Getting Grand Strategy Right

2021 ◽  
pp. 558-574
Author(s):  
Hal Brands ◽  
Peter Feaver

Grand strategy is essential to effective foreign policy. Yet even as the study of grand strategy has flourished within the academy, many academics have remained skeptical of grand strategy as a concept or been harshly critical of grand strategy as practiced by the United States. This essay defines the concept of grand strategy, emphasizing that it is best understood as the logic undergirding state action. The essay also explains why common academic critiques are mistaken; they set fire to straw-person visions that either reduce grand strategy to impractically detailed and rigid plans rather than recognizing the logic that guides purposeful state action, however imperfectly implemented, or to impossibly grandiose visions of American power in the post-Cold War era that ignores the genuine achievements of the last thirty years. Finally, the essay discusses how academics can usefully contribute to public debates on American grand strategy.

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


Author(s):  
Brian Schmidt

This chapter examines some of the competing theories that have been advanced to explain U.S. foreign policy. In trying to explain the foreign policy of the United States, a number of competing theories have been developed by International Relations scholars. Some theories focus on the role of the international system in shaping American foreign policy while others argue that various domestic factors are the driving force. The chapter first considers some of the obstacles to constructing a theory of foreign policy before discussing some of the competing theories of American foreign policy, including defensive realism, offensive realism, liberalism, Marxism, neoclassical realism, and constructivism. The chapter proceeds by reviewing the theoretical debate over the origins of the Cold War and the debate over the most appropriate grand strategy that the United States should follow in the post-Cold War era.


Author(s):  
Robert G. Patman

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Africa. It first considers the United States’ historical engagement with Africa, particularly during the Cold War era that saw the intensification of US–Soviet Union superpower rivalry, before discussing the rise of a New World Order in the immediate post–Cold War period that held out the possibility of positive US involvement in Africa. It then explores the United States’ adoption of a more realist approach after Somalia, as well as its renewal of limited engagement between 1996 and 2001. It also analyzes US policy towards Africa after 9/11, with emphasis on President George W. Bush’s efforts to incorporate Africa into Washington’s global strategic network as part of the new war on terror, as compared to the approach of the Obama administration calling for political transformation in Africa.


Author(s):  
Fredrik Logevall

This chapter assesses how grand American grand strategy has been. If the containment followed by the United States in the Cold War is the most successful, or at least most celebrated, grand strategy the United States has ever pursued, it is worthy of a closer look. This chapter considers two foundational writings from the early Cold War: George Kennan's “X” Article, published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 (under the pseudonym “X”), which laid out the containment policy—that is to say, the containment of Soviet power—and National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) of April 1950. Both of these documents are held to have played major roles in shaping the grand strategy that helped the United States deal successfully with the Soviet threat and ultimately win the Cold War. Each has indeed been referred to as the “blueprint” for US policy in the struggle. The chapter then addresses a second question: How much does grand strategy matter in the context of American history? History suggests that grand strategies do not alter the trajectory of great-power politics all that much. In the case of the United States, even radically imperfect strategies have not fundamentally affected its rise and fall.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Browning ◽  
Pertti Joenniemi ◽  
Brent J. Steele

The chapter explores Denmark’s post–Cold War reorientation in foreign policy, where a previous emphasis on laying low and a reluctance to engage in military actions has been replaced by a willingness to support activist military engagement. The transformation has entailed a fundamental reappraisal of the Cold War past, where a once comfortable and ontological-security-affirming narrative has been recast as a betrayal of Denmark’s true being and its responsibilities for upholding a norms-based international order. The chapter argues that such self-shaming is designed to elicit anxiety and ontological insecurities that can only be salved through activist engagement. However, lacking sufficient resources itself, Denmark’s redemption is possible only by establishing a vicarious bond with the United States and partaking in American wars. In Denmark’s case, vicarious identification has therefore been central to driving change and reconstituting selfhood anew, rather than reaffirming extant identities as might be expected.


Author(s):  
G.M. Kakenova ◽  
Z.А. Kakenova

The article discusses approaches to the study of the theoretical foundations of the U.S. foreign policy. For decades, the United States has been one of the most important actors in international relations. The post-Cold War period is one of the most important periods in the U.S. foreign policy. At this time, scholars also debate the new role of the United States in the structure of international relations. Singling out the United States as the only center of power, American researchers supported the idea of a “unipolar” world. The ideas of American scholars and researchers dominated the words of American political leaders of the time: the United States is a world leader, and its mission is to establish a new international political and economic order based on liberal democratic values. The ideas of spreading democratic values and the theory of a democratic peace have had a significant impact on the formation and development of the U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. The article examines the content and essence of these theories, their basic principles, and the reflection of these theories in the foreign policy of the United States.


Author(s):  
Brian Schmidt

This chapter considers some of the competing theories that have been proposed to explain US foreign policy. It first provides an overview of some of the obstacles to constructing a theory of foreign policy before discussing some of the competing theories of US foreign policy, including systemic theories such as defensive realism and offensive realism, theories that accentuate domestic factors like liberalism and Marxism, and a theory that combines systemic and domestic factors, such as neoclassical realism and constructivism. The chapter also revisits the theoretical debate over the origins of the Cold War and concludes by analysing the debate on the most appropriate grand strategy that the United States should follow in the post-Cold War era, with particular emphasis on, primacy, liberal internationalism, and offshore balancing.


2021 ◽  
pp. 134-156
Author(s):  
Rush Doshi

Chapter 6 considers the economic components of China’s grand strategy to blunt American power. It demonstrates that the “traumatic trifecta” at the end of the Cold War laid bare China’s dependence on US markets, capital, and technology. Beijing had previously been relatively unconcerned about the annual US congressional votes that granted China “most-favored nation” (MFN) trade status, but that changed overnight. Washington’s post-Tiananmen sanctions and its threats to revoke MFN trade status—which could have seriously damaged China’s economy—deeply concerned China’s leaders. Beijing sought not to decouple from the United States but instead to bind the discretionary use of American economic power, and it worked hard to remove MFN from congressional review through “permanent normal trading relations,” leveraging negotiations in APEC and the WTO to obtain it.


2021 ◽  
pp. 619-636
Author(s):  
Peter Dombrowski

The other contributions in this volume take seriously the proposition that having a universal grand strategy is essential for a great power. This chapter considers three alternative propositions: (1) that in many cases grand strategy in a classic sense is not achievable given bureaucratic and political impediments, (2) that all great powers do not require a grand strategy, and, (3) that under some circumstances, the great power can thrive by pursuing calibrated grand strategies depending on both region and threats. The first proposition will build upon the work of scholars (Jervis 1998; Metz 1997) who have argued that the United States and other countries often “muddle through” both strategic formulation and implementation. The second considers arguments about the process of developing grand strategies, such as those advanced by Ionut Popescu (2017) who advocate focusing on “emergent strategies” as understood by scholars studying business corporations. The final proposal builds upon my own research (Reich and Dombrowski 2018) that argues that it is impossible to implement one coherent grand strategy: there are six variants and the United States has inevitably pursued many if not all of them simultaneously in the post–Cold War era. Inverting top-down formulations, the choice of any one strategy in a theater of (potential) conflict is contingent upon the nature of the threat, the actors, and the potential conflicts as interpreted by senior political and military leaders, and the bureaucratic environment in which they operate. In the end, this chapter offers both conceptual and substantive challenges to traditional understandings of grand strategy.


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