Sensible Over-Determination

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (280) ◽  
pp. 588-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umrao Sethi
Keyword(s):  
Direct Contact ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Veridical Perception ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Sensible Qualities ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions acquaint us with instances of the same kinds of sensible qualities. While the instances in hallucination are mind-dependent, those in veridical perception are not. The latter are ontologically over-determined—they have their existence guaranteed both in virtue of having a material bearer and in virtue of being perceived by a mind. Such over-determined instances are mind-independent—they can continue to exist unperceived, because, in addition to the minds that perceive them, their existence is guaranteed by the material objects that are their bearers.

Clearing the Ground

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-38
Author(s):  
David Papineau
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Experience ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism

This chapter sets the stage. It clarifies ‘sensory experience’ and related concepts. It offers arguments against both naïve realism and sense-datum theories. It distinguishes different kinds of representationalism about sensory experience along with a number of further issues that can be put to one side.

The Non-existence of the External World

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-80
Author(s):  
Jan Westerhoff
Keyword(s):  
Main Part ◽  
External World ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter begins with an investigation of the reasons for the presumed certainty of the existence of the external, mind-independent world around us, and considers a selection of arguments directed against the existence of such an external world. I begin by arguing that we do not need to postulate an external world in order to justify the illusion–reality distinction, or to explain the coherence, intersubjectivity, and efficacy of our perception. The second main part of the chapter focuses on the discussion of different theories of perception (naïve realism, disjunctivism, representationalism) and the ontologies they involve, arguing that ultimately a kind of brain-based representationalism (referred to as irrealism) works best as a theory of perception but that this, somewhat surprisingly, also undermines the justification of a mind-independent world of material objects.

Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Metaphysica ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingvar Johansson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Intentional Object ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Mind

AbstractContemporary defenders of non-disjunctivism take a representationalist philosophy of mind for granted; all kinds of conscious intentional states/acts/events are automatically regarded as being representations. The paper presents an alternative anti-representationalist view of the mind. It differs from other present-day anti-representationalisms in arguing that all conscious phenomena contains a this-worldly something called “from-pole”, and it denies that an intentional content and the corresponding intentional object always are distinct entities. The view is set in contrast to both a transcendental ego tradition and a no from-pole tradition. Hereby, the paper defends the common sense-like view that we are persons who

scholarly journals The Varieties of Instantiation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
UMRAO SETHI
Keyword(s):  
Standard View ◽  
Bodily Sensations ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Sensible Qualities ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Unitary Analysis

Abstract Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations like itches. Given that the mind is never itself literally red or itchy, we cannot explain the instantiation of these qualities as a matter of their having a mental bearer. Appealing to insights from Berkeley, I defend a view on which a property can be instantiated not in virtue of having a bearer—mental or material—but rather in virtue of being the object of a conscious act of perception. In the second half of the paper, I suggest that the best account of sensible qualities and bodily sensations ultimately makes use of both varieties of instantiation.

Neopragmatism and Philosophy of Perception

2021 ◽  
pp. 107-126
Author(s):  
Joshua Gert
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Positive View ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Related Idea ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Insight Into

Neopragmatism is an anti-metaphysical approach to philosophical problems. It addresses such problems by taking the focus off of metaphysics, and turning it onto language. That is, the neopragmatist seeks philosophically uncontentious explanations of the sort of talk that often gives rise to the sense that there is a deep philosophical puzzle to solve. In the domain of perception, reflection on apt ways of describing perceptual experiences have led to various metaphysically committing theories, including (i) sense data theory, (ii) representationalism, and (iii) naïve realism. This chapter uses neopragmatist techniques to undermine the case for the last of these. The attack is two-pronged. First, some of the metaphysical commitments of naïve realism are criticized. Second, neopragmatism is used to explain some of the ideas that were thought to lend naïve realism support. These include the idea that perceptual experience has a peculiar sort of openness or presentational character, and the related idea that such experience gives insight into the mind-independent character of the world. Beyond forming the basis for criticizing other views, neopragmatism also suggests a positive view of perception. This is a form of adverbialism that relies on the idea that our sensory states are information-bearing, but not, in any robust sense, representational.

scholarly journals Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation

Disputatio ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (25) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Sollberger
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Veridical Perception ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Causal Argument ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Mental Nature

Abstract In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions must be exhausted by the occurrence of inner sensory experiences that narrowly supervene on the perceiver. That is, empirical objects fail directly to determine the perceptual consciousness of the perceiver. The upshot is that not only naïve realism, but also certain further forms of direct realism have to be abandoned.

Naive realism in terrain appreciation

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey S. Smallman ◽  
Maia B. Cook ◽  
Daniel I. Manes ◽  
Michael B. Cowen
Keyword(s):  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism

Ritual Objects and Artifacts

2020 ◽  
pp. 206-222
Author(s):  
Ryan P. Bonfiglio
Keyword(s):  
Old Testament ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Israelite Religion ◽  
Material Form

This chapter surveys material objects in the Old Testament associated with worship and ritual activities, including the ark, altars, wash basins, tables, lampstands, and items deemed to be illicit (idols, sacred poles, pillars, and the bronze serpent). Special emphasis is given to the material form of these objects as well as how they function in ritual processes, activate sensory experience, and/or make available the presence and power of the deity. Attention is also given to the theological systems that undergird the material dimensions of Israelite religion, including aniconism, Deuteronomistic cult reforms, and the construction and operation of the tabernacle and temple.

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