Aquinas

2020 ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Aquinas develops Aristotelian themes as a foundation for his account of the Christian virtues. The will is both rational, being directed towards the ultimate good, and free, being determined by practical reason about what contributes to the ultimate good. Virtue is the good use of free will; it requires both the appropriate training of the passions (the non-rational part of the soul) and the correct practical reason. Practical reason finds the first principles of the natural law (the rational principles that are suitable for human nature), and the action-guiding rules that specify the implications of the natural law for human beings with a social nature, and for human society. The virtues, embodying the natural law, guide us towards the good that is proper to human beings. They do not guide us all the way, because we are subject to the influence of the sins that turn us away from God. Divine grace moves our free will to overcome the effects of these sins, and to form the Christian virtues that lead us towards the complete good.

2021 ◽  
pp. 268-272
Author(s):  
Sarah Mortimer

This chapter draws together the themes of the book and looks forward to the later-seventeenth century. It argues that for much of the sixteenth century politics was subordinate to religion; temporal authorities needed the additional sanctions provided by religious belief if they were to exert any power over the consciences of individuals. The effect was to entangle temporal power in the deepening conflicts over religious truth, and thus to reveal the brittleness of any conception of political authority which relied on the support of the Church. At the same time, older traditions of political thought did not go away and often became stronger. The circulation of classical ideas, the discovery of new peoples, the growing interest in historical change and development all suggested alternative ways of legitimizing political power, often using natural law and avoiding any reliance on specifically Christian commitments. What happened in the early-seventeenth century, and most obviously in the writing of Hugo Grotius, was a move not only to ground political society in a particular conception of human nature (conceived of juridically, as a source of rights and obligations) but also to detach Christianity from that view of human nature. It was this understanding of human beings which enabled the development of a social contract tradition through the seventeenth century and beyond, and became an important source for modern liberalism. The questions it raised would help to shape the thought of the next century.


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


Author(s):  
Constance Y Lee

Abstract John Calvin (1509–64), a central figure in Reformed theology, is perhaps best known for his bleak doctrine of total human depravity. This dismal view of human reason has commonly overshadowed his statement that ‘some sparks still shine’. This article proposes that Calvin’s account of conscience, by conserving an illuminated space in human nature, makes possible a formal doctrine of natural law. Calvin enlists the interconnectedness between the knowledge of God and human reason to frame his anthropology. According to this, human reason was originally created to perfectly access knowledge of God but after the Fall, can only attain imperfect access. Within this broader framework, by adopting a dialectic of dual perspectives, Calvin maintains that, however fallen, human nature still partially reflects the Imago Dei as first intended. As through a glass darkly, this divine image is reflected in human conscience endowing it with sufficient knowledge for moral discernment. Calvin’s emphasis on ‘common grace’ in the preservation of this knowledge allows him to simultaneously maintain human ignorance and their universal accountability to objective norms. In this way, Calvin’s account of conscience enables him to hold both apparent extremes in tension: the immanent fallibility of human beings with the external normative standards they ought to pursue.


Author(s):  
Douglas L. Berger

In his fascinating 1836 volume On the Will in Nature, Schopenhauer demonstrates a familiarity with scholarship on classical Chinese thought that is, at best, glancing. He takes special interest, however, in a remark rendered from the Song Dynasty Confucian thinker Zhu Xi to the effect that the “will of human beings” is at the ground of all things, which suggests to him a deep resonance with his own system. Though there is nothing of substance to be found in this suspected connection, Schopenhauer may have been better advised to delve into Zhu’s reformulation of ancient Confucian formulations of compassion for an opportunity at cross-cultural dialogue. This chapter demonstrates that, while Zhu Xi’s inspiration for his explication of compassion, namely Mencius, took a far more naturalistic view of this moral feeling, Zhu’s commentarial reformulation of Mencius’s thought, which makes compassion a metaphysical manifestation of the basic patterns of human nature, may have prompted Schopenhauer to deeper confidence in his own convictions about the “intelligible character.”


Author(s):  
Allan Arkush

A Jewish disciple of Leibniz and Wolff, Mendelssohn strove throughout his life to uphold and strengthen their rationalist metaphysics while sustaining his ancestral religion. His most important philosophic task, as he saw it, was to refine and render more persuasive the philosophical proofs for the existence of God, providence and immortality. His major divergence from Leibniz was in stressing that ‘the best of all possible worlds’, which God had created, was in fact more hospitable to human beings than Leibniz had supposed. Towards the end of his life, the irrationalism of Jacobi and the critical philosophy of Kant shook Mendelssohn’s faith in the demonstrability of the fundamental metaphysical precepts, but not his confidence in their truth. They would have to be sustained by ‘common sense’, he reasoned, until future philosophers succeeded in restoring metaphysics to its former glory. While accepting Wolff’s teleological understanding of human nature and natural law, Mendelssohn placed far greater value on human freedom and outlined a political philosophy that protected liberty of conscience. His philosophic defence of his own religion stressed that Judaism is not a ‘revealed religion’ demanding acceptance of particular dogmas but a ‘revealed legislation’ requiring the performance of particular actions. The object of this divine and still valid legislation, he suggested, was often to counteract forces that might otherwise subvert the natural religion entrusted to us by reason. To resolve the tension between his own political liberalism and the Bible’s endorsement of religious coercion, Mendelssohn argued that contemporary Judaism, at any rate, no longer acknowledges any person’s authority to compel others to perform religious acts.


Author(s):  
Han-luen Kantzer Komline

By analyzing a variety of texts from across Augustine’s career, the book traces the development of Augustine’s thinking on the human will. Augustine’s most creative contributions to the notion of the human will do not derive from articulating a monolithic, universal definition. He identifies four types of human will: the created will, which he describes as a hinge; the fallen will, a link in a chain binding human beings to sin; the redeemed will, which is a root of love; and the fully free will, to be enjoyed in the next life, when perfection is made complete. His mature view is theologically differentiated, consisting of four distinct types of human will, which vary according to these diverse theological scenarios. His innovation consists in distinguishing these types with a detail and clarity unprecedented by any thinker before him. Augustine’s mature view of the will is constructed in intensive dialogue with other Christian thinkers and, most of all, with the Christian scriptures. Its basic features shape, and are shaped by, his doctrines of Christ and the Holy Spirit, as well as creation and grace, making it impossible to abstract his views on willing from his account of the central Christian doctrines of Christology, Pneumatology, and the Trinity. The multiple facets of Augustine’s conception of will have been cut to fit the shape of his theology and the biblical story it seeks to describe. From Augustine we inherit a theological account of the will.


2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 292-304
Author(s):  
Nico den Bok

In the last decades naturalism, the view that everything works by complex natural processes, leaving free will an illusory phenomenon, has gained influence in the intellectual climate of the West. This article addresses this issue from an unusual angle: the almost forgotten debate about the will(s) of Christ. It shows that classic Christian theology, during the course of its development, has come to articulate a non-naturalistic view of human nature, by stating that the nature ‘assumed’ by the second divine person includes a proper human free will. Theologically this means that, pace mainstream modern and postmodern orthodox theology, even in Christology human nature cannot be a mere instrument of God and his will.


Author(s):  
Shao Kai Tseng

Summary This article offers an exposition of Karl Barth’s actualistic reorientation of the Augustinian notions of original sin and the bondage of the will in § 60 and § 65 of Church Dogmatics IV/1–2. Barth redefines human nature as a total determination of the human being (Sein/Dasein) “from above” by the covenantal history of reconciliation. Human nature as such remains totally intact in the historical state of sin. The human being, however, is also determined “from below” by the Adamic world-history of total corruption. With this dialectical construal of sin and human nature, Barth redefines original sin as the radically sinful activities and decisions that determine the confinement of human beings to the historical condition of fallenness. Barth also challenges the famous Augustinian account of the bondage of the will to which original sin gives rise, and uses the present active indicative to express his actualistic reorientation of the Augustinian notion of the bondage: “non potest non peccare”.


Author(s):  
Jay L. Garfield

This chapter addresses the causes of the passions and their role in Hume’s psychology. I argue that the passions form the foundation of Hume’s naturalistic program to explain human nature and normativity. It also addresses the relationship between the passions and the idea of the freedom of the will, showing that the account of the passions undergirds Hume’s critique of the idea of freedom. This chapter also shows how central our social context is to the development of the passions, and to our psychology in general, in virtue of Hume’s argument that not only is our social nature determined by our passions, but that many of our passions are conditioned by social factors.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-108
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Scotus and Ockham reject the Aristotelian outlook, as Aquinas presents it, and develop a voluntarist account of the will and of morality. In their view, determination by practical reason does not ensure free will; a free will must be wholly undetermined by reason. Nor can it be determined by the desire for one’s ultimate good; the impulse towards the right is separate from the impulse towards happiness. If we apply these principles to the freedom of the divine will, we find that God could not be free if the nature of right and wrong were independent of the divine will. We must infer that moral rightness and wrongness are ultimately constituted by divine commands.


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