scholarly journals Scanning of speechless comics changes spatial biases in mental model construction

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Román ◽  
Andrea Flumini ◽  
Julio Santiago

The mental representation of both time and number shows lateral spatial biases, which can be affected by habitual reading and writing direction. However, this effect is in place before children begin to read. One potential early cause is the experiences of looking at picture books together with a carer, as those images also follow the directionality of the script. What is the underlying mechanism for this effect? In the present study, we test the possibility that such experiences induce spatial biases in mental model construction, a mechanism which is a good candidate to induce the biases observed with numbers and times. We presented a speechless comic in either standard (left-to-right) or mirror-reversed (right-to-left) form to adult Spanish participants. We then asked them to draw the scene depicted by sentences like ‘the square is between the cross and the circle’. The position of the lateral objects in these drawings reveals the spatial biases at work when building mental models in working memory. Under conditions of highly consistent directionality, the mirror comic changed pre-existing lateral biases. Processes of mental model construction in working memory stand as a potential mechanism for the generation of spatial biases for time and number. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou ◽  
Léo Dutriaux ◽  
Christoph Scheepers

From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Laura Barca ◽  
Ferdinand Binkofski ◽  
Luca Tummolini

The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’, has become particularly crucial in recent years, owing to the increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might rely more on input from others to learn them; we, therefore, suggest that linguistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We will discuss evidence obtained in our and other laboratories showing that processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth motor system activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language. Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive process revealing low confidence in the meaning of our concepts. This process induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual meaning. We conclude that with abstract concepts language works as a social tool: it extends our thinking abilities and pushes us to rely on others to integrate our knowledge. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use, and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Dove

A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical challenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view of embodiment that recognizes the flexible, multimodal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems. On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology that expands our conceptual reach. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gün R. Semin ◽  
Tomás Palma ◽  
Cengiz Acartürk ◽  
Aleksandra Dziuba

Based on research in physical anthropology, we argue that brightness marks the abstract category of gender, with light colours marking the female gender and dark colours marking the male gender. In a set of three experiments, we examine this hypothesis, first in a speeded gender classification experiment with male and female names presented in black and white. As expected, male names in black and female names in white are classified faster than the reverse gender-colour combinations. The second experiment relies on a gender classification task involving the disambiguation of very briefly appearing non-descript stimuli in the form of black and white ‘blobs’. The former are classified predominantly as male and the latter as female names. Finally, the processes driving light and dark object choices for males and females are examined by tracking the number of fixations and their duration in an eye-tracking experiment. The results reveal that when choosing for a male target, participants look longer and make more fixations on dark objects, and the same for light objects when choosing for a female target. The implications of these findings, which repeatedly reveal the same data patterns across experiments with Dutch, Portuguese and Turkish samples for the abstract category of gender, are discussed. The discussion attempts to enlarge the subject beyond mainstream models of embodied grounding. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedemann Pulvermüller

How can we understand causal relationships and how can we understand words such as ‘cause’? Some theorists assume that the underlying abstract concept is given to us, and that perceptual correlation provides the relevant hints towards inferring causation from perceived real-life events. A different approach emphasizes the role of actions and their typical consequences for the emergence of the concept of causation and the application of the related term. A model of causation is proposed that highlights thefamily resemblancebetween causal actions and postulates that symbols are necessary forbinding together the different partially shared semantic features of subsetsof causal actions and their goals. Linguistic symbols are proposed to play a key role in binding the different subsets of semantic features of the abstract concept. The model is spelt out at the neuromechanistic level of distributed cortical circuits and the cognitive functions they carry. The model is discussed in light of behavioural and neuroscience evidence, and questions for future research are highlighted. In sum, taking causation as a concrete example, I argue that abstract concepts and words can be learnt and grounded in real-life interaction, and that the neurobiological mechanisms realizing such abstract semantic grounding are within our grasp.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelo Cangelosi ◽  
Francesca Stramandinoli

This paper reviews computational modelling approaches to the learning of abstract concepts and words in embodied agents such as humanoid robots. This will include a discussion of the learning of abstract words such as ‘use’ and ‘make’ in humanoid robot experiments, and the acquisition of numerical concepts via gesture and finger counting strategies. The current approaches share a strong emphasis on embodied cognition aspects for the grounding of abstract concepts, and a continuum, rather than dichotomy, view of concrete/abstract concepts differences. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Shea

The problem of how concepts can refer to or be about the non-mental world is particularly puzzling for abstract concepts. There is growing evidence that many characteristics beyond the perceptual are involved in grounding different kinds of abstract concept. A resource that has been suggested, but little explored, is introspection. This paper develops that suggestion by focusing specifically on metacognition—on the thoughts and feelings that thinkers have about a concept. One example of metacognition about concepts is the judgement that we should defer to others in how a given concept is used. Another example is our internal assessment of which concepts are dependable and useful, and which less so. Metacognition of this kind may be especially important for grounding abstract concepts. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Laura Barca ◽  
Ferdinand Binkofski ◽  
Luca Tummolini

The capacity for abstract thought is one of the hallmarks of human cognition. However, the mechanisms underlying the ability to form and use abstract concepts like ‘fantasy’ and ‘grace’ have not been elucidated yet. This theme issue brings together developmental, social and cognitive psychologists, linguists, anthropologists, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, philosophers and computer scientists to present theoretical insights and novel evidence on how abstract concepts are acquired, used and represented in the brain. Many of the contributions conceive concepts as grounded in sensorimotor systems and constrained by bodily mechanisms and structures. The theme issue develops along two main axes, related to the most promising research directions on abstract concepts. The axes focus on (i) the different kinds of abstract concepts (numbers, emotions, evaluative concepts like moral and aesthetic ones, social concepts); (ii) the role played by perception and action, language and sociality, and inner processes (emotions, interoception, metacognition) in grounding abstract concepts. Most papers adopt a cognitive science/neuroscience approach, but the theme issue also includes studies on development, on social cognition, and on how linguistic diversity shapes abstract concepts. Overall, the theme issue provides an integrated theoretical account that highlights the importance of language, sociality and inner processes for abstract concepts, and that offers new methodological tools to investigate them. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joerg Fingerhut ◽  
Jesse J. Prinz

Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experience. This is especially clear in the case of moral concepts. Justice, for example, has no fixed appearance. Less obviously, aesthetic concepts may also qualify as abstract. The very same sensory input can be regarded as beautiful by one person and ugly by another. Artistic success can also transcend sensory accessible features. Here, we focus on moral badness and aesthetic goodness and argue that both can be grounded in emotional responses. Emotions, in turn, are grounded in bodily perceptions, which correspond to action tendencies. When we conceptualize something as good or bad (whether in the moral or aesthetic domain), we experience our bodily responses to that thing. The moral and aesthetic domains are distinguished by the emotions that they involve. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document