Expressive Voting

2019 ◽  
pp. 332-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hamlin ◽  
Colin Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Basic Logic ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Expressive Voting ◽  
Rational Individual

Just as voting occupies a central role in democratic politics, so a rational choice–theoretic account of voting occupies a central role in public choice theory. Such an account must initially address two questions: under what circumstances is it rational for an individual to vote, and in those circumstances, how will a rational individual cast his or her vote? After reviewing the basic logic of expressive choice, this chapter addresses salient theoretical and empirical themes relating to expressive voting. The theoretical section addresses the debate regarding the probability of causal effect when voting, strategic voting, and institutional design. The empirical section discusses expressiveness as related to identity and moral choice, and the extent to which expressive choice can be distinguished from social pressure and illusion.

scholarly journals Looking Deeper at the Reform of New Zealand's Roading System: Driven by Economic Rationalism or an Example of Public Choice Theory in Action

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 781
Author(s):  
Matthew J Coull
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Road Network ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Efficiency Gains ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Public Road ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Operational Management

Successive New Zealand governments have investigated reforming New Zealand's road network since 1994. The draft Roads Bill 1998 creates a system of road provision operated according to commercial principles. Roads remain publicly owned, but operational management passes from Transit and 74 territorial authorities to newly incorporated "public road companies". The reforms are examined from "a law and economics" perspective, which finds that while efficiency gains may be generated, the proposed institutional design may prevent these gains from being realised to the proposed extent. The reform proposal is then analysed using public choice theory. This analysis finds that while some elements of the proposal are consistent with legislator and bureaucrat self interest, it contains too many politically sensitive variables to displace the Government's stated "efficiency gains" premise as the overriding motivation for reform.  

Sources of Law and the Institutional Design of Lawmaking

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-121
Author(s):  
Francesco Parisi
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Functionalist Approach

Abstract This paper considers the relative advantages and the respective limits of three main sources of law, namely: a) legislation; b) judge-made law; and c) customary law. The traditional presentation of sources of law is revisited considering the important issue of institutional design of lawmaking through the lens of public choice theory. This functionalist approach to legal analysis sheds new light on die process of law formation emphasizing various criteria of evaluation, which include: i) the minimization of agency problems; ii) the minimization of direct and external rulemaking costs; and iii) the stability and transitivity of collective outcomes.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Financial Indicators as Determinants of Mayoral Elections

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Serena Santis ◽  
Francesca Citro ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Bisogno
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Italian Context

The chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on determinants of local government election by adopting a different perspective focused on the effects of financial indicators on the elections of mayors. Using the agency and the public choice theory, this study implements a model where specific financial indicators—whose selection takes into account the increased autonomy and responsibility of local politicians—have been included to document their effect on mayoral re-election. Focusing on the Italian context, the chapter examines a sample of 129 municipalities during the period 2008-2014, where several elections were held. By using different estimators, findings indicate that the re-election of mayors is affected by the level of indebtedness and the current equilibrium. In addition, current spending is better valued by citizens/voters than capital expenditure, which increases the probability of being re-elected.

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