Extended Emulation Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Rade
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Weak Form ◽  
External Input ◽  
Motor Action ◽  
Abstract Thought ◽  
Thought Patterns ◽  
Stored Information ◽  
Short Term Prediction ◽  
The Mind

Emulators are internal models, first evolved for prediction in perception to shorten the feedback on motor action. However, the selective pressure on perception is to improve the fitness of decision-making, driving the evolution of emulators towards context-dependent payoff representation and integration of action planning, not enhanced prediction as is generally assumed. The result is integrated perceptual, memory, representational, and imaginative capacities processing external input and stored internal input for decision-making, while simultaneously updating stored information. Perception, recall, imagination, theory of mind, and dreaming are the same process with different inputs. Learning proceeds via scaffolding on existing conceptual infrastructure, a weak form of embodied cognition. Discrete concepts are emergent from continuous dynamics and are in a perceptual, not representational, format. Language is also in perceptual format and enables precise abstract thought. In sum, what was initially a primitive system for short-term prediction in perception has evolved to perform abstract thought, store and retrieve memory, understand others, hold embedded action plans, build stable narratives, simulate scenarios, and integrate context dependence into perception. Crucially, emulators co-evolved with the emergence of societies, producing a mind-society system in which emulators are dysfunctional unless integrated into a society, which enables their complexity. The Target Emulator System, evolved initially for honest signaling, produces the emergent dynamics of the mind-society system and spreads variation-testing of behavior and thought patterns across a population. The human brain is the most dysfunctional in isolation, but the most effective given its context.

Continuous Decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seng Bum Michael Yoo ◽  
Benjamin Hayden ◽  
John Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Control Theory ◽  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Extended Period ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Engineering Control ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Academic Study

Humans and other animals evolved to make decisions that extend over time with continuous and ever-changing options. Nonetheless, the academic study of decision-making is mostly limited to the simple case of choice between two options. Here we advocate that the study of choice should expand to include continuous decisions. Continuous decisions, by our definition, involve a continuum of possible responses and take place over an extended period of time during which the response is continuously subject to modification. In most continuous decisions, the range of options can fluctuate and is affected by recent responses, making consideration of reciprocal feedback between choices and the environment essential. The study of continuous decisions raises new questions, such as how abstract processes of valuation and comparison are co-implemented with action planning and execution, how we simulate the large number of possible futures our choices lead to, and how our brains employ hierarchical structure to make choices more efficiently. While microeconomic theory has proven invaluable for discrete decisions, we propose that engineering control theory may serve as a better foundation for continuous ones. And while the concept of value has proven foundational for discrete decisions, goal states and policies may prove more useful for continuous ones.

scholarly journals Human language evolution: a view from theoretical linguistics on how syntax and the lexicon first came into being

Primates ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haruka Fujita ◽  
Koji Fujita
Keyword(s):  
Language Evolution ◽  
Animal Cognition ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Motor Action ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Gradual Evolution ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Evolutionary Continuity

AbstractHuman language is a multi-componential function comprising several sub-functions each of which may have evolved in other species independently of language. Among them, two sub-functions, or modules, have been claimed to be truly unique to the humans, namely hierarchical syntax (known as “Merge” in linguistics) and the “lexicon.” This kind of species-specificity stands as a hindrance to our natural understanding of human language evolution. Here we challenge this issue and advance our hypotheses on how human syntax and lexicon may have evolved from pre-existing cognitive capacities in our ancestors and other species including but not limited to nonhuman primates. Specifically, we argue that Merge evolved from motor action planning, and that the human lexicon with the distinction between lexical and functional categories evolved from its predecessors found in animal cognition through a process we call “disintegration.” We build our arguments on recent developments in generative grammar but crucially depart from some of its core ideas by borrowing insights from other relevant disciplines. Most importantly, we maintain that every sub-function of human language keeps evolutionary continuity with other species’ cognitive capacities and reject a saltational emergence of language in favor of its gradual evolution. By doing so, we aim to offer a firm theoretical background on which a promising scenario of language evolution can be constructed.

scholarly journals Strategy selection as rational metareasoning

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Falk Lieder ◽  
Tom Griffiths
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Rational Model ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Human Rationality

Many contemporary accounts of human reasoning assume that the mind is equipped with multiple heuristics that could be deployed to perform a given task. This raises the question how the mind determines when to use which heuristic. To answer this question, we developed a rational model of strategy selection, based on the theory of rational metareasoning developed in the artificial intelligence literature. According to our model people learn to efficiently choose the strategy with the best cost-benefit tradeoff by learning a predictive model of each strategy’s performance. We found that our model can provide a unifying explanation for classic findings from domains ranging from decision-making to problem-solving and arithmetic by capturing the variability of people’s strategy choices, their dependence on task and context, and their development over time. Systematic model comparisons supported our theory, and four new experiments confirmed its distinctive predictions. Our findings suggest that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of fallible heuristics. This perspective reconciles the two poles of the debate about human rationality by integrating heuristics and biases with learning and rationality.

scholarly journals A Role for Emotional Granularity in Judging

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9(5)) ◽  
pp. 557-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Gendron ◽  
Lisa Feldman Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Classical View ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Toma De Decisiones ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Emotions are traditionally viewed as detrimental to judicial responsibility, a belief rooted in the classical view of the mind as a battle ground between reason and emotion. Drawing on recent developments in psychology and neuroscience we propose that the brain uses past experience, organized as concepts, to guide actions and give sensations meaning, constructing experiences such as “fear” or “anger”. Wisdom comes from skill at constructing emotions in a more precise and functional way, a skill called “emotional granularity”. Studies show that individuals who are more emotionally granular have better function across a range of domains, including self regulation and decision making. We propose that effective judicial decision-making does not require a dispassionate judge, but a judge who is high in emotional granularity. We lay out an empirical agenda for testing this idea and end by discussing empirically supported recommendations for increasing emotional granularity in the judiciary. Tradicionalmente, se ha considerado que las emociones son perjudiciales para el desempeño responsable de la labor judicial, una creencia enraizada en la concepción clásica de la mente como campo de batalla entre razón y emoción. Partiendo de nuevos descubrimientos en psicología y neurociencia, argumentamos que el cerebro usa la experiencia pasada, organizada como conceptos, para guiar las acciones y dar sentido a las sensaciones, construyendo experiencias como “miedo” o “ira”. La sabiduría proviene de la habilidad en construir emociones de un modo más preciso y funcional, habilidad denominada “granularidad emocional”. Los estudios muestran que los individuos más granulares emocionalmente funcionan mejor en varios dominios, incluyendo la autorregulación y la toma de decisiones. Argumentamos que la toma de decisiones eficaz en judicatura no requiere de un juez desapasionado, sino de un juez que tenga alta granularidad emocional. Proponemos un programa empírico para poner a prueba esa idea, y concluimos con un debate de recomendaciones de base empírica para aumentar la granularidad emocional en la judicatura.

scholarly journals Communication in Action: Planning and Interpreting Communicative Demonstrations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark K Ho ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman ◽  
Michael L. Littman ◽  
Joseph L. Austerweil
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Physical Environment ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Intentional Behavior ◽  
The World ◽  
Communication Culture

Theory of mind enables an observer to interpret others' behavior in terms of unobservable beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, and expectations about the world. This also empowers the person whose behavior is being observed: By intelligently modifying her actions, she can influence the mental representations that an observer ascribes to her, and by extension, what the observer comes to believe about the world. That is, she can engage in intentionally communicative demonstrations. Here, we develop a computational account of generating and interpreting communicative demonstrations by explicitly distinguishing between two interacting types of planning. Typically, instrumental planning aims to control states of the physical environment, whereas belief-directed planning aims to influence an observer's mental representations. Our framework (1) extends existing formal models of pragmatics and pedagogy to the setting of value-guided decision-making, (2) captures how people modify their intentional behavior to show what they know about the reward or causal structure of an environment, and (3) helps explain data on infant and child imitation in terms of literal versus pragmatic interpretation of adult demonstrators' actions. Additionally, our analysis of belief-directed intentionality and mentalizing sheds light on the socio-cognitive mechanisms that underlie distinctly human forms of communication, culture, and sociality.

Philosophers-Citizens

In Our Name ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Beerbohm
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Life Of The Mind ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter challenges an account of citizenship that treats us as political philosophers or perennial deliberators and instead proposes the model of the philosopher-citizen who exhibits a computationally intense life of the mind. It first describes the ideal of the philosopher-citizen before considering how a theory of justice is to be employed by well-intentioned citizens by taking into account the views of John Rawls. It argues that the model of the philosopher-citizens tends to be monistic, collapsing the diversity of moral achievements that citizens can make in a democracy, and that this ideal should be separated from an account of the citizen's decision-making obligations. The chapter also examines the principles for citizens and for representatives in the context of Justice as Fairness and concludes by outlining the essential assumptions of a nonideal democratic theory.

Re-ordering Desires: A Trinitarian Lens on Eating Disorders

2017 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-274
Author(s):  
Jillian Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Eating Disorders ◽  
Eating Disorder ◽  
Holy Spirit ◽  
Healthcare Services ◽  
Unique Role ◽  
Thought Patterns ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Trinity

This paper uses the doctrine of the Trinity to demonstrate the unique role God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can play in the healing of eating disorders and explores how a trinitarian framework may be brought alongside healthcare services to aid in recovery. Drawing on the theological work of Sarah Coakley, the paper considers various trinitarian models and practices that can redirect our minds, hearts, and imaginations to a new participation in the trinitarian God. This essay seeks to show that it is also possible to challenge the idolatrous thought patterns of an eating disorder by redirecting the mind to participation in life through the lens of the life-giving Trinity.

Compassionate Reasoning, the Mind, and Moral Choice

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-130
Author(s):  
Marc Gopin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Change ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Extensive Training ◽  
Positive Social Change ◽  
Fierce Competition ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Obedience To Authority

The ethical schools of thought are essential to decision-making for peacebuilding and positive social change. The directives emerging from ethical schools often contradict each other, but Compassionate Reasoning can help resolve these contradictions and guide people in a more coherent direction of thinking and acting. The cultivation of compassion is shown to be a glue that bonds schools of ethics into one enterprise of moral reasoning as seen through several lenses. People who reason together are more adept at problem solving than when reasoning alone, but only if they have cultivated caring and compassionate relationships as a group. Moral reasoning in fierce competition with others, by contrast, retards the discovery of solutions to thorny problems. Compassionate Reasoning encourages collective reasoning rather than isolated and selfish reasoning. Excessive obedience to authority is also one of the most dangerous aspects of the human lower brain. A critical antidote is extensive training in taking the perspectives of others through Compassionate Reasoning.

Exploring the hyphen in ideo-motor action

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 891-892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilfried Kunde
Keyword(s):  
Action Planning ◽  
Action Control ◽  
Motor Action ◽  
Movement Effect ◽  
Feature Based

This commentary focuses on Hommel et al.'s inferences on action planning. It discusses the relevance of anticipated extrinsic movement effects for action control, the problems of a feature-based representation of actions, and the necessity of the acquisition of conditional movement-effect associations.

scholarly journals Humans incorporate trial-to-trial working memory uncertainty into rewarded decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (15) ◽  
pp. 8391-8397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maija Honig ◽  
Wei Ji Ma ◽  
Daryl Fougnie
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Working Memory ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Informational Content ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Stimulus Color ◽  
Uncertainty Information ◽  
Best Fit ◽  
With Memory

Working memory (WM) plays an important role in action planning and decision making; however, both the informational content of memory and how that information is used in decisions remain poorly understood. To investigate this, we used a color WM task in which subjects viewed colored stimuli and reported both an estimate of a stimulus color and a measure of memory uncertainty, obtained through a rewarded decision. Reported memory uncertainty is correlated with memory error, showing that people incorporate their trial-to-trial memory quality into rewarded decisions. Moreover, memory uncertainty can be combined with other sources of information; after inducing expectations (prior beliefs) about stimuli probabilities, we found that estimates became shifted toward expected colors, with the shift increasing with reported uncertainty. The data are best fit by models in which people incorporate their trial-to-trial memory uncertainty with potential rewards and prior beliefs. Our results suggest that WM represents uncertainty information, and that this can be combined with prior beliefs. This highlights the potential complexity of WM representations and shows that rewarded decision can be a powerful tool for examining WM and informing and constraining theoretical, computational, and neurobiological models of memory.

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