The emergence of molecular systems neuroscience

Systems neuroscience is focused on how ensemble properties in the brain, such as the activity of neuronal circuits, gives rise to internal brain states and behavior. Many of the studies in this field have traditionally involved electrophysiological recordings and computational approaches that attempt to decode how the brain transforms inputs into functional outputs. More recently, systems neuroscience has received an infusion of approaches and techniques that allow the manipulation (e.g., optogenetics, chemogenetics) and imaging (e.g., two-photon imaging, head mounted fluorescent microscopes) of neurons, neurocircuits, their inputs and outputs. Here, we will review novel approaches that allow the manipulation and imaging of specific molecular mechanisms in specific cells (not just neurons), cell ensembles and brain regions. These molecular approaches, with the specificity and temporal resolution appropriate for systems studies, promise to infuse the field with novel ideas, emphases and directions, and are motivating the emergence of a molecularly oriented systems neuroscience, a new discipline that studies how the spatial and temporal patterns of molecular systems modulate circuits and brain networks, and consequently shape the properties of brain states and behavior.

Time-resolved smoothness of distributed brain activity tracks conscious states and unifies emergent neural phenomena

Much of systems neuroscience posits that emergent neural phenomena underpin important aspects of brain function. Studies in the field variously emphasize the importance of distinct emergent phenomena, including weakly stable dynamics, arrhythmic 1/f activity, long-range temporal correlations, and scale-free avalanche statistics. Few studies, however, have sought to reconcile these often abstract phenomena with interpretable properties of neural activity. Here, we developed a method to efficiently and unbiasedly generate model data constrained by interpretable empirical features in long neurophysiological recordings. We used this method to ground several major emergent neural phenomena to time-resolved smoothness, the correlation of distributed brain activity between adjacent timepoints. We first found that in electrocorticography recordings, time-resolved smoothness closely tracked transitions between conscious and anesthetized states. We then showed that a minimal model constrained by time-resolved smoothness, variance, and mean, captured dynamical and statistical emergent neural phenomena across modalities and species. Our results thus decouple major emergent neural phenomena from network mechanisms of brain function, and instead couple these phenomena to spatially nonspecific, time-resolved changes of brain activity. These results anchor several theoretical frameworks to a single interpretable property of the neurophysiological signal and, in this way, ultimately help bridge abstract theories of brain function with observed properties of brain activity.

As soon as there was life, there was danger: the deep history of survival behaviours and the shallower history of consciousness

It is often said that fear is a universal innate emotion that we humans have inherited from our mammalian ancestors by virtue of having inherited conserved features of their nervous systems. Contrary to this common sense-based scientific point of view, I have argued that what we have inherited from our mammalian ancestors, and they from their distal vertebrate ancestors, and they from their chordate ancestors, and so forth, is not a fear circuit. It is, instead, a defensive survival circuit that detects threats, and in response, initiates defensive survival behaviours and supporting physiological adjustments. Seen in this light, the defensive survival circuits of humans and other mammals can be conceptualized as manifestations of an ancient survival function—the ability to detect danger and respond to it—that may in fact predate animals and their nervous systems, and perhaps may go back to the beginning of life. Fear, on the other hand, from my perspective, is a product of cortical cognitive circuits. This conception is not just of academic interest. It also has practical implications, offering clues as to why efforts to treat problems related to fear and anxiety are not more effective, and what might make them better. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

Computational validity: using computation to translate behaviours across species

We propose a new conceptual framework (computational validity) for translation across species and populations based on the computational similarity between the information processing underlying parallel tasks. Translating between species depends not on the superficial similarity of the tasks presented, but rather on the computational similarity of the strategies and mechanisms that underlie those behaviours. Computational validity goes beyond construct validity by directly addressing questions of information processing. Computational validity interacts with circuit validity as computation depends on circuits, but similar computations could be accomplished by different circuits. Because different individuals may use different computations to accomplish a given task, computational validity suggests that behaviour should be understood through the subject's point of view; thus, behaviour should be characterized on an individual level rather than a task level. Tasks can constrain the computational algorithms available to a subject and the observed subtleties of that behaviour can provide information about the computations used by each individual. Computational validity has especially high relevance for the study of psychiatric disorders, given the new views of psychiatry as identifying and mediating information processing dysfunctions that may show high inter-individual variability, as well as for animal models investigating aspects of human psychiatric disorders. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

The neural bases of vertebrate motor behaviour through the lens of evolution

The primary driver of the evolution of the vertebrate nervous system has been the necessity to move, along with the requirement of controlling the plethora of motor behavioural repertoires seen among the vast and diverse vertebrate species. Understanding the neural basis of motor control through the perspective of evolution, mandates thorough examinations of the nervous systems of species in critical phylogenetic positions. We present here, a broad review of studies on the neural motor infrastructure of the lamprey, a basal and ancient vertebrate, which enjoys a unique phylogenetic position as being an extant representative of the earliest group of vertebrates. From the central pattern generators in the spinal cord to the microcircuits of the pallial cortex, work on the lamprey brain over the years, has provided detailed insights into the basic organization (a bauplan ) of the ancestral vertebrate brain, and narrates a compelling account of common ancestry of fundamental aspects of the neural bases for motion control, maintained through half a billion years of vertebrate evolution. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

The neuroecology of the water-to-land transition and the evolution of the vertebrate brain

The water-to-land transition in vertebrate evolution offers an unusual opportunity to consider computational affordances of a new ecology for the brain. All sensory modalities are changed, particularly a greatly enlarged visual sensorium owing to air versus water as a medium, and expanded by mobile eyes and neck. The multiplication of limbs, as evolved to exploit aspects of life on land, is a comparable computational challenge. As the total mass of living organisms on land is a hundredfold larger than the mass underwater, computational improvements promise great rewards. In water, the midbrain tectum coordinates approach/avoid decisions, contextualized by water flow and by the animal’s body state and learning. On land, the relative motions of sensory surfaces and effectors must be resolved, adding on computational architectures from the dorsal pallium, such as the parietal cortex. For the large-brained and long-living denizens of land, making the right decision when the wrong one means death may be the basis of planning, which allows animals to learn from hypothetical experience before enactment. Integration of value-weighted, memorized panoramas in basal ganglia/frontal cortex circuitry, with allocentric cognitive maps of the hippocampus and its associated cortices becomes a cognitive habit-to-plan transition as substantial as the change in ecology. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

Self-tuition as an essential design feature of the brain

We are curious by nature, particularly when young. Evolution has endowed our brain with an inbuilt obligation to educate itself. In this perspectives article, we posit that self-tuition is an evolved principle of vertebrate brain design that is reflected in its basic architecture and critical for its normal development. Self-tuition involves coordination between functionally distinct components of the brain, with one set of areas motivating exploration that leads to the experiences that train another set. We review key hypothalamic and telencephalic structures involved in this interplay, including their anatomical connections and placement within the segmental architecture of conserved forebrain circuits. We discuss the nature of educative behaviours motivated by the hypothalamus, innate stimulus biases, the relationship to survival in early life, and mechanisms by which telencephalic areas gradually accumulate knowledge. We argue that this aspect of brain function is of paramount importance for systems neuroscience, as it confers neural specialization and allows animals to attain far more sophisticated behaviours than would be possible through genetic mechanisms alone. Self-tuition is of particular importance in humans and other primates, whose large brains and complex social cognition rely critically on experience-based learning during a protracted childhood period. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

The evolution of brain architectures for predictive coding and active inference

This article considers the evolution of brain architectures for predictive processing. We argue that brain mechanisms for predictive perception and action are not late evolutionary additions of advanced creatures like us. Rather, they emerged gradually from simpler predictive loops (e.g. autonomic and motor reflexes) that were a legacy from our earlier evolutionary ancestors—and were key to solving their fundamental problems of adaptive regulation. We characterize simpler-to-more-complex brains formally, in terms of generative models that include predictive loops of increasing hierarchical breadth and depth. These may start from a simple homeostatic motif and be elaborated during evolution in four main ways: these include the multimodal expansion of predictive control into an allostatic loop; its duplication to form multiple sensorimotor loops that expand an animal's behavioural repertoire; and the gradual endowment of generative models with hierarchical depth (to deal with aspects of the world that unfold at different spatial scales) and temporal depth (to select plans in a future-oriented manner). In turn, these elaborations underwrite the solution to biological regulation problems faced by increasingly sophisticated animals. Our proposal aligns neuroscientific theorising—about predictive processing—with evolutionary and comparative data on brain architectures in different animal species. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

Refocusing neuroscience: moving away from mental categories and towards complex behaviours

Mental terms—such as perception, cognition, action, emotion, as well as attention, memory, decision-making—are epistemically sterile. We support our thesis based on extensive comparative neuroanatomy knowledge of the organization of the vertebrate brain. Evolutionary pressures have moulded the central nervous system to promote survival. Careful characterization of the vertebrate brain shows that its architecture supports an enormous amount of communication and integration of signals, especially in birds and mammals. The general architecture supports a degree of ‘computational flexibility’ that enables animals to cope successfully with complex and ever-changing environments. Here, we suggest that the vertebrate neuroarchitecture does not respect the boundaries of standard mental terms, and propose that neuroscience should aim to unravel the dynamic coupling between large-scale brain circuits and complex, naturalistic behaviours. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.