTAD) in Assam is integrated within a constellation of power and authority. Based on over ten months of ethnographic field research, our analysis shows that the timber trade is indeed characterized by what can be conceptualized as an excess of sovereignty. However, a burdened agency is still exercised by those in the timber trade. Moreover, the authority structure consisting of state, rebel and non-armed actors do not directly engage violently in the trade, but are more interested in taxation, governance, or indeed wildlife protection, showing the other side of this multiple authoruty structure. As the article shows, different ethnic groups, which are often thought to be diametrically opposed to each other, collaborate in the local timber commodity chain. However, these collaborations are characterized by highly unequal relations of exchange. As we argue, those that have preferential access to the authority structure can use this to dictate the terms of interaction. Finally, while the timber economy is usually characterized by the operation of the constellation of power and authority, there are interstitial moments where the (violent) interactions among the actors embeded in the structure weaken the direct territorial control by them. As a result, times of violence are often also those in which the trade can flourish.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Machine Tools ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Social Concerns

International trade seems to be a subject where the advice of economists is routinely disregarded. Economists are nearly unanimous in their general opposition to protectionism, but the increase in U.S. protection in recent years in such sectors as automobiles, steel, textiles and apparel, machine tools, footwear and semiconductors demonstrates that economists lack political influence on trade policy. Two broad approaches have been developed to analyze the political economics of trade policy and the processes that generate protectionism. One approach emphasizes the economic self-interest of the political participants, while the other stresses the importance of the broad social concerns of voters and public officials. This paper outlines the nature of the two approaches, indicating how they can explain the above anomalies and other trade policy behavior, and concludes with observations about integrating the two frameworks, conducting further research, and making policy based on the analysis.

The Political Economy of Land Reform in China's “Newly Liberated Areas”: Evidence from Wuxi County

2008 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 675-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-Sing Kung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Land Inequality ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Farm Survey ◽  
Class Status ◽  
The Rich

AbstractA farm survey conducted in Wuxi county in the 1950s found that the Chinese Communist Party had successfully “preserved the rich peasant economy” in the “newly liberated areas”: the landlords were indeed the only social class whose properties had been redistributed, yet without compromising on the magnitude of benefits received by the poor peasants. A higher land inequality in that region, coupled with an inter-village transfer of land, allowed these dual goals to be achieved. Our study further reveals that class status was determined both by the amount of land a household owned and whether it had committed certain “exploitative acts,” which explains why some landlords did not own a vast amount of land. Conversely, it was the amount of land owned, not class status, that determined redistributive entitlements, which was why 15 per cent of the poor peasants and half of the middle peasants were not redistributed any land.

scholarly journals Class Politics, American-Style

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 654-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Pontusson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Political Science ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson'sWinner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Classis both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue ofThe American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers ofPerspectives on Politicswill know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels'sUnequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.”Winner-Take-All Politicsthus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

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