Mind, computational theories of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Block ◽  
Georges Rey
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Psychological Explanation ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Important Research ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Simple Step ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Linguistics ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Semantic Properties

The computational theory of mind (CTM) is the theory that the mind can be understood as a computer or, roughly, as the ‘software program’ of the brain. It is the most influential form of ‘functionalism’, according to which what distinguishes a mind is not what it is made of, nor a person’s behavioural dispositions, but the way in which the brain is organized. CTM underlies some of the most important research in current cognitive science, for example, theories of artificial intelligence, perception, decision making and linguistics. CTM involves a number of important ideas. (1) Computations can be defined over syntactically specifiable symbols (that is, symbols specified by rules governing their combination) possessing semantic properties (or ‘meaning’). For example, addition can be captured by rules defined over decimal numerals (symbols) that name the numbers. (2) Computations can be analysed into ‘algorithms’, or simple step-by-step procedures, each of which could be carried out by a machine. (3) Computation can be generalized to include not only arithmetic, but deductive logic and other forms of reasoning, including induction, abduction and decision making. (4) Computations capture relatively autonomous levels of ordinary psychological explanation different from neurophysiology and descriptions of behaviour.

Computation and the Function of Consciousness

2020 ◽  
pp. 317-350
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Functional Organization ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Computational Explanation ◽  
Computational Functionalism ◽  
Empirical Discovery ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.

Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Methodological Solipsism ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

scholarly journals A Role for Emotional Granularity in Judging

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9(5)) ◽  
pp. 557-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Gendron ◽  
Lisa Feldman Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Classical View ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Toma De Decisiones ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Emotions are traditionally viewed as detrimental to judicial responsibility, a belief rooted in the classical view of the mind as a battle ground between reason and emotion. Drawing on recent developments in psychology and neuroscience we propose that the brain uses past experience, organized as concepts, to guide actions and give sensations meaning, constructing experiences such as “fear” or “anger”. Wisdom comes from skill at constructing emotions in a more precise and functional way, a skill called “emotional granularity”. Studies show that individuals who are more emotionally granular have better function across a range of domains, including self regulation and decision making. We propose that effective judicial decision-making does not require a dispassionate judge, but a judge who is high in emotional granularity. We lay out an empirical agenda for testing this idea and end by discussing empirically supported recommendations for increasing emotional granularity in the judiciary. Tradicionalmente, se ha considerado que las emociones son perjudiciales para el desempeño responsable de la labor judicial, una creencia enraizada en la concepción clásica de la mente como campo de batalla entre razón y emoción. Partiendo de nuevos descubrimientos en psicología y neurociencia, argumentamos que el cerebro usa la experiencia pasada, organizada como conceptos, para guiar las acciones y dar sentido a las sensaciones, construyendo experiencias como “miedo” o “ira”. La sabiduría proviene de la habilidad en construir emociones de un modo más preciso y funcional, habilidad denominada “granularidad emocional”. Los estudios muestran que los individuos más granulares emocionalmente funcionan mejor en varios dominios, incluyendo la autorregulación y la toma de decisiones. Argumentamos que la toma de decisiones eficaz en judicatura no requiere de un juez desapasionado, sino de un juez que tenga alta granularidad emocional. Proponemos un programa empírico para poner a prueba esa idea, y concluimos con un debate de recomendaciones de base empírica para aumentar la granularidad emocional en la judicatura.

scholarly journals The biology of cultural conflict

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1589) ◽  
pp. 633-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Berns ◽  
Scott Atran
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Social Environment ◽  
Religion And Politics ◽  
Reproductive Behaviour ◽  
Cultural Conflict ◽  
Cultural Group ◽  
Cognitive Decision ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Although culture is usually thought of as the collection of knowledge and traditions that are transmitted outside of biology, evidence continues to accumulate showing how biology and culture are inseparably intertwined. Cultural conflict will occur only when the beliefs and traditions of one cultural group represent a challenge to individuals of another. Such a challenge will elicit brain processes involved in cognitive decision-making, emotional activation and physiological arousal associated with the outbreak, conduct and resolution of conflict. Key targets to understand bio-cultural differences include primitive drives—how the brain responds to likes and dislikes, how it discounts the future, and how this relates to reproductive behaviour—but also higher level functions, such as how the mind represents and values the surrounding physical and social environment. Future cultural wars, while they may bear familiar labels of religion and politics, will ultimately be fought over control of our biology and our environment.

Skinner, Burrhus Frederick (1904–90)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Flanagan ◽  
Georges Rey
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Operant Conditioning ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
The Mind

B.F. Skinner advocated a philosophy of psychology, called ‘radical behaviourism’, as well as a substantive psychological theory, ‘scientific behaviourism’. Radical behaviourism restricted psychology to establishing lawful links between the environment and behaviour, rejecting the ‘mind’ as a ‘needless way station’ mediating the two. Scientific behaviourism proposed specific links, the laws of ‘operant conditioning’, whereby behaviours are ‘reinforced’ by the consequences they have had in an animal’s past. Although Skinner brought to psychology new standards of experimental rigour, and managed to train animals to do remarkable things, there are serious limits to the range of behaviours scientific behaviourism can explain. Both it and radical behaviourism have been obviated by the development of a computational theory of mind.

Mind, Brain, and Behavior

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvaro Pascual-Leone ◽  
Adolfo Plasencia
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dark Energy ◽  
Magnetic Stimulation ◽  
Inattentional Blindness ◽  
Detailed Explanation ◽  
Brain And Behavior ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain Change

In this dialogue, the Harvard neuroscientist, Alvaro Pascual-Leone initially reflects on the importance of ‘unlearning’ and forgetting. He then gives a detailed explanation of, and how he carries out, transcraneal magnetic stimulation (TMS) and how he uses this technology to fight diseases, as well as explaining his experiments on inattentional blindness. He then discusses how the brain acts as a hypothesis generator and whether the brain, the mind and the soul are different things or not. Later reflect on the questions: Is the mind and what we are a consequence of the brain’s structure?  Do changes in the brain change our reality? And why are a person’s dreams important? Then he explains how freewill and decision-making work from the brain, and relates his vision of intelligence and where it may be generated from, explaining the differences between the mind and the brain. He finally reflects on what is known so far about the brain’s “dark energy” and the way we are continuously being surprised by the wonders of the brain's plasticity.

It’s in My Bones

2020 ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Iris Berent
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
The Body ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Bodily Experiences ◽  
Abstract Notion ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Material Bodies

When I point to an object, you and I can agree on what it is (a red, round cup). How does our brain (matter) represent such notions? And how do we (distinct material bodies) apparently converge so we can talk about the same things? Cognitive scientists and philosophers have long assumed that people share abstract concepts (e.g., a cup); to explain how such abstract concepts can give rise to thinking, they further proposed the computational theory of mind. But theories of “embodied cognition” assert that cognition is all “in people’s bones.” What we know as a cup is not an abstract notion but rather the bodily experiences of our sensory and motor interactions with a cup—its shiny color, how it feels in our hands, the smoothness of its surface, its weight, and shape. I suggest that “Embodiment” is alluring because it promises to resolve the mysteries of Dualism (how can material bodies encode the immaterial notion of a cup?) and the origins of ideas (how do we all converge on an understanding that allows us to talk about the same things?). The solution is strikingly simple—just remove the “mind” from the equation. If there is no (immaterial) knowledge, then we no longer need to worry about how knowledge arises from the body and how knowledge can be learned. As discussed in the previous chapter, people erroneously believe that “if it’s in my body” then “it’s inborn.” Dualism and essentialism thus explain some of the lure of embodied cognition.

That Seventies Cult

Ideal Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 100-135
Author(s):  
Michael Trask
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Libertarian Paternalism ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Mind Control ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Force Data ◽  
The Prestige

This chapter assesses the unlikely mutuality of two very different seventies formations: the mind-control cult and the libertarian movement that arose out of a longer and more conflicted tradition of anarchism. It demonstrates that the cult's principles converge with those of libertarianism, particularly with respect to the prestige both cultists and libertarians assigned to expanded consciousness. L. Ron Hubbard bases Scientology on a premise not unlike libertarian paternalism: “What is true is what is true for you. No one has any right to force data on you and command you to believe.” Hubbard embraces the computational theory of mind with a fundamentalist zeal. Just as Hubbard shows us that cult libertarianism pairs well with the decade's resurgent antifoundationalism, so Scientology's techno-fetishism and celebrity centers remind us that seventies cults, breaking with an earlier generation's despair about mass media's atomizing effects, go all in on the euphoria of togetherness.

scholarly journals Probabilistic Biases Meet the Bayesian Brain

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 506-512
Author(s):  
Nick Chater ◽  
Jian-Qiao Zhu ◽  
Jake Spicer ◽  
Joakim Sundh ◽  
Pablo León-Villagrá ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Bayesian Brain ◽  
Anchoring And Adjustment ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Bayesian Cognitive Science

In Bayesian cognitive science, the mind is seen as a spectacular probabilistic-inference machine. But judgment and decision-making (JDM) researchers have spent half a century uncovering how dramatically and systematically people depart from rational norms. In this article, we outline recent research that opens up the possibility of an unexpected reconciliation. The key hypothesis is that the brain neither represents nor calculates with probabilities but approximates probabilistic calculations by drawing samples from memory or mental simulation. Sampling models diverge from perfect probabilistic calculations in ways that capture many classic JDM findings, which offers the hope of an integrated explanation of classic heuristics and biases, including availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment.

Do Not Neglect the Body and Action: The Emergence of Embodiment Approaches to Understanding Human Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 126 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Marmeleira ◽  
Graça Duarte Santos
Keyword(s):  
Human Development ◽  
The Body ◽  
Important Research ◽  
Human Relations ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Brain

It is becoming clear that to truly understand what it is to be human, focusing scientific efforts on the mind alone is insufficient. We are embodied minds, living and acting in a world full of meaningful things. In this article, we discuss how science has been informed by important research insights into the close relationship between the body, the mind, and the world. These interactions can be translated into embodied perspectives of human development. We provide evidence that perception, cognition, emotion, human relations, and behavior are grounded in our bodies from the beginning of our lives. From this perspective, the body cannot be assumed to be simply an effector for cognition or an instrument for collecting information for the brain. This comprehensive review and debate of embodied-related literature is accompanied by the identification of theoretical challenges and practical applications that will shape research for years to come.

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