scholarly journals Dynamic influences on static measures of metacognition

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kobe Desender ◽  
Luc Vermeylen ◽  
Tom Verguts

AbstractHumans differ in their capability to judge the accuracy of their own choices via confidence judgments. Signal detection theory has been used to quantify the extent to which confidence tracks accuracy via M-ratio, often referred to as metacognitive efficiency. This measure, however, is static in that it does not consider the dynamics of decision making. This could be problematic because humans may shift their level of response caution to alter the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. Such shifts could induce unaccounted-for sources of variation in the assessment of metacognition. Instead, evidence accumulation frameworks consider decision making, including the computation of confidence, as a dynamic process unfolding over time. We draw on evidence accumulation frameworks to examine the influence of response caution on metacognition. Simulation results demonstrate that response caution has an influence on M-ratio. We then tested and confirmed that this was also the case in human participants who were explicitly instructed to either focus on speed or accuracy. We next demonstrated that this association between M-ratio and response caution was also present in an experiment without any reference towards speed. The latter finding was replicated in an independent dataset. In contrast, when data were analyzed with a novel dynamic measure of metacognition, which we refer to as v-ratio, in all of the three studies there was no effect of speed-accuracy tradeoff. These findings have important implications for research on metacognition, such as the question about domain-generality, individual differences in metacognition and its neural correlates.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fanny Fievez ◽  
Gerard Derosiere ◽  
Frederick Verbruggen ◽  
Julie Duque

Errors and their consequences are typically studied by investigating changes in decision speed and accuracy in trials that follow an error, commonly referred to as "post-error adjustments". Many studies have reported that subjects slow down following an error, a phenomenon called "post-error slowing" (PES). However, the functional significance of PES is still a matter of debate as it is not always adaptive. That is, it is not always associated with a gain in performance and can even occur with a decline in accuracy. Here, we hypothesized that the nature of PES is influenced by one's speed-accuracy tradeoff policy, which determines the overall level of choice accuracy in the task at hand. To test this hypothesis, we investigated post-error adjustments in subjects performing the same task while they were required to either emphasize speed (low accuracy) or cautiousness (high accuracy) in two distinct contexts (hasty and cautious contexts, respectively) experienced on separate days. Accordingly, our data indicate that post-error adjustments varied according to the context in which subjects performed the task, with PES being solely significant in the hasty context. In addition, we only observed a gain in performance after errors in a specific trial type, suggesting that post-error adjustments depend on a complex combination of processes that affect the speed of ensuing actions as well as the degree to which such PES comes with a gain in performance.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Nelli ◽  
Sirawaj Itthipuripat ◽  
Nuttida Rungratsameetaweemana ◽  
John T. Serences

AbstractDecisions made about identical perceptual stimuli can be radically different under changing task demands. For example, the need to make a fast decision undermines the accuracy of that decision, a well-documented effect termed the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Models of the SAT are generally based on theories of decision making in which responses are triggered only after sensory evidence accumulation terminates at a set threshold. Within this accumulate-to-bound framework, speed pressure operates by lowering the response threshold, allowing for faster responses at the expense of accumulated sensory evidence. To empirically examine the mechanisms necessary for adaptively adjusting the speed and accuracy of decisions, we used an event-related potential that indexes sensory evidence accumulation in the human brain. Instead of lowering response thresholds, we found that speed pressure adaptively shifts responses to occur close to where the rate of evidence accumulation peaks. Moreover, responses are not triggered automatically by the termination of the accumulation process, as sensory evidence continues to build after speeded decisions. Together these results suggest that response processes adaptively access accumulating sensory evidence depending on task demands and support parallel over serial models of decision making.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hector Palada ◽  
Rachel A Searston ◽  
Annabel Persson ◽  
Timothy Ballard ◽  
Matthew B Thompson

Evidence accumulation models have been used to describe the cognitive processes underlying performance in tasks involving two-choice decisions about unidimensional stimuli, such as motion or orientation. Given the multidimensionality of natural stimuli, however, we might expect qualitatively different patterns of evidence accumulation in more applied perceptual tasks. One domain that relies heavily on human decisions about complex natural stimuli is fingerprint discrimination. We know little about the ability of evidence accumulation models to account for the dynamic decision process of a fingerprint examiner resolving if two different prints belong to the same finger or not. Here, we apply a dynamic decision-making model — the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) — to fingerprint discrimination decisions in order to gain insight into the cognitive processes underlying these complex perceptual judgments. Across three experiments, we show that the LBA provides an accurate description of the fingerprint discrimination decision process with manipulations in visual noise, speed-accuracy emphasis, and training. Our results demonstrate that the LBA is a promising model for furthering our understanding of applied decision-making with naturally varying visual stimuli.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1433-1444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuğçe Tosun ◽  
Dilara Berkay ◽  
Alexander T. Sack ◽  
Yusuf Ö. Çakmak ◽  
Fuat Balcı

Decisions are made based on the integration of available evidence. The noise in evidence accumulation leads to a particular speed–accuracy tradeoff in decision-making, which can be modulated and optimized by adaptive decision threshold setting. Given the effect of pre-SMA activity on striatal excitability, we hypothesized that the inhibition of pre-SMA would lead to higher decision thresholds and an increased accuracy bias. We used offline continuous theta burst stimulation to assess the effect of transient inhibition of the right pre-SMA on the decision processes in a free-response two-alternative forced-choice task within the drift diffusion model framework. Participants became more cautious and set higher decision thresholds following right pre-SMA inhibition compared with inhibition of the control site (vertex). Increased decision thresholds were accompanied by an accuracy bias with no effects on post-error choice behavior. Participants also exhibited higher drift rates as a result of pre-SMA inhibition compared with the vertex inhibition. These results, in line with the striatal theory of speed–accuracy tradeoff, provide evidence for the functional role of pre-SMA activity in decision threshold modulation. Our results also suggest that pre-SMA might be a part of the brain network associated with the sensory evidence integration.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kobe Desender ◽  
Annika Boldt ◽  
Tom Verguts ◽  
Tobias H. Donner

AbstractWhen external feedback about decision outcomes is lacking, agents need to adapt their decision policies based on an internal estimate of the correctness of their choices (i.e., decision confidence). We hypothesized that agents use confidence to continuously update the tradeoff between the speed and accuracy of their decisions: When confidence is low in one decision, the agent needs more evidence before committing to a choice in the next decision, leading to slower but more accurate decisions. We tested this hypothesis by fitting a bounded accumulation decision model to behavioral data from three different perceptual choice tasks. Decision bounds indeed depended on the reported confidence on the previous trial, independent of objective accuracy. This increase in decision bound was predicted by a centro-parietal EEG component sensitive to confidence. We conclude that the brain uses internally computed confidence signals for the ongoing adjustment of decision policies.


Author(s):  
Victor Mittelstädt ◽  
Jeff Miller ◽  
Hartmut Leuthold ◽  
Ian Grant Mackenzie ◽  
Rolf Ulrich

AbstractThe cognitive processes underlying the ability of human performers to trade speed for accuracy is often conceptualized within evidence accumulation models, but it is not yet clear whether and how these models can account for decision-making in the presence of various sources of conflicting information. In the present study, we provide evidence that speed-accuracy tradeoffs (SATs) can have opposing effects on performance across two different conflict tasks. Specifically, in a single preregistered experiment, the mean reaction time (RT) congruency effect in the Simon task increased, whereas the mean RT congruency effect in the Eriksen task decreased, when the focus was put on response speed versus accuracy. Critically, distributional RT analyses revealed distinct delta plot patterns across tasks, thus indicating that the unfolding of distractor-based response activation in time is sufficient to explain the opposing pattern of congruency effects. In addition, a recent evidence accumulation model with the notion of time-varying conflicting information was successfully fitted to the experimental data. These fits revealed task-specific time-courses of distractor-based activation and suggested that time pressure substantially decreases decision boundaries in addition to reducing the duration of non-decision processes and the rate of evidence accumulation. Overall, the present results suggest that time pressure can have multiple effects in decision-making under conflict, but that strategic adjustments of decision boundaries in conjunction with different time-courses of distractor-based activation can produce counteracting effects on task performance with different types of distracting sources of information.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (15) ◽  
pp. 8382-8390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Pereira ◽  
Nathan Faivre ◽  
Iñaki Iturrate ◽  
Marco Wirthlin ◽  
Luana Serafini ◽  
...  

The human capacity to compute the likelihood that a decision is correct—known as metacognition—has proven difficult to study in isolation as it usually cooccurs with decision making. Here, we isolated postdecisional from decisional contributions to metacognition by analyzing neural correlates of confidence with multimodal imaging. Healthy volunteers reported their confidence in the accuracy of decisions they made or decisions they observed. We found better metacognitive performance for committed vs. observed decisions, indicating that committing to a decision may improve confidence. Relying on concurrent electroencephalography and hemodynamic recordings, we found a common correlate of confidence following committed and observed decisions in the inferior frontal gyrus and a dissociation in the anterior prefrontal cortex and anterior insula. We discuss these results in light of decisional and postdecisional accounts of confidence and propose a computational model of confidence in which metacognitive performance naturally improves when evidence accumulation is constrained upon committing a decision.


Author(s):  
Xiaolei Zhou ◽  
Xiangshi Ren

A tradeoff between speed and accuracy is a very common phenomenon in many types of human motor tasks. In general, the accuracy of a movement tends to decrease when its speed increases and the speed of a movement tends to decrease with an increase in its accuracy. This phenomenon has been studied for more than a century, during which several alternative performance models that account for the tradeoff between speed and accuracy have been presented. In this chapter, the authors present a critical survey of the scientific literature that discusses speed-accuracy tradeoff models of target-based and trajectory-based movement; these two types of movement are the major popular task paradigms in studies of human-computer interactions. Some of the models emerged from basic research in experimental psychology and motor control theory, whereas others emerged from a specific need to model the interaction between users and physical devices, such as mice, keyboards, and styluses in the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). This chapter summarizes these models from the perspectives of spatial constraints and temporal constraints for both target-based and trajectory-based movements.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (45) ◽  
pp. 12868-12873 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Keramati ◽  
Peter Smittenaar ◽  
Raymond J. Dolan ◽  
Peter Dayan

Behavioral and neural evidence reveal a prospective goal-directed decision process that relies on mental simulation of the environment, and a retrospective habitual process that caches returns previously garnered from available choices. Artificial systems combine the two by simulating the environment up to some depth and then exploiting habitual values as proxies for consequences that may arise in the further future. Using a three-step task, we provide evidence that human subjects use such a normative plan-until-habit strategy, implying a spectrum of approaches that interpolates between habitual and goal-directed responding. We found that increasing time pressure led to shallower goal-directed planning, suggesting that a speed-accuracy tradeoff controls the depth of planning with deeper search leading to more accurate evaluation, at the cost of slower decision-making. We conclude that subjects integrate habit-based cached values directly into goal-directed evaluations in a normative manner.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (7) ◽  
pp. e2635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Ivanoff ◽  
Philip Branning ◽  
René Marois

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document