International Law-based Responses to the September 11 International Terrorist Attacks

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 280-286
Author(s):  
E. McWhinney
2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.


2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 37-73
Author(s):  
Paul R. Powers

The ideas of an “Islamic Reformation” and a “Muslim Luther” have been much discussed, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This “Reformation” rhetoric, however, displays little consistency, encompassing moderate, liberalizing trends as well as their putative opposite, Islamist “fundamentalism.” The rhetoric and the diverse phenomena to which it refers have provoked both enthusiastic endorsement and vigorous rejection. After briefly surveying the history of “Islamic Reformation” rhetoric, the present article argues for a four-part typology to account for most recent instances of such rhetoric. The analysis reveals that few who employ the terminology of an “Islamic Reformation” consider the specific details of its implicit analogy to the Protestant Reformation, but rather use this language to add emotional weight to various prescriptive agendas. However, some examples demonstrate the potential power of the analogy to illuminate important aspects of religious, social, and political change in the modern Islamic world.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Mueller ◽  
Mark G. Stewart

In this article, we present a simple back-of-the-envelope approach for evaluating whether counterterrorism security measures reduce risk sufficiently to justify their costs. The approach uses only four variables: the consequences of a successful attack, the likelihood of a successful attack, the degree to which the security measure reduces risk, and the cost of the security measure. After measuring the cost of a counterterrorism measure, we explore a range of outcomes for the costs of terrorist attacks and a range of possible estimates for how much risk might be reduced by the measure. Then working from this mix of information and assumptions, we can calculate how many terrorist attacks (and of what size) would need to be averted to justify the cost of the counterterrorism measure in narrow cost–benefit terms. To illustrate this approach, we first apply it to the overall increases in domestic counterterrorism expenditures that have taken place since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and alternatively we apply it to just the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. We then evaluate evidence on the number and size of terrorist attacks that have actually been averted or might have been averted since 9/11.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Baker Benjamin

At the heart of contemporary international law lies a paradox: the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 have justified 16 years of international war, yet the official international community, embodied principally in the United Nations, has failed to question or even scrutinise the US government's account of those attacks. Despite the emergence of an impressive and serious body of literature that impugns the official account and even suggests that 9/11 may have been a classic (if unprecedentedly monstrous) false-flag attack, international statesmen, following the lead of scholars, have been reluctant to wade into what appears to be a very real controversy. African nations are no strangers to the concept of the false flag tactic, and to its use historically in the pursuit of illegitimate geopolitical aims and interests. This article draws on recent African history in this regard, as well as on deeper twentieth-century European and American history, to lay a foundation for entertaining the possibility of 9/11-as-false-flag. This article then argues that the United Nations should seek to fulfil its core and incontrovertible ‘jury’ function of determining the existence of inter-state aggression in order to exercise a long-overdue oversight of the official 9/11 narrative.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document