The Political Economy of Land Reform in China's “Newly Liberated Areas”: Evidence from Wuxi County

2008 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 675-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-Sing Kung

AbstractA farm survey conducted in Wuxi county in the 1950s found that the Chinese Communist Party had successfully “preserved the rich peasant economy” in the “newly liberated areas”: the landlords were indeed the only social class whose properties had been redistributed, yet without compromising on the magnitude of benefits received by the poor peasants. A higher land inequality in that region, coupled with an inter-village transfer of land, allowed these dual goals to be achieved. Our study further reveals that class status was determined both by the amount of land a household owned and whether it had committed certain “exploitative acts,” which explains why some landlords did not own a vast amount of land. Conversely, it was the amount of land owned, not class status, that determined redistributive entitlements, which was why 15 per cent of the poor peasants and half of the middle peasants were not redistributed any land.

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.


2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Gersbach ◽  
Lars-H. R. Siemers

We examine the nexus between land transfers and human capital formation. A sequence of land redistributions enables the beneficiaries to educate their children and thus to escape from poverty. A successful land reform allows the transition of a society from an agriculture-based state of poverty to a human capital–based developed economy. We find that a temporary state of inequality among the poor is unavoidable. Finally, we discuss the political economy of land reform, whether access to land markets should be allowed for beneficiaries of land reforms, and property rights issues.


Author(s):  
Frank Bönker

This chapter discusses two strands of transformation research that focus on the interaction of economics and politics and start from the assumption of rational, self-interested actors. The political economy of policy reform approach deals with the political preconditions for successful large-scale economic reforms. It emerged from the analysis of economic reforms in developing countries in the 1980s, played a major role in the analysis—and the design—of economic reforms in postcommunist transition countries in the 1990s, but has lost importance since. The second strand of transformation research discussed in the chapter addresses the economic origins of democracy and dictatorship. Two distinct yet complementary approaches can be identified—one focusing on the struggle between the rich and the poor, the other emphasizing conflicts between the governing elite and the citizens.


2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-382
Author(s):  
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis

Socio-economic justice lies in the normative core of Islam. The concepts of fard-al-kifāyah and zakāh reveal its commitment to protect the poor from the arbitrariness of the rich and treat the state as an institution that maximises collective welfare. The political economy of Safavid Iran indicates that the establishment of Islam as Iran’s state religion facilitated the empire’s administrative modernisation, economic development and class formation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that religion did not only offer legitimacy grounds to the Safavid government. It also provided institutional incentives that transformed clerics into intermediaries between people and the Imperial Court, improved fiscal capacity and increased general trust toward the central government.


1975 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 631-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byung-Joon Ahn

The establishent of the Chinese rural people's commune in 1958 as a new political and economic organization has aroused considerable interest among observers. One important question in this regard has been the role the commune has played in China's modernization. Since China is committed to both “socialist transformation and construction,” modernization in China involves two tasks: revolution and development. As for China's rural problems, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards the commune as the best organization for achieving these two goals during its transition to communism. Yet the commune has undergone a series of changes as a result of interactions between the Party's revolutionary goals and its development requirements, presenting a microcosm of Chinese communism. This article is an attempt to account for changes and continuities in the political economy of the commune.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Waddell

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Timofey Rakov

This article analyses practices related to the cult of Lenin in the confines of the Leningrad party organisation of the RCP(b) and its influence on innerparty discussions and political disagreements. The author aims to examine how appeal to the cult and Leninism helped shape the position of the Leningrad Bolsheviks led by G. E. Zinoviev. To achieve this goal, the author refers to a variety of sources, i. e. the works of the leaders of the Leningrad party organisation, such pamphlets by G. I. Safarov and G. E. Evdokimov, minutes of district party conferences, etc. The sources listed above suggest that the terms “testament,” “heritage,” and “task” used in party discourse symbolise a set of actions and principles, following and being faithful to which allowed party members to comply with the correct political line. For representatives of the Leningrad opposition, this meant relying on the poor and middle strata of the village. The category of practice mentioned in the title of this article means that attention was paid not so much to the function of quotations or clichéd phrases but rather to what party groups implied when quoting Lenin’s statements. The term “cult”, which historiography usually employs to describe the veneration of V. I. Lenin as the leader of the party, does not reflect the entirety of this process or take into account its productive component, namely, the fact that, because of its heterogeneity, Leninism allowed members of the Communist Party to pay attention to diverse aspects of Lenin’s heritage. In the course of the polemic surrounding issues facing the party (politics in the countryside, the possibility of building socialism in a single country, etc.), the Leningrad Bolsheviks turned to Leninism as a range of ideas legitimising their political position and as a tool for identifying the Bolsheviks who, in contrast to the Leningraders, “deviated” from the correct political line.


Modern China ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Trevaskes

This article explores the political significance of “governing the nation in accordance with the law” 依法治国 ( yifa zhiguo) in the Xi Jinping era. It examines party statements and propaganda about the necessity of exercising party leadership over all key aspects of law-based governance, particularly the politico-legal system. The aim is to understand the strategic need for yifa zhiguo as part of the ideological repertoire of the Xi leadership. The argument is that yifa zhiguo is essentially an ideological and strategic message about power relations under Xi and the capacity of the party to withstand various threats to its credibility and thus ultimately to bring about the nation’s and party’s rejuvenation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Satriono Priyo Utomo

During the leadership of President Sukarno, China had an important meaning not only for the people of Indonesia but also as a source of political concept from the perspective of Sukarno. In addition, China also had significance for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a meeting room prior to communist ideology. The paper employs literary study method and discusses about diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China during the Guidance Democracy ( 1949-1965). The relationship between two countries at that time exhibited closeness between Sukarno and Mao Tse Tung. The political dynamics at that time brought the spirit of the New Emerging Forces. Both leaders relied on mass mobilization politics in which Mao used the Chinese Communist Party while Sukarno used the PKI.Keywords: Indonesia, China, diplomacy, politics, ideology, communism


Urban Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 1164-1183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Bassett

In August 2010, Kenyans voted to adopt a new Constitution. Amongst its many provisions was devolved governance, which established 47 independent counties each led by a directly elected governor and legislative assembly. The Constitution also sought to address the country’s ‘land question’ by radically reworking land institutions and administration. The Constitution introduced an independent body, the National Land Commission, empowered to oversee public land management and allocation. Constitutional provisions devolved significant powers and responsibilities in land management and planning to the county level. These reforms – stressing transparency, accountability and greater community participation in land planning and administration – were intended to halt endemic corruption at the Ministry of Lands, address land injustices, enhance tenure security, and facilitate better-functioning land markets. This paper examines the unfolding institutional reform around land pursuant to the 2010 Constitution. It explores the political economy of land in Kenya by examining incentives for and impediments to institutional change toward better land management and long sought-after land justice. As with many reforms adopted throughout the Global South, Kenya’s land reforms were premised on ‘getting the incentives right’. Incentivising behaviour is extremely complicated in a sector as complex, dynamic and profitable as the land sector. The research highlights the role of urban planners, actors rarely examined in the literature on Kenya’s land politics. Kenya’s faltering land reform is a result of the internal conflicting incentives of land actors and the fact that no legal reform will be sufficient to alter entrenched behaviour without renewed pressure from a broad-based land justice/human rights movement.


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