scholarly journals Relativized Rankings

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Matthew Hammerton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The State ◽  
States Of Affairs

In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who lacks this connection. In this chapter several different kinds of position-relative rankings related to agents, times, physical locations, and possible worlds are explored. Arguments for and against adopting a position-relative axiology are examined, and it is suggested that position-relative consequentialism is a promising moral theory that has been underestimated.

Utilitarianism

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-21
Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tännsjö
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Subjective Time ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Common Currency ◽  
Exact Number ◽  
Single Scale

Utilitarianism is the idea that we ought to maximize the sum total of happiness. The notion of happiness is clarified. Happiness is taken in a subjective and empirical sense, as a kind of mood. Affirmative answers to the following questions are provided: What is happiness? Can it be measured? Can we compare it between persons? Can it function as a common currency when the different theories of distributive justice are compared? What about the heterogeneity objection? Can very different kinds of happiness be measured on a single scale? In the answers to these questions the idea of a least noticeable difference with respect to happiness plays a crucial role. It is conjectured that, if a person is in a certain mood (momentarily), then there exists an exact number of just noticeable changes for the worse or the better to the point where life is just worth living. Many different conditions can contribute to cause a person to be at the state where she is. A distinction of the utmost importance between physical and subjective time is introduced and a claim is made that what matters, from the point of view of moral theory, is subjective time.

Human Rights & the National Interest

Worldview ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 18-21
Author(s):  
J. Bryan Hehir
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Roman Catholic ◽  
The State ◽  
Cautionary Note ◽  
National Goal ◽  
Stanley Hoffmann ◽  
Difficult Subject

The philosophical discussions about the nature and origins of human rights are learned, complex and fascinating; it can certainly be argued that before a statesman decides to make a national goal of their promotion he should have a firm moral theory about their essence and their foundations. But much of the literature has a tendency to overcomplicate what is already a formidably difficult subject.—Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond BordersHeeding this cautionary note from a perceptive theorist who has explored the philosophical dimensions of rights policy, my limited purpose here is to examine three concepts from Roman Catholic theory that structure the Church's participation in the human rights debate. These concepts are: (1) the foundation of human rights; (2) the range of human rights claims; and (3) the conception of the state in international relations today.

Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 319-346
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Perceptual Skills ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Crucial Component ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency.

Agent-neutral Consequentialism from the Inside-out: Concern for Integrity without Self-indulgence

Utilitas ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ridge
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Inside Out ◽  
Stephen Darwall

Consequentialists are sometimes accused of being unable to accommodate all the ways in which an agent should care about her own integrity. Here it is helpful to follow Stephen Darwall in distinguishing two approaches to moral theory. First, we might begin with the value of states of affairs and then work our way ‘inward’ to our integrity, explaining the value of the latter in terms of their contribution to the value of the former. This is the ‘outside-in’ approach, and Darwall argues that it is well-suited to defending consequentialism. Alternatively, we might begin with the perspective of a virtuous agent's concern for her integrity, and then work our way ‘outward’, building a conception of the value of states of affairs from this perspective. On this ‘inside-out’ account there is a kind of agent-centred concern each agent should have for her own integrity simply because it is her own. The inside-out approach therefore suggests a possible rationale for a non-consequentialist moral theory, in so far as such a fundamental egocentric concern for one's own integrity seems alien to consequentialism's commitment to the agent-neutrality of value. If this is correct then the consequentialist should explain why we should prefer the outside-in approach to its rival. I argue that the consequentialist can meet this challenge.

scholarly journals A step-indexed Kripke model of hidden state

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAN SCHWINGHAMMER ◽  
LARS BIRKEDAL ◽  
FRANÇOIS POTTIER ◽  
BERNHARD REUS ◽  
KRISTIAN STØVRING ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Metric Space ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Operational Semantics ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
The State ◽  
Local State ◽  
Modular Reasoning ◽  
Proof Rules ◽  
Model Based ◽  
First Sound

Frame and anti-frame rules have been proposed as proof rules for modular reasoning about programs. Frame rules allow the hiding of irrelevant parts of the state during verification, whereas the anti-frame rule allows the hiding of local state from the context.We discuss the semantic foundations of frame and anti-frame rules, and present the first sound model for Charguéraud and Pottier's type and capability system including both of these rules. The model is a possible worlds model based on the operational semantics and step-indexed heap relations, and the worlds are given by a recursively defined metric space. We also extend the model to account for Pottier's generalised frame and anti-frame rules, where invariants are generalised to families of invariants indexed over preorders. This generalisation enables reasoning about some well-bracketed as well as (locally) monotone uses of local state.

Monadic Perception

2015 ◽  
pp. 380-392
Author(s):  
Heinrich Schepers
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The State ◽  
Possible World ◽  
The Real ◽  
The World ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Momentary State

This chapter discusses Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s notion of monadic perception as a key component of his metaphysics. It first considers Leibniz’s thesis about monads, together with their perceptions and appetites, and his definition of perception as the representation of external variation in the internal. It then examines Leibniz’s belief that the world is a community of all compatible substances or monads, and that compatibility is the real principle underlying existence and the composition of possible worlds. The content of a monad’s perception is the momentary state of the whole world or, more precisely, the state of all the monads that are compatible with that monad. In every possible world these sequences are fully determinate. The chapter also analyzes Leibniz’s assertion that all monads are accompanied by a “manière de corps organique”.

scholarly journals Another Look at Aspect in Thai

MANUSYA ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
Pranee Kullavanijaya ◽  
Walter Bisang
Keyword(s):  
Initial Boundary ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Selection Theory ◽  
Aspect Markers ◽  
State Of Affairs

The aim of the paper is twofold. The first aim is to analyse aspect in Thai in the framework of the selection-theory approach developed by Breu and Sasse (1991). The second aim is to study all possible co-occurrenc;es of each of the three aspect markers: lεεw, kamlaƞ, yùu with the four classes of verbs and with the verbs occurring with other strategies within the five classes of states of affairs. It was found that the selectional approach chosen helped explaining the inceptive-stative state of affairs in Thai clearly. It also pointed out that the Thai aspectuality focused on the initial boundary and terminative boundary of the state of affairs. It is here that combinations of the three aspect markers occur. The study shows that they have certain rules of co-occurances.

Both the Rule and the Exception

2020 ◽  
pp. 242-256
Author(s):  
Valentin Jeutner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The State ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
International Court ◽  
Self Defence ◽  
Legal Classification

The chapter considers whether there can be legal states of affairs that are both the rule and the exception or, in other words, whether there can be situations where the rule and the exception are superimposed upon each other so that neither the rule nor the exception singularly controls the legal classification of a given situation, although both the rule and the exception continue to apply. The chapter attempts to show that such situations can exist and that such situations can have a very distinct and useful legal function. The argument is illustrated with reference to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and, in particular, with reference to the notion of the ‘survival of the State’ as a ground of self-defence, as discussed in the Advisory Opinion.

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