The Bernal Lecture, 1971 Science and antiscience
In his book Science in history Bernal (1954) recalls Robert Hooke’s draft preamble to the Statues of the Royal Society: ‘The business of the Royal Society is: To improve the knowledge of naturall things. . . (not meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Morals, Politics, Grammar, Rhetorick, or Logicks).’ Bernal’s generous gift to the Society, which we inaugurate this afternoon, is a direct challenge to this attitude. One cannot consider the social function of science without meddling in some of these subjects. The risks of doing so were evident to Bernal himself, for in this same book he sternly criticizes the social sciences; but his conclusion is that the risks must be run; the present condition of mankind requires some scientists to get outside the framework of their science and to influence its interactions with society. In common with thousands of my generation I was driven to think about these matters after reading an earlier book by Bernal (1939): The social function of science , published on the eve of World War II. The last two chapters of that book carried, in the idiom of twentieth-century science, the message of John Donne’s Devotions , written three and a half centuries earlier: ‘No man is an Hand, intire of itself; every man is a peece of the Continent. . . ’ It was not necessary to embrace Bernal’s political views in order to be moved by his concern for mankind.