The Union Blockade

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-65
Author(s):  
Craig L. Symonds

Declaring a blockade of the Confederate coast was the first important strategic decision made by the administration of Pres. Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. Though it started modestly, before the war was over it absorbed more ships and more naval personnel than all of America’s previous wars combined. By implying a recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent, Lincoln’s declaration complicated the administration’s foreign policy, and the very size of the undertaking challenged the Union’s shipbuilding capacity. Though it never succeeded in cutting off Southern trade completely, it severely reduced the South’s exports, especially cotton; demonstrated the vulnerability of the South’s coastal defenses; and provided a safety valve for Black refugees. By exposing weaknesses in the Confederate economy, the blockade contributed to an inflationary spiral that depressed civilian morale. In the end, the cumulative impact of the blockade very likely helped shorten the war.

Author(s):  
Joseph A. Fry

President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William Henry Seward confronted the greatest foreign policy challenge of their young, and still impermanent, nation’s existence. With the South’s secession and potential European intervention in the Civil War, national survival was literally at stake. Neither President Lincoln nor Secretary of State Seward could boast of the relevant foreign policy background and experience of several of their better-prepared predecessors, such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, or John Quincy Adams. Still, both were highly intelligent, well-read, shrewd political operatives, who had developed great skill in managing difficult contemporaries and complex public issues and problems. They were also quick studies who learned from both successes and failures....


1977 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. I. Dawisha

Brecher's ‘research design’ is particularly suitable for exploring the process of foreign policy making of transitional political systems characterized by the preponderance of a charismatic leader. In this paper, the ‘research design’ is utilized to explain the decision by President Nasser of Egypt to intervene militarily in the Yemen civil war in September-October, 1962. The various components of the operational environment are first analysed, and then a qualitative and quantitative analysis of Nasser's perceptions of these components is undertaken. Within the context of this perceptual pattern, the decision-making process is then examined and is deemed to comprise three major decisions: two tactical decisions leading to the strategic decision necessitating the commitment of Egyptian troops in the Yemeni civil war. The feedback effects and policy consequences resulting from the implementation of the strategic decision are then explored, and finally, eleven hypotheses are tested against the findings of the study.


Author(s):  
Fred I. Greenstein ◽  
Dale Anderson

The United States witnessed an unprecedented failure of its political system in the mid-nineteenth century, resulting in a disastrous civil war that claimed the lives of an estimated 750,000 Americans. This book assesses the personal strengths and weaknesses of presidents from George Washington to Barack Obama. The book evaluates the leadership styles of the Civil War-era presidents. The book looks at the presidential qualities of James K. Polk, Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and Abraham Lincoln. For each president, the book provides a concise history of the man's life and presidency, and evaluates him in the areas of public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. The book sheds light on why Buchanan is justly ranked as perhaps the worst president in the nation's history, how Pierce helped set the stage for the collapse of the Union and the bloodiest war America had ever experienced, and why Lincoln is still considered the consummate American leader to this day. The book reveals what enabled some of these presidents, like Lincoln and Polk, to meet the challenges of their times—and what caused others to fail.


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49
Author(s):  
William Minter

Mozambique “switched from a pro-Chinese to a pro-Soviet stance during the Angolan civil war,” writes a commentator in the influential U.S. quarterly Foreign Policy of Fall 1977. “Mozambique said to Cool on Soviets, Turn West,” headlines a Washington Post dispatch of December 15, 1977. The Economist’s Foreign Report claims in its advertising to have been the first to describe the ideological infighting within FRELIMO and the swing to Russia. The commentators seemed to have missed Mozambique’s 1977 trade fair in September, at which the People’s Republic of China won first prize for an exhibit corresponding to Mozambique’s needs, but if they had been there one might well have seen headlines proclaiming Mozambique’s shift back to China.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

Despite the popularity of arming rebels as a foreign policy option, there is very little, if any, detailed engagement with the ethical issues surrounding the practice. There is a growing literature on the ethical issues surrounding civil wars and, more specifically, the conditions for engaging in just rebellion; but the focus of this literature is largely on the question of the justifiability of the rebels themselves in engaging in civil war and their conduct when doing so, rather than the permissibility of the arming of rebels by other agents. It is precisely this issue that I want to address here. Overall, I argue that the process should be generally eschewed. More specifically, this article seeks to establish that arming rebels is generally impermissible and only exceptionally morally permissible (even, as I will argue, when rebels are engaged in unjust wars). The former, far more restrictive claim will be established in the first part of the article. The latter, more permissive claim will be established in the second part of the article.


1971 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lois G. Schwoerer

The struggle between King and Parliament in 1641-42 for command of the militia was to King Charles I “the Fittest Subject for a King's Quarrel.” As the King himself and a group of pamphleteers, preachers and members of Parliament realized, the controversy was not just a contest for control of military power. The fundamental issue was a change in England's government, a shift in sovereignty from King or King-in-Parliament to Parliament alone. As Charles explained, “Kingly Power is but a shadow” without command of the militia. His contemporaries, representing various political allegiances, also testified to the significance of the contest over the militia. They described it as the “avowed foundation” of the Civil War, “the greatest concernment” ever faced by the House of Commons, and the “great quarrel” between the King and his critics. To some men it was this dispute over military authority and the implications for government which were inherent in it, rather than disagreements about religion, taxes or foreign policy, that made civil war unavoidable.Concern about military authority first erupted in the fall of 1641 in response to a series of events – rumors of plots involving the King, the presence in London of disbanded soldiers who had returned from the war with Scotland, the “Incident” in Scotland, and above all the rebellion in Ireland which required the levying of an army to subdue those rebels.


2001 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 468
Author(s):  
Phillip Paludan ◽  
John Y. Simon ◽  
Harold Holzer ◽  
William Pederson
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document