Political Economy Approaches

2019 ◽  
pp. 124-131
Author(s):  
Frank Bönker
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Economics And Politics

This chapter discusses two strands of transformation research that focus on the interaction of economics and politics and start from the assumption of rational, self-interested actors. The political economy of policy reform approach deals with the political preconditions for successful large-scale economic reforms. It emerged from the analysis of economic reforms in developing countries in the 1980s, played a major role in the analysis—and the design—of economic reforms in postcommunist transition countries in the 1990s, but has lost importance since. The second strand of transformation research discussed in the chapter addresses the economic origins of democracy and dictatorship. Two distinct yet complementary approaches can be identified—one focusing on the struggle between the rich and the poor, the other emphasizing conflicts between the governing elite and the citizens.

scholarly journals THE PROTECTION OF THE RICH AGAINST THE POOR: THE POLITICS OF ADAM SMITH’S POLITICAL ECONOMY

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Culture ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
General Attitude ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Natural Forms ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Point Of Departure

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.

scholarly journals KONSEP HAK MILIK DALAM EKONOMI ISLAM

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-207
Author(s):  
AN Ras Try Astuti ◽  
Andi Faisal
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Economic System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The World ◽  
Joint Ownership ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Individual

Capitalism as an economic system that is implemented by most countries in the world today, in fact it gave birth to injustice and social inequalityare increasingly out of control. Social and economic inequalities are felt both between countries (developed and developing countries) as well as insociety itself (the rich minority and the poor majority). The condition is born from the practice of departing from faulty assumptions about the man. In capitalism the individual to own property released uncontrollably, causing a social imbalance. On the other hand, Islam never given a state model that guarantees fair distribution of ownership for all members of society, ie at the time of the Prophet Muhammad established the Islamic government in Medina. In Islam, the private ownership of property was also recognized but not absolute like capitalism. Islam also recognizes the forms of joint ownership for the benefit of society and acknowledges the ownership of the state that aims to create a balance and social justice.

After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico

1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Neoliberal Reforms ◽  
Market Governance ◽  
Neoliberal Policies ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
New Institutions

Neoliberal economic reforms, rather than unleashing market forces, can result in new institutions for market governance. By vacating institutionalized policy domains, neoliberal reforms can trigger two-step reregulation processes, as first, political entrepreneurs launch projects to build support coalitions by reregulating markets, and second, societal groups respond to these projects by mobilizing to influence the terms of reregulation. Depending on the strengths and strategies of politicians and societal groups, reregulation processes result in varied institutions for market governance. The article develops this argument by analyzing how neoliberal reforms in Mexico led to the construction of distinct institutions for market governance across four states (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla). The findings from Mexico highlight the importance of moving beyond the questions of why developing countries choose neoliberal policies and how they implement them. Students of the political economy of development should shift their attention instead to understanding the kinds of new institutions that replace those destroyed or displaced by neoliberal reforms.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Insights from Southeast Asia

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hal Hill
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Economics And Politics ◽  
Political Economy Of Reform

Economists broadly agree on many key economic policy issues, but economics as a discipline has provided much less guidance on why and how economic policy reform occurs and how to develop institutional mechanisms that enable governments to adopt “good” economic policy. Political scientists are adept at identifying coalitions, constituencies, institutions, and interest groups, but they less commonly examine the implications for economic policy. Thus, work at the intersection between economics and politics—of why and how policy reform takes place—remains relatively unexplored territory. This is especially so in developing countries where political processes are more personalistic, institutions often less well established, outcomes more fluid, and the detailed case study literature on economic policy making still in its infancy. This paper provides an analytical survey of economic policy reform in Southeast Asia. It ranges across the major policy U-turns and the incremental reforms, with special reference to macroeconomic management and trade policy. On the basis of several case studies and set against the broader international literature, we advance nine conclusions on the political economy of reform.

The Political Economy of Land Reform in China's “Newly Liberated Areas”: Evidence from Wuxi County

2008 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 675-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-Sing Kung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Land Inequality ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Farm Survey ◽  
Class Status ◽  
The Rich

AbstractA farm survey conducted in Wuxi county in the 1950s found that the Chinese Communist Party had successfully “preserved the rich peasant economy” in the “newly liberated areas”: the landlords were indeed the only social class whose properties had been redistributed, yet without compromising on the magnitude of benefits received by the poor peasants. A higher land inequality in that region, coupled with an inter-village transfer of land, allowed these dual goals to be achieved. Our study further reveals that class status was determined both by the amount of land a household owned and whether it had committed certain “exploitative acts,” which explains why some landlords did not own a vast amount of land. Conversely, it was the amount of land owned, not class status, that determined redistributive entitlements, which was why 15 per cent of the poor peasants and half of the middle peasants were not redistributed any land.

Large Screens, Third Screens, Virtuality, and Innovation

2013 ◽  
pp. 75-91
Author(s):  
Sean Cubitt
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Digital Media ◽  
Social Participation ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Places ◽  
Mp3 Players ◽  
Screen Space ◽  
Technical Standardization

This article appears in the Oxford Handbook of Sound and Image in Digital Media edited by Carol Vernallis, Amy Herzog, and John Richardson. The development of large-scale screens in public places parallels the emergence of handheld screen devices (phones, tablets, MP3 players, games consoles), yet they seem to pull in opposite social directions: toward mass social participation and spectacle on one side, toward intimate, private experience and one-to-one communication on the other. Increasing commercialization of both types of screen, and the increasing technical standardization of screens in general, indicate a subordination of screen aesthetics to the extraction of wealth and to the extension of control. This essay analyzes the political economy of contemporary screens as ground for an aesthetic that, while praising innovation, sacrifices the virtuality of screen technology—its capacity to become other. Drawing on research into transnational public screen space, it concludes optimistically with an account of possibilities emerging from the contradictory architecture of these forms of screen culture.

Business Interests and State Autonomy in India

2020 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Rob Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Global Market ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
The Rich

Given the striking increases in the wealth and stature of India’s private sector over the past quarter century, we may expect its role to have changed from that outlined The Political Economy of India (PEDI). Such a conclusion is incorrect. First, despite the considerable deregulation of the Indian economy that has taken place, state elites still enjoy significant autonomy in policymaking. Second, while industrial capital has expanded faster than the other two dominant propriety classes, the rich farmers and professionals have developed in ways that make them formidable political counterweights to industrial capital. Third, although the state elite’s vision of ‘the national interest’ has evolved toward embracing private capital and the global market, the extent of big business hegemony over public discourse and policy should not be overstated.

Compromising Islam with Empire: Bureaucracy and Class in Safavid Iran

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-382
Author(s):  
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Economic Justice ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Trust ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Imperial Court ◽  
The Rich

Socio-economic justice lies in the normative core of Islam. The concepts of fard-al-kifāyah and zakāh reveal its commitment to protect the poor from the arbitrariness of the rich and treat the state as an institution that maximises collective welfare. The political economy of Safavid Iran indicates that the establishment of Islam as Iran’s state religion facilitated the empire’s administrative modernisation, economic development and class formation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that religion did not only offer legitimacy grounds to the Safavid government. It also provided institutional incentives that transformed clerics into intermediaries between people and the Imperial Court, improved fiscal capacity and increased general trust toward the central government.

The effects of debt restructurings on income inequality in the developing world

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406612110014
Author(s):  
Glen Biglaiser ◽  
Ronald J. McGauvran
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Income Distribution ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Social Spending ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Impact

Developing countries, saddled with debts, often prefer investors absorb losses through debt restructurings. By not making full repayments, debtor governments could increase social spending, serving poorer constituents, and, in turn, lowering income inequality. Alternatively, debtor governments could reduce taxes and cut government spending, bolstering the assets of the rich at the expense of the poor. Using panel data for 71 developing countries from 1986 to 2016, we assess the effects of debt restructurings on societal income distribution. Specifically, we study the impact of debt restructurings on social spending, tax reform, and income inequality. We find that countries receiving debt restructurings tend to use their newly acquired economic flexibility to reduce taxes and lower social spending, worsening income inequality. The results are also robust to different model specifications. Our study contributes to the globalization and the poor debate, suggesting the economic harm caused to the less well-off following debt restructurings.

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