The Dialectic of Pro-Poor Papaya

Author(s):  
Mark Lynas ◽  
Sarah Davidson Evanega

The development and rapid adoption of genetically engineered, virus-resistant papaya for Hawaii was an early, rare successful case of a small-scale horticultural crop improved for farmers of mostly modest means by the public sector. Demand was potentially great because the technology addressed a crop-destroying disease for which there were—and are—no alternative solutions. The developers of the technology promoted diffusion with a philanthropic spirit of public-sector universities and personal commitment. Success in Hawaii demonstrated that the technology could benefit papaya growers world-wide. To replicate that success, Thailand was among the first countries to work to adapt the technology. The greatest challenge facing those charged with introducing virus-resistant transgenic papaya into Thailand turned out not to be a technical but political one as Greenpeace targeted virus-resistant papaya as the likely first GE crop to be grown in the country and thus, a gateway for other GE crops. The subsequent anti-GE papaya campaigns foiled biotechnology in Thailand and throughout Southeast Asia, which is puzzling because many biotech crops being developed in that region have similar potential to benefit smallholder farmers, impact the environment positively, and address major nutritional challenges. Many are developed by the public sector. Had Thailand successfully promoted transgenic papaya despite opposition from Greenpeace, governments and scientific agencies across Southeast Asia might have been encouraged by the success story and continued to use the tools of biotechnology in their own agricultural sectors to confront rapidly mounting global agricultural challenges. That this best-case scenario for biotechnology—a pro-poor papaya developed in the public sector without multinational property claims—has not reached resource-poor farmers in the developing world almost twenty years after its release in Hawaii offers lessons larger than a minor crop. The case aids in understanding the reasons for the limited spread of biotechnology for small farmers globally and the dimensions of opposition and reasons for success of opposition to all transgenics technologies.

1980 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred H. Saulniers

Until 1968, state enterprises played a minor role in the Peruvian economy. The list of public sector enterprises was relatively small. It included the Central and sectoral banks, a merchant fleet, railways, a minor petroleum producer, hyroelectric power companies, a steel mill, monopolies over salt, tobacco, and guano, a few tourism projects, and a set of regional development corporations. From 1968 to 1974 the state moved swiftly to expand its role in order to direct and control the course of the country's economic evolution. The public sector increased both in size and scope to include most banking, basic industries, and most international and some domestic trade.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawit Alemu ◽  
John Thompson ◽  
Abebaw Assaye

Rice was considered a minor crop in Ethiopia, rarely consumed by many households in Sub-Saharan Africa. In recent decades, however, it has become the most rapidly growing staple food source in the country. This paper presents an historical analysis of rice commercialisation and the observed agrarian changes that have resulted from its introduction and spread in Ethiopia. The paper analyses the role of the state, private actors and development partners in promoting improvements in rice production and value chain upgrading, as well as examines the impacts of small-scale commercialisation on local livelihoods and rural economies.


1989 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. House

The Christian and animist population of the Southern Sudan is largely composed of black Africans, estimated to number 5·3 million in 1983, as against the 15·3 million, predominantly Arabic and Muslim, who inhabit the Northern Sudan. The economy of the Southern Sudan, comprised of the three semi-autonomous regions of Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria, remains one of the least developed in sub-Saharan Africa. The great majority of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, although some limited cash income is generated from the sale of surplus crops, and nomadic pastoralism is also widely practised. Only about three per cent of the inhabitants live in the three regional capitals of Wau, Malakal, and Juba, and they have to depend heavily for work in the public sector and small-scale informal activities.


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