scholarly journals The control of epistemic curiosity in the human brain

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romain Ligneul ◽  
Martial Mermillod ◽  
Tiffany Morisseau

AbstractEpistemic curiosity (EC) is a cornerstone of human cognition that contributes to the actualization of our cognitive potential by stimulating a myriad of information-seeking behaviours. Yet, its fundamental relationship with uncertainty remains poorly understood, which limits our ability to predict within- and between-individual variability in the willingness to acquire knowledge. Here, a two-step stochastic trivia quiz designed to induce curiosity and manipulate answer uncertainty provided behavioural and neural evidence for an integrative model of EC inspired from predictive coding. More precisely, our behavioural data indicated an inverse relationship between average surprise and EC levels, which depended upon hemodynamic activity in the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex from one trial to another and from one individual to another. Complementary, the elicitation of epistemic surprise and the relief of acute curiosity states were respectively related to ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum activity. Taken together, our results account for the temporal evolution of EC over time, as well as for the interplay of EC, prior knowledge and surprise in controlling memory gain.

Nature ◽  
10.1038/20178 ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 399 (6732) ◽  
pp. 148-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne Koechlin ◽  
Gianpaolo Basso ◽  
Pietro Pietrini ◽  
Seth Panzer ◽  
Jordan Grafman

1987 ◽  
Vol 151 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. McKenna

The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia implies that positive schizophrenic symptoms should be understandable by reference to brain structures receiving a dopamine innervation, or in terms of the functional role of dopamine itself. The basal ganglia, ventral striatum, septo-hippocampal system, and prefrontal cortex, sites of mesotelencephalic dopamine innervation, are examined and it is argued that their dysfunction could form the basis of particular schizophrenic symptom classes. The postulated involvement of dopamine in reinforcement processes might further assist such interpretations. This type of analysis can be extended to other categories of schizophrenic psychopathology.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence T Hunt ◽  
Timothy EJ Behrens ◽  
Takayuki Hosokawa ◽  
Jonathan D Wallis ◽  
Steven W Kennerley

2013 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 844-861 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandeep Pendyam ◽  
Christian Bravo-Rivera ◽  
Anthony Burgos-Robles ◽  
Francisco Sotres-Bayon ◽  
Gregory J. Quirk ◽  
...  

The acquisition and expression of conditioned fear depends on prefrontal-amygdala circuits. Auditory fear conditioning increases the tone responses of lateral amygdala neurons, but the increase is transient, lasting only a few hundred milliseconds after tone onset. It was recently reported that that the prelimbic (PL) prefrontal cortex transforms transient lateral amygdala input into a sustained PL output, which could drive fear responses via projections to the lateral division of basal amygdala (BL). To explore the possible mechanisms involved in this transformation, we developed a large-scale biophysical model of the BL-PL network, consisting of 850 conductance-based Hodgkin-Huxley-type cells, calcium-based learning, and neuromodulator effects. The model predicts that sustained firing in PL can be derived from BL-induced release of dopamine and norepinephrine that is maintained by PL-BL interconnections. These predictions were confirmed with physiological recordings from PL neurons during fear conditioning with the selective β-blocker propranolol and by inactivation of BL with muscimol. Our model suggests that PL has a higher bandwidth than BL, due to PL's decreased internal inhibition and lower spiking thresholds. It also suggests that variations in specific microcircuits in the PL-BL interconnection can have a significant impact on the expression of fear, possibly explaining individual variability in fear responses. The human homolog of PL could thus be an effective target for anxiety disorders.


2008 ◽  
Vol 213 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 183-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornnarin Taepavarapruk ◽  
John G. Howland ◽  
Soyon Ahn ◽  
Anthony G. Phillips

Author(s):  
Georg Northoff

Some recent philosophical discussions consider whether the brain is best understood as an open or closed system. This issue has major epistemic consequences akin to the scepticism engendered by the famous Cartesian demon. Specifically, one and the same empirical theory of brain function, predictive coding, entailing a prediction model of brain, have been associated with contradictory views of the brain as either open (Clark, 2012, 2013) or closed (Hohwy, 2013, 2014). Based on recent empirical evidence, the present paper argues that contrary to appearances, these views of the brain are compatible with one another. I suggest that there are two main forms of neural activity in the brain, one of which can be characterized as open, and the other as closed. Stimulus-induced activity, because it relies on predictive coding is indeed closed to the world, which entails that in certain respects, the brain is an inferentially secluded and self-evidencing system. In contrast, the brain’s resting state or spontaneous activity is best taken as open because it is a world-evidencing system that allows for the brain’s neural activity to align with the statistically-based spatiotemporal structure of objects and events in the world. This model requires an important caveat, however. Due to its statistically-based nature, the resting state’s alignment to the world comes in degrees. In extreme cases, the degree of alignment can be extremely low, resulting in a resting state that is barely if at all aligned to the world. This is for instance the case in schizophrenia. Clinical symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenics are indicative of the fundamental delicateness of the alignment between the brain’s resting-state and the world’s phenomena. Nevertheless, I argue that so long as we are dealing with a well-functioning brain, the more dire epistemic implications of predictive coding can be forestalled. That the brain is in part a self-evidencing system does not yield any generalizable reason to worry that human cognition is out of step with the real world. Instead, the brain is aligned to the world accounting for “world-brain relation” that mitigates sceptistic worries.


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