scholarly journals Investment Timing and Incentive Costs*

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 309-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gryglewicz ◽  
Barney Hartman-Glaser

Abstract We analyze how the costs of smoothly adjusting capital, such as incentive costs, affect investment timing. In our model, the owner of a firm holds a real option to increase a lumpy form of capital and can also smoothly adjust an incremental form of capital. Increasing the cost of incremental capital can delay or accelerate investment in lumpy capital. Incentive costs due to moral hazard are a natural source of costs for the accumulation of incremental capital. When moral hazard is severe, delaying investment in lumpy capital is costly, and overinvesting relative to the first-best case is optimal. Received January 24, 2017; editorial decision March 15, 2019 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Guthrie

AbstractReal option analysis typically assumes that projects are continuously evaluated and launched at precisely the time determined to be optimal, but real world projects cannot be managed in this way because of the costs of formally evaluating an investment opportunity. This paper shows that immediate investment is more attractive if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is large. The optimal delay until a reevaluation is long if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is small. The reduction in the value of project rights is especially severe when the value of the completed project is strongly mean reverting because then precision in investment timing is particularly important.


2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Calum G. Turvey ◽  
Michael Hoy ◽  
Zahirul Islam

We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a combination of partial insurance coverage and partial monitoring of inputs may reduce substantially the problems associated with moral hazard. The minimum level of input use that must be required by regulation is determined to be substantially lower than the optimal or actual input level chosen by producers. Because the use of inputs for crop production occurs in many stages over the pre‐planting, planting, and growing seasons, only a minimal input requirement is needed. Thus, the cost of implementing such a regulation can be kept much lower than would be the case for a regulation of complete monitoring of input usage.


2000 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 669-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary M. Margiotta ◽  
Robert A. Miller

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yrjö Koskinen ◽  
Joril Maeland

AbstractIn our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and the timing of the investment. Innovators privately learn the cost of investing. The investor has to compensate the innovators for their reservation wages, but competition makes screening easier and helps to erode innovators’ informational rents. Consequently, competition leads to faster innovation, because the investor has less need to delay expensive investments. With an endogenous number of innovators investment timing becomes first best.Received June 5, 2013; accepted February 26, 2016 by Editor Paolo Fulghieri.


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