scholarly journals The biology of cultural conflict

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1589) ◽  
pp. 633-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Berns ◽  
Scott Atran

Although culture is usually thought of as the collection of knowledge and traditions that are transmitted outside of biology, evidence continues to accumulate showing how biology and culture are inseparably intertwined. Cultural conflict will occur only when the beliefs and traditions of one cultural group represent a challenge to individuals of another. Such a challenge will elicit brain processes involved in cognitive decision-making, emotional activation and physiological arousal associated with the outbreak, conduct and resolution of conflict. Key targets to understand bio-cultural differences include primitive drives—how the brain responds to likes and dislikes, how it discounts the future, and how this relates to reproductive behaviour—but also higher level functions, such as how the mind represents and values the surrounding physical and social environment. Future cultural wars, while they may bear familiar labels of religion and politics, will ultimately be fought over control of our biology and our environment.

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9(5)) ◽  
pp. 557-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Gendron ◽  
Lisa Feldman Barrett

Emotions are traditionally viewed as detrimental to judicial responsibility, a belief rooted in the classical view of the mind as a battle ground between reason and emotion. Drawing on recent developments in psychology and neuroscience we propose that the brain uses past experience, organized as concepts, to guide actions and give sensations meaning, constructing experiences such as “fear” or “anger”. Wisdom comes from skill at constructing emotions in a more precise and functional way, a skill called “emotional granularity”. Studies show that individuals who are more emotionally granular have better function across a range of domains, including self regulation and decision making. We propose that effective judicial decision-making does not require a dispassionate judge, but a judge who is high in emotional granularity. We lay out an empirical agenda for testing this idea and end by discussing empirically supported recommendations for increasing emotional granularity in the judiciary. Tradicionalmente, se ha considerado que las emociones son perjudiciales para el desempeño responsable de la labor judicial, una creencia enraizada en la concepción clásica de la mente como campo de batalla entre razón y emoción. Partiendo de nuevos descubrimientos en psicología y neurociencia, argumentamos que el cerebro usa la experiencia pasada, organizada como conceptos, para guiar las acciones y dar sentido a las sensaciones, construyendo experiencias como “miedo” o “ira”. La sabiduría proviene de la habilidad en construir emociones de un modo más preciso y funcional, habilidad denominada “granularidad emocional”. Los estudios muestran que los individuos más granulares emocionalmente funcionan mejor en varios dominios, incluyendo la autorregulación y la toma de decisiones. Argumentamos que la toma de decisiones eficaz en judicatura no requiere de un juez desapasionado, sino de un juez que tenga alta granularidad emocional. Proponemos un programa empírico para poner a prueba esa idea, y concluimos con un debate de recomendaciones de base empírica para aumentar la granularidad emocional en la judicatura.


Author(s):  
Ned Block ◽  
Georges Rey

The computational theory of mind (CTM) is the theory that the mind can be understood as a computer or, roughly, as the ‘software program’ of the brain. It is the most influential form of ‘functionalism’, according to which what distinguishes a mind is not what it is made of, nor a person’s behavioural dispositions, but the way in which the brain is organized. CTM underlies some of the most important research in current cognitive science, for example, theories of artificial intelligence, perception, decision making and linguistics. CTM involves a number of important ideas. (1) Computations can be defined over syntactically specifiable symbols (that is, symbols specified by rules governing their combination) possessing semantic properties (or ‘meaning’). For example, addition can be captured by rules defined over decimal numerals (symbols) that name the numbers. (2) Computations can be analysed into ‘algorithms’, or simple step-by-step procedures, each of which could be carried out by a machine. (3) Computation can be generalized to include not only arithmetic, but deductive logic and other forms of reasoning, including induction, abduction and decision making. (4) Computations capture relatively autonomous levels of ordinary psychological explanation different from neurophysiology and descriptions of behaviour.


Author(s):  
Alvaro Pascual-Leone ◽  
Adolfo Plasencia

In this dialogue, the Harvard neuroscientist, Alvaro Pascual-Leone initially reflects on the importance of ‘unlearning’ and forgetting. He then gives a detailed explanation of, and how he carries out, transcraneal magnetic stimulation (TMS) and how he uses this technology to fight diseases, as well as explaining his experiments on inattentional blindness. He then discusses how the brain acts as a hypothesis generator and whether the brain, the mind and the soul are different things or not. Later reflect on the questions: Is the mind and what we are a consequence of the brain’s structure?  Do changes in the brain change our reality? And why are a person’s dreams important? Then he explains how freewill and decision-making work from the brain, and relates his vision of intelligence and where it may be generated from, explaining the differences between the mind and the brain. He finally reflects on what is known so far about the brain’s “dark energy” and the way we are continuously being surprised by the wonders of the brain's plasticity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 506-512
Author(s):  
Nick Chater ◽  
Jian-Qiao Zhu ◽  
Jake Spicer ◽  
Joakim Sundh ◽  
Pablo León-Villagrá ◽  
...  

In Bayesian cognitive science, the mind is seen as a spectacular probabilistic-inference machine. But judgment and decision-making (JDM) researchers have spent half a century uncovering how dramatically and systematically people depart from rational norms. In this article, we outline recent research that opens up the possibility of an unexpected reconciliation. The key hypothesis is that the brain neither represents nor calculates with probabilities but approximates probabilistic calculations by drawing samples from memory or mental simulation. Sampling models diverge from perfect probabilistic calculations in ways that capture many classic JDM findings, which offers the hope of an integrated explanation of classic heuristics and biases, including availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment.


Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Lance Nizami

Purpose Neuroscientists act as proxies for implied anthropomorphic signal-processing beings within the brain, Homunculi. The latter examine the arriving neuronal spike-trains to infer internal and external states. But a Homunculus needs a brain of its own, to coordinate its capabilities – a brain that necessarily contains a Homunculus and so on indefinitely. Such infinity is impossible – and in well-cited papers, Attneave and later Dennett claim to eliminate it. How do their approaches differ and do they (in fact) obviate the Homunculi? Design/methodology/approach The Attneave and Dennett approaches are carefully scrutinized. To Attneave, Homunculi are effectively “decision-making” neurons that control behaviors. Attneave presumes that Homunculi, when successively nested, become successively “stupider”, limiting their numbers by diminishing their responsibilities. Dennett likewise postulates neuronal Homunculi that become “stupider” – but brain-wards, where greater sophistication might have been expected. Findings Attneave’s argument is Reductionist and it simply assumes-away the Homuncular infinity. Dennett’s scheme, which evidently derives from Attneave’s, ultimately involves the same mistakes. Attneave and Dennett fail, because they attempt to reduce intentionality to non-intentionality. Research limitations/implications Homunculus has been successively recognized over the centuries by philosophers, psychologists and (some) neuroscientists as a crucial conundrum of cognitive science. It still is. Practical implications Cognitive-science researchers need to recognize that Reductionist explanations of cognition may actually devolve to Homunculi, rather than eliminating them. Originality/value Two notable Reductionist arguments against the infinity of Homunculi are proven wrong. In their place, a non-Reductionist treatment of the mind, “Emergence”, is discussed as a means of rendering Homunculi irrelevant.


2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 713-716
Author(s):  
Ellen S. Berscheid
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (32) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Was
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Rade

Emulators are internal models, first evolved for prediction in perception to shorten the feedback on motor action. However, the selective pressure on perception is to improve the fitness of decision-making, driving the evolution of emulators towards context-dependent payoff representation and integration of action planning, not enhanced prediction as is generally assumed. The result is integrated perceptual, memory, representational, and imaginative capacities processing external input and stored internal input for decision-making, while simultaneously updating stored information. Perception, recall, imagination, theory of mind, and dreaming are the same process with different inputs. Learning proceeds via scaffolding on existing conceptual infrastructure, a weak form of embodied cognition. Discrete concepts are emergent from continuous dynamics and are in a perceptual, not representational, format. Language is also in perceptual format and enables precise abstract thought. In sum, what was initially a primitive system for short-term prediction in perception has evolved to perform abstract thought, store and retrieve memory, understand others, hold embedded action plans, build stable narratives, simulate scenarios, and integrate context dependence into perception. Crucially, emulators co-evolved with the emergence of societies, producing a mind-society system in which emulators are dysfunctional unless integrated into a society, which enables their complexity. The Target Emulator System, evolved initially for honest signaling, produces the emergent dynamics of the mind-society system and spreads variation-testing of behavior and thought patterns across a population. The human brain is the most dysfunctional in isolation, but the most effective given its context.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
vernon thornton

A description of of the mind and its relationship to the brain, set in an evolutionary context. Introduction of a correct version of 'language-of-thought' called 'thinkish'.


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