CONCEPTUAL FUNDAMENTALS OF FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC MAN: EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT

The article considers the evolution of the formation of approaches to defining the essence of man in the economy. The theo­retical foundations of the concept of «economic man» are described and its correspondence to modern processes is shown. The perception of the «economic man» model in economic discourse is analyzed. A comparative analysis of the views of different economic schools on the place and role of man in the economy makes it possible to argue that the analysis of models of economic man has not yet stood out in an independent area of research in world economics. In the framework of rather infrequent attempts in the literature to comprehensively analyze the theoretical and methodological problems associated with the economic person, there is not yet a clear definite definition. Some identify the economic person as «a rational individual who has stable advantages and seeks to maximize their own benefits in terms of complete information, freedom of choice and quality evaluation of alternatives». Others believe that «economic man is a metaphorical or figurative concept that means a prerequisite for a hypothetical­deductive system of economic theory». There is also the opinion that the economic person is characterized by goals based on self­interest and rational choice of means, but the rationality of the economic person does not extend to the choice of goals themselves. It is purely in-strumental in nature and is associated exclusively with the choice of optimal means of self­interest, which is equivalent to maximizing the individual objective function. The models of the economic person formulated above have developed in the course of more than two centuries of evolution of economic science. During this time, some features of the economic man, previously considered basic, have disappeared as optional. These signs include the inevitable selfishness, completeness of information, instant reaction. Entre-preneurial abilities have been added to the main features, where an economic person can work to satisfy his own needs constantly, or become the driving force of this process and then simply control this process, thus satisfying all his needs.Keywords: man, economic man, model of «economic man», sociological man. У статті розглянуто еволюцію формування підходів до визначення сутності людини в економіці. Охарактеризовано теоретичні засади концепції «економічної людини» та показано її відповідність сучасним процесам. Проаналізовано сприйняття моделі «економічної людини» в економічному дискурсі. Порівняльне аналізування поглядів різних економічних шкіл на місце і роль людини в економіці дає можливість стверджувати те, що економічна людина розглядалася не як фактичний суб’єкт, який володіє волею, приймає конкретні господарські рішення, а як пасивний носій тієї чи іншої соціальної ролі. Лише в останні роки з’явилася низка праць економістів, соціологів, філософів, у яких людина економічна розглядається як сукупність економічних потреб, цілей індивіда та розкривається у суперечливій єдності людини, працівника як основ­ного елемента системи продуктивних сил та суб’єкта економічних відносин.Ключові слова: людина, економічна людина, модель «економічної людини», соціологічної людини.

Responding to Critics of Emotions and Collectives

Chapter 6 explore three questions: why other climate ethicists including Dale Jamieson, Stephen M. Gardiner, and Tracy Lynn Isaacs have not examined moral emotions or the negative emotions of guilt and shame; why their philosophical assumptions prevent them from doing so; and what the advantages are of taking guilt and shame seriously in environmental and climate ethics. Philosophical climate ethics generally prioritizes rational, individual analyses and direct linear causality. These commitments are challenged by the complex layers of agency causing climate change and lead scholars to overlook (1) the contributions of guilt and shame to moral development and (2) how such moral emotions can help agents recognize their as-yet unacknowledged moral commitments––particularly critical tasks in rapidly developing moral circumstances such as that of climate change. Additionally, philosophical commitments of most climate ethicists hinder their recognition of important ethical questions: What are the ethical ramifications of environmental guilt and shame? Should agents intentionally induce them? Regardless of how these emotions come to exist, how should agents respond to them? A more capacious vision of ethics as outlined in this project—which draws on insights of laypeople as well as academics in multiple disciplines; includes rationality, emotion, relationships; acknowledges the agency of individuals and collectives; and recognizes human limits—can address a broader scope of ethical questions including but not limited to those sparked by environmental guilt and shame.

Just society

I examine the foundations of a just society using the lens of decision theory. The conception of just society is from an individual’s viewpoint: where would I rather live if I have an equal chance of being any individual? Three alternative designs for a just society are examined. These are: laissez-faire, maximin and social minimum. Two assumptions about human nature clarify the distinction among three societies. The first assumption is that a representative individual’s utility function is concave. The second assumption recognizes that redistribution to achieve equality reduces total wealth. A rational individual would prefer a society where one is free to maximize one’s expected utility. A social minimum that includes both the provision of essential human needs and equality of opportunity (education, healthcare, access to capital) for a flourishing life emerges as a candidate solution for the basic structure of society.

Rewilding policy futures: Maori whakapapa and the ecology of the subject

The world is changing, but political and educational institutions appears to be stuck in the 19th century. Modern policy and education are both premised on an Enlightenment assumption of the human, rational, individual subject. Increasingly, elements of these philosophical premises are being interrogated. The critique emerges from the environmental interest in collapsing the dualism between subject and object, and reintegrating the human with/in our ecological context. Indigenous philosophy is important for rethinking the integration of the dualism between humanity and ecology. Maori philosophy is a vital counterpoint to the anthropomorphic position of modern policy and education. Taking Maori concepts to inform contemporary philosophy generates a substantive shift in world view that does not lose sight of the solipsist, phenomenological parameters of human sense making, but enables us to make deeper ethical decisions, and transform the basis of education and policy.

Abdelkébir Khatibi

Despite the considerable acclaim that Khatibi’s work has received, critics are frequently challenged to describe it. It is often considered « hybrid, » because it cannot be contained by the genres and categories of thought that we associate with Literature. I will argue that Khatibi’s work is less hybrid than « hermetic, » and that the difficulty felt in classifying or even analyzing his writing, is due to the presence of echoes and traces of archaic traditions. Khatibi devoted years of his life to studying other cultures as well as his own, finding that it was a rich fabric of varied influences, just as he found that other cultures bear material traces of many buried encounters. The influences present in Khatibi’s writing include Sufism, the traditions of Asia, such as the Tao and the Vedas, but also the esoteric sciences originating in Mesopotamia and Egypt that found their way to Greece, and which were revised and translated by Arabs and Eastern Christians. These entered into Europe from Andalusia and also through Italy, under the sponsorship of the Medicis, and contributed substantially to the revolution in the arts and sciences of the Renaissance. These cultures entertained a different relation to signs and images than that which has predominated since the Enlightenment in Europe. They also had a less binary and hierarchised conception of the world and man’s place in it. They imagined the universe as the space of a continuous transformation of diverse elements, a view opposed to that of the rational individual as master of his environment. Ostracized by the Church and the State, they remained in shadow, treated as heresies. I will try to show that many of the unorthodox traits of Khatibi’s thought and writing can be attributed to the influence of these archaic traditions, whose poetic and ethical values have much to teach us in the modern world.

De l’image-modèle à l’image de Dieu. Le dépassement de l’individu dans la doctrine éthique de Fichte, 1798–1812

Fichte’s ethics changed in many ways between 1794 and 1812: in the first place spiritual life replaced the transformation of nature; individual supersession was radicalized; and ethics was linked with first philosophy. In 1812 it was no longer a matter of inflecting natural necessity by means of the model image of an ideal world (Vorbild). The theme of image reappears as an externalizing of absolute life. Ethical action becomes a moment of this manifestation: a return to unity, following the process of fragmentation of the originary phenomenon (the I or the I-one), into an infinity of individual I’s. This fragmentation is fondamental: life is self-consciousness only in this individual form. The ethical act manifests the concept or image of God with the self-annihilation of individuality. Fichte had already written, in part XI of the Second Introduction, that the I, “only reasonnable”, “is no longer an individual”, and in the first Sittenlehre, § 18 : “We are all supposed to act identically”. Fichte’s final Ethics thus does not radicalize the supersession of the individual. It defines the rational individual by this supersession of himself [or herself], making ethics into a moment [stage] of the absolute life. The matter is not to merge the individual into the whole, but to partake in a living order, in the activity of the whole, which reaches out to each of its members, only to return to the first unity, by forming the whole as such.De 1794 à 1812, l’éthique de Fichte connaît plusieurs évolutions : abandon de la transformation de la nature au profit de la vie spirituelle, radicalisation du dépassement de l’individu, et rapprochement entre éthique et philosophie première. En 1812 il n’est plus question d’infléchir la nécessité naturelle par l’image modeèe (Vorbild) d’un monde idéal. La thématique de l’image apparaît comme extériorisation de la vie absolue. L’action éthique devient un moment de cette manifestation : le retour vers l’un, au terme d’un morcellement du phénomène originaire (le »Moi« ou »Moi un«) en une infinité de Moi(s) individuels. Cette diffraction est essentielle : la vie ne peut être consciente d’elle-même que dans cette forme individuelle. L’agir éthique manifeste le concept ou l’image de Dieu en anéantissant l’individualité. Mais la XIe section de la Seconde Introduction précisait déjà, que dans le monde moral, le Moi »uniquement raisonnable«, »a cessé d’être un individu« et dans la première Sittenlehre, § 18, Fichte écrivait : »Nous devons tous agir de la même manière«. L’éthique tardive ne radicalise donc pas le dépassement de l’individu. Elle définit l’individu rationnel par le dépassement de soi, en faisant de l’éthique un moment de la vie absolue. La question est donc moins de fondre l’individu dans un tout que de participer à un ordre vivant, à l’activité du tout qui va jusqu’à chacun des membres pour revenir vers l’unité première en constituant la totalité comme telle.

Bounded Rationality of Individual Action in the Consumption of Public Goods

In order to gain a better understanding of human behaviour, Economics seeks to work with other disciplines such as Psychology, Sociology, or Anthropology (Behavioural Economics). Unlike neoclassical economic theory, behavioural economics does not assume a rational individual. On the contrary, it focuses on an irrational (bounded rational) individual while revealing what really influences his decision and his actions in order to respond more adequately to public needs, increasing the efficiency of public-service provision. The aim of the paper is to investigate the factors of willingness to pay for public services. The willingness of individuals to pay depends on factors such as affection and sympathy, conviction, compassion, regret, respect, warm glow, commitment to society, appreciation, invitation to participation, fundraising method and tax policy. The significance of the research conclusions lies in initiating a new perspective on the possibilities of securing public services.

Expressive Voting

Just as voting occupies a central role in democratic politics, so a rational choice–theoretic account of voting occupies a central role in public choice theory. Such an account must initially address two questions: under what circumstances is it rational for an individual to vote, and in those circumstances, how will a rational individual cast his or her vote? After reviewing the basic logic of expressive choice, this chapter addresses salient theoretical and empirical themes relating to expressive voting. The theoretical section addresses the debate regarding the probability of causal effect when voting, strategic voting, and institutional design. The empirical section discusses expressiveness as related to identity and moral choice, and the extent to which expressive choice can be distinguished from social pressure and illusion.

Qualifying Coordination Mechanism for Cascade-Reservoir Operation with a New Game-Theoretical Methodology

The coordinated operation for hydropower generation in cascade reservoirs is critical to resolve the conflicts in hydropower needs between upstream and downstream reservoirs. Due to the individual rationality and collective rationality highlighted by game theory, we propose an integrated game-theoretical model to simulate the coordination behaviors among cascade reservoirs for hydropower generation. In the case study of a cascade-reservoir system in the Yangtze River of China, three operation models are compared and analyzed: the non-cooperative model, centralized model, and integrated game-theoretical model. The factors influencing the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model are also explored in this study. The results indicate that the system’s hydropower generation obtained by the integrated game-theoretical model is closer to the ideal solution obtained by the centralized model compared to that obtained by the non-cooperative model. Moreover, individual hydropower generation in non-cooperation (rational individual gains) is guaranteed by the integrated game-theoretical model, which is neglected by the centralized model. Furthermore, the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model is influenced by the water availability variation and regulation capacities of cascade reservoirs.