scholarly journals Reasons and Moral Principles

Author(s):  
Pekka Väyrynen

Moral particularism and generalism are families of views united by their denial or affirmation (respectively) that general moral principles play some fundamental role in morality. In this survey of the generalism/particularism debate, I distinguish between contributory and overall moral principles and between two distinct roles, standards and guides, which either sort of principles might be claimed to play. Next I describe three different forms which particularist opposition to any of these kinds of principles can take. I then survey debates about whether moral principles play a fundamental role either as standards or as guides. Throughout I pay particular attention to issues and arguments which involve claims about normative reasons that favor or justify things or explanatory reasons that explain their moral features. I also note some broader implications of these arguments for both moral theory and the theory of reasons, and point to questions that merit further work.

Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.


2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.


Author(s):  
Roger Crisp

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.


Author(s):  
Michael Goodhart

This chapter offers a review and critique of the core assumptions and procedures of ideal moral theory, the dominant approach to theorizing questions of justice and injustice in global normative theory. It does so with the aim of defamiliarizing readers with this approach, that is, of making it seem less like a natural, sensible, coherent, and necessary approach to theorizing injustice than like a strange, bewildering, and profoundly problematic one. The chapter stresses two important but rarely discussed assumptions of ideal moral theory: it conceptualizes injustice as the absence or opposite of justice, and it presumes that only justified moral principles can provide an adequate and reliable guide for critique and reform. These assumptions are problematic and contribute to three pathologies that cripple ideal moral theory: analytical paralysis, a reflex to subordinate politics to morality, and a disposition to distortional thinking.


Author(s):  
Anton Didikin

The paper interprets the arguments of Aristotle, which characterize his ethical theory and had a significant impact on the moral theory of R. Hare. The author reveals the conceptual foundations of R. Hare's understanding of the nature of moral prescriptions and the ways of their expression in the moral language, and the controversial issues of his interpretation of the content of moral principles and other ethical concepts. The author comes to the conclusion that R. Hare's reinterpretation of the grounds for committing ethically significant actions leads him to formulate moral imperatives in the context of the method of linguistic analysis, which brings ethical theory to the meta-level.


Dialogue ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-294
Author(s):  
Marlene Benjamin

Human rights claims rely on both utilitarian and deontological perspectives of the moral universe. The persuasiveness of these claims depends on the extent to which they resonate harmoniously with a person's other moral opinions. If these opinions cannot be grounded in a larger structure of ra-tionally defensible moral principles, differences of opinion cannot be satis-factorily resolved. When this happens, action protective of rights —about which there may be not only different but diametrically opposed opinion — will be hard to achieve.


2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean McKeever ◽  
Michael Ridge

What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner of moral particularism. Particularists can be found in diverse areas of philosophical inquiry, and their positions and arguments are of broad interest. Despite its importance, a proper evaluation of particularism has been hindered both by the diversity of arguments employed to defend it, and, perhaps more significantly, by the diversity of positions that can fairly claim to be particularist.


1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neera K. Badhwar

Liberal political philosophy presupposes a moral theory according to which the ability to assess and choose conceptions of the good from a universal and impartial moral standpoint is central to the individual's moral identity. This viewpoint is standardly understood by liberals as that of a rational human (not transcendental) agent. Such an agent is able to reflect on her ends and pursuits, including those she strongly identifies with, and to understand and take into account the basic interests of others. From the perspective of liberalism as a political morality, the most important of these interests is the interest in maximum, equal liberty for each individual, and thus the most important moral principles are the principles of justice that protect individuals' rights to life and liberty.According to the communitarian critics of liberalism, however, the liberal picture of moral agency is unrealistically abstract. Communitarians object that moral agents in the real world neither choose their conceptions of the good nor occupy a universalistically impartial moral standpoint. Rather, their conceptions of the good are determined chiefly by the communities in which they find themselves, and these conceptions are largely “constitutive” of their particular moral identities. Moral agency is thus “situated” and “particularistic,” and an impartial reflection on the conception of the good that constitutes it is undesirable, if not impossible. Further, communitarians contend, the good is “prior” to the right in the sense that moral norms are derived from, and justified in terms of, the good. An adequate moral and political theory must reflect these facts about moral agency and moral norms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 165 (4) ◽  
pp. 270-272
Author(s):  
Simon Paul Jenkins

Moral theory should be practically useful, but without oversight from the philosophical community, the practical application of ethics by other institutions such as the military may drift into forms that are not theoretically robust. Ethical approaches that drift in this way run the risk of becoming ‘cargo cults’: simulations that will never properly fulfil their intended purpose. The four quadrant approach, a systematic method of ethical analysis that applies moral principles to clinical cases, has gained popularity in the last 10 years in a variety of medical contexts, especially the military. This paper considers whether the four quadrant approach is a cargo cult or whether it has theoretical value, with particular reference to the more popular four principles approach. This analysis concludes that the four quadrant approach has theoretical advantages over the four principles approach, if used in the right way (namely, with all four quadrants being used). The principal advantage is that the four quadrant approach leaves more room for clinical judgement, and thus avoids the charge of being too algorithmic, which has been levelled at the four principles approach. I suggest that it is the fourth quadrant, which invites the user to consider wider, contextual features of the case, which gives the approach this key advantage. Finally, I make a more general proposal that theoretical ethicists should work closely with those practitioners who apply ethics in the world, and I call for a symbiotic relationship between these two camps.


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