scholarly journals Higher order thoughts in action: consciousness as an unconscious re-description process

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1594) ◽  
pp. 1412-1423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert Timmermans ◽  
Leonhard Schilbach ◽  
Antoine Pasquali ◽  
Axel Cleeremans

Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational re-description processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world and on other people through three predictive loops: an inner loop, a perception–action loop and a self–other (social cognition) loop, which together form a tangled hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this form of enactive metacognition. We extend previous neural network simulations and compare the model with signal detection theory, highlighting that while the latter approach assumes that both type I (objective) and type II (subjective, metacognition-based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is closer to dual-route models in which it is assumed that the re-descriptions made possible by the emergence of meta-representations occur independently and outside of the first-order causal chain. We close by reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea that awareness, self-awareness and social cognition involve the same mechanisms.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 1203-1211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Wykowska

AbstractAs the field of social robotics has been dynamically growing and expanding over various areas of research and application, in which robots can be of assistance and companionship for humans, this paper offers a different perspective on a role that social robots can also play, namely the role of informing us about flexibility of human mechanisms of social cognition. The paper focuses on studies in which robots have been used as a new type of “stimuli” in psychological experiments to examine whether similar mechanisms of social cognition would be activated in interaction with a robot, as would be elicited in interaction with another human. Analysing studies in which a direct comparison has been made between a robot and a human agent, the paper examines whether for robot agents, the brain re-uses the same mechanisms that have been developed for interaction with other humans in terms of perception, action representation, attention and higher-order social cognition. Based on this analysis, the paper concludes that the human socio-cognitive mechanisms, in adult brains, are sufficiently flexible to be re-used for robotic agents, at least for those that have some level of resemblance to humans.


2009 ◽  
Vol 364 (1521) ◽  
pp. 1281-1289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou

Based on accumulating evidence, simulation appears to be a basic computational mechanism in the brain that supports a broad spectrum of processes from perception to social cognition. Further evidence suggests that simulation is typically situated, with the situated character of experience in the environment being reflected in the situated character of the representations that underlie simulation. A basic architecture is sketched of how the brain implements situated simulation. Within this framework, simulators implement the concepts that underlie knowledge, and situated conceptualizations capture patterns of multi-modal simulation associated with frequently experienced situations. A pattern completion inference mechanism uses current perception to activate situated conceptualizations that produce predictions via simulations on relevant modalities. Empirical findings from perception, action, working memory, conceptual processing, language and social cognition illustrate how this framework produces the extensive prediction that characterizes natural intelligence.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Wykowska

As the field of social robotics has been dynamically growing and expanding over various areas of research and application, in which robots can be of assistance and companionship for humans, this paper offers a different perspective on a role that social robots can also play, namely the role of informing us about flexibility of human mechanisms of social cognition. The paper focuses on studies in which robots have been used as a new type of “stimuli” in psychological experiments to examine whether similar mechanisms of social cognition would be activated in interaction with a robot, as would be elicited in interaction with another human. Analysing studies in which a direct comparison has been made between a robot and a human agent, the paper examines whether for robot agents, the brain re-uses the same mechanisms that have been developed for interaction with other humans in terms of perception, action representation, attention and higher-order social cognition. Based on this analysis, the paper concludes that the human socio-cognitive mechanisms, in adult brains, are sufficiently flexible to be re-used for robotic agents, at least for those that have some level of resemblance to humans.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Herson Da Silva Costa ◽  
Hélio Norberto De Araújo Júnior ◽  
Ferdinando Vinícius Fernandes Bezerra ◽  
Carlos Eduardo Vale Rebouças ◽  
Danilo José Ayres De Menezes ◽  
...  

 Background: The Rhea americana americana is a wild bird belonging to the group of Ratites, and is important from the scientific point of view given their adaptability to captivity. Considering that information about its morphology is important for the viability of domesticating the species, the aim of this study was to macroscopically identify the brain regions, as well as the cerebral arteries and the cerebral arterial circuit in order to establish the cerebral vascular pattern and systematization.Materials, Methods & Results: Twenty one brains from young and adult Greater Rheas of both sexes were used from animals that had died due to natural causes and were then kept in a freezer. The specimens were thawed and incised in the cervical region to allow exposure of the left common carotid artery, which was cannulated. The vascular system was rinsed with 0.9% saline solution, then perfused with latex Neoprene 650 stained with red pigment. The animals were subsequently fixed in 3.7% aqueous formaldehyde solution for 72 h, and then they were dissected by removing the bones from the skull cap. The brains were analyzed, and the structures were identified, photographed, schematized and denominated. Morphometric measurements were performed on the basilar and cerebellar ventral caudal arteries, recording the values of length and width in millimeters with the aid of a digital caliper. The brain was divided into: telencephalon, diencephalon, brainstem and cerebellum; while externally, the observed structures are: olfactory bulbs, optical lobes, optic nerves, optic chiasm, pituitary and pineal glands. Vascularization was performed by the following arteries: ventral spinal artery, basilar artery, ventricular cerebellar arteries, medium ventricular cerebellar arteries, caudal branches of the carotid arteries of the brain, ventral mesencephalic artery, cerebral caudal arteries, rostral branches of the carotid arteries of the brain, middle cerebral arteries, cerebroethmoidal arteries, rostral intercerebral anastomosis, rostral cerebral arteries, ethmoidal arteries, internal ophthalmic arteries, inter-hemispheric artery, pituitary arteries, dorsal mesencephalic tectal arteries, dorsal cerebellar arteries, occipital, pineal and dorsal hemispherical branches. The cerebral arterial circuit was both caudally and rostrally closed in 100.0% of the samples, being composed of the arteries: basilar artery, caudal branches of the carotid brain, rostral branches of the brain carotid, cerebroethmoidal arteries and rostral intercerebral anastomosis.Discussion: Encephalon classification regarding the presence or absence of gyri is a characteristic associated to evolution­ary aspects among vertebrates, being respectively considered as lisencephalon or girencecephalus when it presents or does not present convolutions. In Greater Rheas, the telencephalon was quite developed, with a relatively rounded shape and the absence of sulci and convolutions in the cortex, which allowed it to be classified as a lisencephalon. Such findings resemble those described for the ostrich and in a comparative study involving kiwis, emus, owls and pigeons, although different sizes and forms of telencephalon development were observed in the latter. Regarding the cerebral arterial circuit, this structure in Rheas was complete and both caudally and rostrally closed in 100.0% of the specimens. Our findings differ from those ob­served for ostriches, in which a rostrally open behavior has been described, while it is caudally closed in 20.0% of cases and opened in 80.0%. Regarding the vascular type of the brain, in the Rhea it was observed that there was only contribution of the carotid system, similar to that found for birds such as ostriches and turkeys which confer a type I encephalic vascularization.Keywords: arteries, brain, arterial circuit, morphometry, ratites.


2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luiza A. Castro-Jorge ◽  
Carla D. Pretto ◽  
Asa B. Smith ◽  
Oded Foreman ◽  
Kelly E. Carnahan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Interleukin-1β (IL-1β), an inflammatory cytokine and IL-1 receptor ligand, has diverse activities in the brain. We examined whether IL-1 signaling contributes to the encephalitis observed in mouse adenovirus type 1 (MAV-1) infection, using mice lacking the IL-1 receptor (Il1r1 −/− mice). Il1r1 −/− mice demonstrated reduced survival, greater disruption of the blood-brain barrier (BBB), higher brain viral loads, and higher brain inflammatory cytokine and chemokine levels than control C57BL/6J mice. We also examined infections of mice defective in IL-1β production (Pycard −/− mice) and mice defective in trafficking of Toll-like receptors to the endosome (Unc93b1 −/− mice). Pycard −/− and Unc93b1 −/− mice showed lower survival (similar to Il1r1 −/− mice) than control mice but, unlike Il1r1 −/− mice, did not have increased brain viral loads or BBB disruption. Based on the brain cytokine levels, MAV-1-infected Unc93b1 −/− mice had a very different inflammatory profile from infected Il1r1 −/− and Pycard −/− mice. Histological examination demonstrated pathological findings consistent with encephalitis in control and knockout mice; however, intranuclear viral inclusions were seen only in Il1r1 −/− mice. A time course of infection of control and Il1r1 −/− mice evaluating the kinetics of viral replication and cytokine production revealed differences between the mouse strains primarily at 7 to 8 days after infection, when mice began succumbing to MAV-1 infection. In the absence of IL-1 signaling, we noted an increase in the transcription of type I interferon (IFN)-stimulated genes. Together, these results indicate that IL-1 signaling is important during MAV-1 infection and suggest that, in its absence, increased IFN-β signaling may result in increased neuroinflammation. IMPORTANCE The investigation of encephalitis pathogenesis produced by different viruses is needed to characterize virus and host-specific factors that contribute to disease. MAV-1 produces viral encephalitis in its natural host, providing a good model for studying factors involved in encephalitis development. We investigated the role of IL-1 signaling during MAV-1-induced encephalitis. Unexpectedly, the lack of IL-1 signaling increased the mortality and inflammation in mice infected with MAV-1. Also, there was an increase in the transcription of type I IFN-stimulated genes that correlated with the observed increased mortality and inflammation. The findings highlight the complex nature of encephalitis and suggests that IL-1 has a protective effect for the development of MAV-1-induced encephalitis.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea E. Martin

Hierarchical structure and compositionality imbue human language with unparalleled expressive power and set it apart from other perception-action systems. However, neither formal nor neurobiological models account for how these defining computational properties might arise in a physiological system. I attempt to reconcile hierarchy and compositionality with principles from cell assembly computation in neuroscience; the result is an emerging theory of how the brain could convert distributed perceptual representations into hierarchical structures across multiple timescales while representing interpretable incremental stages of (de)compositional meaning. The model's architecture - a multidimensional coordinate system based on neurophysiological models of sensory processing - proposes that a manifold of neural trajectories encodes sensory, motor, and abstract linguistic states. Gain modulation, including inhibition, tunes the path in the manifold in accordance with behavior, and is how latent structure is inferred. As a consequence, predictive information about upcoming sensory input during production and comprehension is available without a separate operation. The proposed processing mechanism is synthesized from current models of neural entrainment to speech, concepts from systems neuroscience and category theory, and a symbolic-connectionist computational model that uses time and rhythm to structure information. I build on evidence from cognitive neuroscience and computational modeling that suggests a formal and mechanistic alignment between structure building and neural oscillations, and moves towards unifying basic insights from linguistics and psycholinguistics with the currency of neural computation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.


2015 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Mark Miller

AbstractPessoa (2013) makes a compelling case for conceiving of emotion and cognition as deeply integrated processes in the brain. We will begin our commentary by asking what implications this view of the brain has for an ontology of cognition – a theory of what cognition is and what cognitive processes exist. We will suggest that Pessoa's book, The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, provides strong support for an embodied theory of cognition. We end our commentary by offering some speculation about how Pessoa's arguments naturally extend to social cognition.


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