Highways

Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Dan Squires QC

Damages claims brought against public authorities responsible for the maintenance of highways are common. It has been suggested that claims brought against local authorities in their capacity as ‘highway authorities’ represent the largest number of claims they receive. This is unsurprising given the total number of accidents that occur on the roads. While most accidents may be the fault of individual drivers, some could have been averted if the authority responsible for the highway had acted carefully in its maintenance of roads, its provision of signs, its removal of ice etc. Claims arising in such circumstances are considered in this chapter. As we shall see, claims brought against highway authorities are predominantly framed as breaches of the statutory duty contained in the Highways Act 1980 rather than as common law negligence claims. Common law claims tend to operate as a residual category, and they are brought when damages are not available under the 1980 Act.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker

Abstract In this paper, I will examine the extent to which the common law of tort in England and Wales imposes a duty to prevent harm on public authorities and private individuals. As will be seen, the starting point for the common law is that such liability should, in both cases, be regarded as exceptional. This must, however, be weighed against duties to prevent harm that arise under the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty. Public authorities may also face claims that their failure to prevent harm is in breach of ECHR arts 2 or 3. While the law is complex, this paper identifies three key arguments that explain the current legal position at common law, namely that: (i) tort law should treat private and public parties alike: (ii) human rights claims should be treated as distinct from private law claims and (iii) libertarian concerns signify that a duty to prevent harm should be exceptional and needs to be justified. While these arguments provide both an explanation of and a justification for the current law, this article questions to what extent the treatment of public authority liability may be regarded as unduly harsh on vulnerable claimants.



2000 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
Janet O'Sullivan

ONE of the most difficult current problems for tort lawyers is the extent to which the normal rules of tort, developed over decades of litigation between private individuals, should apply in undiluted form to local and other public authorities. Most individuals have never seen a child drowning in a puddle or about to walk off a cliff, and would not hesitate to help them if they did, but public authorities, empowered by Parliament, are faced every day with the delicate and expensive task of protecting others from harm. It has become all too apparent, as the courts (domestic and European) grapple with the thorny question of when a common law duty of care should exist in the context of the careless exercise of, or failure to exercise, statutory powers, that the ordinary rules of negligence liability need considerable refinement to operate sensibly in such a political field. Moreover those difficulties and differences do not disappear merely because a tort other than negligence is involved, and this has been amply illustrated in three recent cases, each involving actions against local authorities in the tort of nuisance.



2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 787-823
Author(s):  
Claude Samson

This paper deals with the exclusive sale contract or solus agreement. Its first part identifies some characteristic features of this type of agreement, which quite often is not only aimed at regulating the exercise of trade, but also serves as a technique of market organization and economic power concentration. The impact of the increasing currency of such commercial practices on the free market justifies consideration of the various forms of control that can be exercised by public authorities in order to preserve free competition. Control can be achieved through the judiciary applying concepts such as public order in civil law or public policy at common law. However, in view of the courts' reluctance to interfere with such instances of private economic power and their indifference towards the economic inequities inherent in such agreements for the distributor, legislative intervention has become necessary to protect the free market. Thus the Combines Investigation Act was amended in 1976 to allow regulation of commercial practices such as refusal to deal, consignment selling, exclusive dealing, market restriction and tied selling.



2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Griffin ◽  
Gemma Briffa

In 2017 Victoria became the first Australian jurisdiction to initiate substantive reforms to its civil liability laws, to address barriers faced by plaintiffs seeking to hold institutions liable for child abuse. The new law, based on recommendations arising from a Victorian inquiry, establishes a statutory duty of care owed by organisations to take reasonable precautions against abuse of children under their care or supervision. On its face, the Wrongs Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2017 (Vic) looks like a helpful clarification of this complex area of law. However, when viewed within the context of the work of the Royal Commission on Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, as well as common law principles – particularly strict liability in the areas of non- delegable duty and vicarious liability, and the High Court decision of Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC – we see that barriers and uncertainties remain.



Legal Studies ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Brodie

X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council is by far the most important decision on the liability in negligence of public authorities since Anns v Merton London Borough Council. These two authorities, along with Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office, furnish the ground rules for such actions. The leading judgment in X v Bedfordshire CC, in which all his brethren concur, is given by Lord Browne- Wilkinson; the only other judgment being given by Lord Jauncey. The common thread running through this trilogy of cases is the emphasis on the significance of the element of discretion in the exercise of the statutory functions of a public authority: ‘Most statutes which impose a statutory duty on local authorities confer on the authority a discretion as to the extent to which, and the methods by which, such statutory duty is to be performed’.



2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-569
Author(s):  
Tom Cornford

AbstractIn this article I address the question of whether the omissions principle – the principle that the common law does not impose liability for omissions – applies with the same force in negligence cases involving public authority defendants as in cases involving private defendants. My argument is that the answer depends upon the answer to a prior question: can a duty of care be based upon the public law powers and duties of a public authority? In making my argument, I refute the views both of those who insist that a claim in negligence against a public authority can be rejected purely because it relates to an omission not falling within one of the standard exceptions to the omissions principle and of those who insist that such a claim can succeed while at the same denying that a duty of care can be based on a public authority's public law powers and duties.



Author(s):  
Max Loubser ◽  
Tamar Gidron

Both the Israeli and the South African legal systems are classified as mixed legal systems, or mixed jurisdictions. In Israel, tort law was originally pure English common law, adopted by legislation and later developed judicially. In South Africa, the law of delict (tort) was originally Roman-Dutch but was later strongly influenced by the English common law. Under both systems, tort law is characterized by open-ended norms allowing extensive judicial development. This paper traces and compares the structural basis, methodology, policy, and trends of the judicial development of state and public-authority liability in the Israeli and South African jurisdictions. Specific factors that have impacted the development of state- and public-authority liability are: (1) constitutional values, (2) the courts’ recognition of the need for expanded protection of fundamental human rights and activism towards achieving such protection, (3) the multicultural nature of the societies, (4) problems of crime and security, and (5) worldwide trends, linked to consumerism, toward the widening of liability of the state and public authorities.Within essentially similar conceptual structures the South African courts have been much more conservative in their approach to state liability for pure economic loss than their Israeli counterparts. This can perhaps be attributed to a sense of priorities. In a developing country with huge disparities in wealth, the courts would naturally be inclined to prioritize safety and security of persons above pure economic loss. The South African courts have been similarly more conservative in cases involving administrative negligence and evidential loss.The development of the law on state and public-authority liability in Israel and South Africa is also the product of factors such as the levels of education, the effectiveness of the public service, and the history and pervasiveness of constitutional ordering. Despite important differences, the law in the two jurisdictions has developed from a broadly similar mixed background; the courts have adopted broadly similar methods and reasoning; and the outcomes show broadly similar trends.



1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 341-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

It would be impossible in a short lecture to give a comprehensive survey of all the changes that have occurred in the last forty years in that branch of law known as “Israel common law”. I will not, therefore, try to do so. Instead, I wish to single out the most distinctive phenomenon in this area of law. I refer to the conceptual/intellectual revolution in the outlook of the court regarding the nature of its judicial function. The original view, according to which the sole function of the court in the area of public law is to decide disputes between citizens and public authorities, has been abandoned and replaced by an outlook that views the court as an institution responsible for the legality of public administration, or, as the court itself is accustomed to defining the matter, for the rule of law.I shall divide my discussion into two parts. In the first part I will briefly discuss the prominent changes that have occurred in the judicial decisions regarding public law in recent years, and the judicial philosophy underlying these changes.



1962 ◽  
Vol 2 (18) ◽  
pp. 490-494

Mr. G. C. Senn, delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross recently visited the central prison of Stanleyville, chief town of the Orientale Province of the Congo (formerly Belgian). At the time of the visit there were a total of 800 prisoners amongst whom numbered one hundred Katanga gendarmes captured by the National Congolese Army. There were in addition some thirty Congolese political detainees, the remainder being prisoners of common law. On this occasion Mr. Senn was given considerable facilities by the local authorities and especially by General Lundula, Commander of the Congolese forces stationed in Orientale Province. He received the nominal roll of the Katanga detainees which he transmitted to the military authorities of Elisabethville, which in turn informed the families concerned. He is awaiting replies from the latter which he will pass on to the prisoners.



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