“Linkage” in International Law. From September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks to March 20, 2003 US/British Invasion of Iraq

2004 ◽  
pp. 13-18
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Invasion Of Iraq

Letting the Exception Prove the Rule

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Department Of State ◽  
Military Campaigns ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The Trauma of 9/11: 2001–2002

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-104
Author(s):  
John L. Helgerson
Keyword(s):  
September 11 ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Terrorist Threat ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Us Intervention ◽  
Invasion Of Iraq ◽  
Intelligence Officer

John Helgerson’s tenure began just six weeks before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The terrorist threat had been the subject of major analyses produced during John Gannon’s tenure; it became the overwhelming priority after 9/11. Helgerson describes the early responses as well as the longer-term analyses of the evolving terrorist threat and the new landscape of counterterrorist cooperation with traditional allies and former adversaries alike. The US intervention in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime gave way to a new focus on Iraq. The ostensible rationale for the invasion of Iraq was a controversial national intelligence estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the NIE was published in the interval between Helgerson’s tenure and his successor’s, the chapter assesses the estimate and the decision to go to war in Iraq through the analysis of National Intelligence Officer Paul Pillar, who straddled both tenures.

You Say You Want a Reformation? Parsing the Ubiquitous Rhetoric of an “Islamic Reformation”

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 37-73
Author(s):  
Paul R. Powers
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Political Change ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Protestant Reformation ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
History Of

The ideas of an “Islamic Reformation” and a “Muslim Luther” have been much discussed, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This “Reformation” rhetoric, however, displays little consistency, encompassing moderate, liberalizing trends as well as their putative opposite, Islamist “fundamentalism.” The rhetoric and the diverse phenomena to which it refers have provoked both enthusiastic endorsement and vigorous rejection. After briefly surveying the history of “Islamic Reformation” rhetoric, the present article argues for a four-part typology to account for most recent instances of such rhetoric. The analysis reveals that few who employ the terminology of an “Islamic Reformation” consider the specific details of its implicit analogy to the Protestant Reformation, but rather use this language to add emotional weight to various prescriptive agendas. However, some examples demonstrate the potential power of the analogy to illuminate important aspects of religious, social, and political change in the modern Islamic world.

Prosody and ideology

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-334
Author(s):  
Annabelle Lukin ◽  
Lucía Inés Rivas
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
News Reporting ◽  
Role Choices ◽  
Invasion Of Iraq ◽  
Ideological Work ◽  
As If

Abstract The focus of this paper is on the role choices in phonological systems (Brazil 1997; Halliday & Greaves 2008) play in the ideological work of a text. Using an instance of news reporting of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we show how prosodic choices – both those shared with other texts in this register, and those specific to this instance – contribute to the ideological force of the text. The ideological effects of prosodic choices in this text, we argue, include projecting a very particular interpretation of the invasion as if distant and objective, and giving prominence to claims that the invasion was measured and targeted, and by implication in accordance with international law.

scholarly journals Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Mueller ◽  
Mark G. Stewart
Keyword(s):  
Cost Benefit ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Successful Attack ◽  
Security Measure ◽  
Reduce Risk ◽  
The Cost

In this article, we present a simple back-of-the-envelope approach for evaluating whether counterterrorism security measures reduce risk sufficiently to justify their costs. The approach uses only four variables: the consequences of a successful attack, the likelihood of a successful attack, the degree to which the security measure reduces risk, and the cost of the security measure. After measuring the cost of a counterterrorism measure, we explore a range of outcomes for the costs of terrorist attacks and a range of possible estimates for how much risk might be reduced by the measure. Then working from this mix of information and assumptions, we can calculate how many terrorist attacks (and of what size) would need to be averted to justify the cost of the counterterrorism measure in narrow cost–benefit terms. To illustrate this approach, we first apply it to the overall increases in domestic counterterrorism expenditures that have taken place since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and alternatively we apply it to just the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. We then evaluate evidence on the number and size of terrorist attacks that have actually been averted or might have been averted since 9/11.

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