The basic relationship between consciously-experienced representations, and material objects they represent, is hotly debated in some circles. But is it practically important? To investigate this, I introduce new symbolic notation, capable of labelling object, brain-perception, and conscious representation. Simple physics-based reasoning argues against identity of object and representation (rejecting e.g., direct realism). Nevertheless, a pivotal concern of the direct-realism school remains: how do we have knowledge of the world, if it’s only experienced indirectly? I sketch an indirect-school response, and review recent theoretical results showing how it simply doesn’t work in the dynamically-conventional setting (which is the hallmark of modern mainstream science). After illustrating how dynamically-conventional dysfunctions affect the foundations of science itself, I point to an experimentally-based resolution of knowledge-problems (and of the direct/indirect debate itself). Because the foundational problems for science affect its standing in society (for example, in its conflict with postmodernist ‘post-Truth’), the object-representation debate does turn out to have a practical significance, far beyond its conventional, academic/abstract/technical, framing.