scholarly journals Neural signatures for sustaining object representations attributed to others in preverbal human infants

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1819) ◽  
pp. 20151683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dora Kampis ◽  
Eugenio Parise ◽  
Gergely Csibra ◽  
Ágnes Melinda Kovács

A major feat of social beings is to encode what their conspecifics see, know or believe. While various non-human animals show precursors of these abilities, humans perform uniquely sophisticated inferences about other people's mental states. However, it is still unclear how these possibly human-specific capacities develop and whether preverbal infants, similarly to adults, form representations of other agents' mental states, specifically metarepresentations. We explored the neurocognitive bases of eight-month-olds' ability to encode the world from another person's perspective, using gamma-band electroencephalographic activity over the temporal lobes, an established neural signature for sustained object representation after occlusion. We observed such gamma-band activity when an object was occluded from the infants' perspective, as well as when it was occluded only from the other person (study 1), and also when subsequently the object disappeared, but the person falsely believed the object to be present (study 2). These findings suggest that the cognitive systems involved in representing the world from infants' own perspective are also recruited for encoding others' beliefs. Such results point to an early-developing, powerful apparatus suitable to deal with multiple concurrent representations, and suggest that infants can have a metarepresentational understanding of other minds even before the onset of language.

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Pomiechowska ◽  
Teodora Gliga

To what extent does language shape how we think about the world? Studies suggest that linguistic symbols expressing conceptual categories (‘apple’, ‘squirrel’) make us focus on categorical information (e.g. that you saw a squirrel) and disregard individual information (e.g. whether that squirrel had a long or short tail). Across two experiments with preverbal infants, we demonstrated that it is not language but nonverbal category knowledge that determines what information is packed into object representations. Twelve-month-olds ( N = 48) participated in an electroencephalography (EEG) change-detection task involving objects undergoing a brief occlusion. When viewing objects from unfamiliar categories, infants detected both across- and within-category changes, as evidenced by their negative central wave (Nc) event-related potential. Conversely, when viewing objects from familiar categories, they did not respond to within-category changes, which indicates that nonverbal category knowledge interfered with the representation of individual surface features necessary to detect such changes. Furthermore, distinct patterns of γ and α oscillations between familiar and unfamiliar categories were evident before and during occlusion, suggesting that categorization had an influence on the format of recruited object representations. Thus, we show that nonverbal category knowledge has rapid and enduring effects on object representation and discuss their functional significance for generic knowledge acquisition in the absence of language.


Author(s):  
Michael Sollberger
Keyword(s):  

Can some synaesthetic experiences be treated as veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. as conscious mental states in which worldly objects and their features perceptually appear as they really are? Most empirical scientists and philosophers working on synaesthesia answer this question in the negative. Contrary to this prevailing opinion, Mohan Matthen’s ‘When is Synaesthesia Perception?’ (Chapter 8, this volume) argues that such a dismissive approach to the epistemic properties of synaesthetic experiences is not mandatory. Matthen claims that there is conceptual room for a more tolerant approach according to which at least one variety of synaesthesia, which he calls ‘direct synaesthesia’, is epistemically on a par with everyday non-synaesthetic perception. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the idea of ‘direct synaesthesia’ and to assess whether the accepted dogma that synaesthesia is always prone to error has to go.


Author(s):  
Elise L. Radtke ◽  
Ulla Martens ◽  
Thomas Gruber

AbstractWe applied high-density EEG to examine steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs) during a perceptual/semantic stimulus repetition design. SSVEPs are evoked oscillatory cortical responses at the same frequency as visual stimuli flickered at this frequency. In repetition designs, stimuli are presented twice with the repetition being task irrelevant. The cortical processing of the second stimulus is commonly characterized by decreased neuronal activity (repetition suppression). The behavioral consequences of stimulus repetition were examined in a companion reaction time pre-study using the same experimental design as the EEG study. During the first presentation of a stimulus, we confronted participants with drawings of familiar object images or object words, respectively. The second stimulus was either a repetition of the same object image (perceptual repetition; PR) or an image depicting the word presented during the first presentation (semantic repetition; SR)—all flickered at 15 Hz to elicit SSVEPs. The behavioral study revealed priming effects in both experimental conditions (PR and SR). In the EEG, PR was associated with repetition suppression of SSVEP amplitudes at left occipital and repetition enhancement at left temporal electrodes. In contrast, SR was associated with SSVEP suppression at left occipital and central electrodes originating in bilateral postcentral and occipital gyri, right middle frontal and right temporal gyrus. The conclusion of the presented study is twofold. First, SSVEP amplitudes do not only index perceptual aspects of incoming sensory information but also semantic aspects of cortical object representation. Second, our electrophysiological findings can be interpreted as neuronal underpinnings of perceptual and semantic priming.


2001 ◽  
Vol 112 (7) ◽  
pp. 1219-1228 ◽  
Author(s):  
I.G Gurtubay ◽  
M Alegre ◽  
A Labarga ◽  
A Malanda ◽  
J Iriarte ◽  
...  

PLoS ONE ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. e44215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Maling ◽  
Rowshanak Hashemiyoon ◽  
Kelly D. Foote ◽  
Michael S. Okun ◽  
Justin C. Sanchez

2006 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 533-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Matsumoto ◽  
Yoko Ichikawa ◽  
Noriaki Kanayama ◽  
Hideki Ohira ◽  
Tetsuya Iidaka

2008 ◽  
Vol 115 (9) ◽  
pp. 1301-1311 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. van Deursen ◽  
E. F. P. M. Vuurman ◽  
F. R. J. Verhey ◽  
V. H. J. M. van Kranen-Mastenbroek ◽  
W. J. Riedel

Cephalalgia ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (12) ◽  
pp. 1360-1367 ◽  
Author(s):  
G Coppola ◽  
A Ambrosini ◽  
L Di Clemente ◽  
D Magis ◽  
A Fumal ◽  
...  

Between attacks, migraineurs lack habituation in standard visual evoked potentials (VEPs). Visual stimuli also evoke high-frequency oscillations in the gamma band range (GBOs, 20–35 Hz) assumed to be generated both at subcortical (early GBOs) and cortical levels (late GBOs). The consecutive peaks of GBOs were analysed regarding amplitude and habituation in six successive blocks of 100 averaged pattern reversal (PR)-VEPs in healthy volunteers and interictally in migraine with (MA) or without aura patients. Amplitude of the two early GBO components in the first PR-VEP block was significantly increased in MA patients. There was a significant habituation deficit of the late GBO peaks in migraineurs. The increased amplitude of early GBOs could be related to the increased interictal visual discomfort reported by patients. We hypothesize that the hypo-functioning serotonergic pathways may cause, in line with the thalamocortical dysrhythmia theory, a functional disconnection of the thalamus leading to decreased intracortical lateral inhibition, which can induce dishabituation.


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