scholarly journals Does Contact Tracing Work? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from an Excel Error in England

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thiemo Fetzer ◽  
Thomas Graeber
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Substantial Variation ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Processing Error ◽  
Health Response ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Central Pillar ◽  
Different Parts

Contact tracing has been a central pillar of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, contact tracing measures face substantive challenges in practice and well-identified evidence about their effectiveness remains scarce. This paper exploits quasi-random variation in COVID-19 contact tracing. Between September 25 and October 2, 2020, a total of 15,841 COVID-19 cases in England (around 15 to 20% of all cases) were not immediately referred to the contact tracing system due to a data processing error. Case information had been truncated from an Excel spreadsheet due to a row limit, which was discovered on October 3. There is substantial variation in the degree to which different parts of England areas were exposed - by chance - to delayed referrals of COVID-19 cases to to the contact tracing system. We show that more affected areas subsequently experienced a drastic rise in new COVID-19 infections and deaths alongside an increase in the positivity rate and the number of test performed, as well as a decline in the performance of the contact tracing system. Conservative estimates suggest that the failure of timely contact tracing due to the data glitch is associated with more than 125,000 additional infections and over 1,500 additional COVID-19-related deaths. Our findings provide strong quasi-experimental evidence for the effectiveness of contact tracing.

scholarly journals United States response to the COVID-19 pandemic, January–November 2020

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Mathew Alexander ◽  
Lynn Unruh ◽  
Andriy Koval ◽  
William Belanger
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Past ◽  
Health Response ◽  
Physical Infrastructure ◽  
Key Policy ◽  
United States Healthcare

Abstract As of November 2020, the United States leads the world in confirmed coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases and deaths. Over the past 10 months, the United States has experienced three peaks in new cases, with the most recent spike in November setting new records. Inaction and the lack of a scientifically informed, unified response have contributed to the sustained spread of COVID-19 in the United States. This paper describes major events and findings from the domestic response to COVID-19 from January to November 2020, including on preventing transmission, COVID-19 testing and contact tracing, ensuring sufficient physical infrastructure and healthcare workforce, paying for services, and governance. We further reflect on the public health response to-date and analyse the link between key policy decisions (e.g. closing, reopening) and COVID-19 cases in three states that are representative of the broader regions that have experienced spikes in cases. Finally, as we approach the winter months and undergo a change in national leadership, we highlight some considerations for the ongoing COVID-19 response and the broader United States healthcare system. These findings describe why the United States has failed to contain COVID-19 effectively to-date and can serve as a reference in the continued response to COVID-19 and future pandemics.

scholarly journals Defusing COVID-19: Lessons Learned from a Century of Pandemics

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 182
Author(s):  
Graciela Mujica ◽  
Zane Sternberg ◽  
Jamie Solis ◽  
Taylor Wand ◽  
Peter Carrasco ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Groups ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Influenza Pandemics ◽  
Mass Gatherings ◽  
Healthcare Settings ◽  
Global Pandemic ◽  
Health Response

Amidst the COVID-19 global pandemic of 2020, identifying and applying lessons learned from previous influenza and coronavirus pandemics may offer important insight into its interruption. Herein, we conducted a review of the literature of the influenza pandemics of the 20th century; and of the coronavirus and influenza pandemics of the 21st century. Influenza and coronavirus pandemics are zoonoses that spread rapidly in consistent seasonal patterns during an initial wave of infection and subsequent waves of spread. For all of their differences in the state of available medical technologies, global population changes, and social and geopolitical factors surrounding each pandemic, there are remarkable similarities among them. While vaccination of high-risk groups is advocated as an instrumental mode of interrupting pandemics, non-pharmacological interventions including avoidance of mass gatherings, school closings, case isolation, contact tracing, and the implementation of infection prevention strategies in healthcare settings represent the cornerstone to halting transmission. In conjunction with lessons learned from previous pandemics, the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes the basis for delineating best practices to confront future pandemics.

scholarly journals Public health response to two incidents of confirmed MERS-CoV cases travelling on flights through London Heathrow Airport in 2014 – lessons learnt

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
F Parry-Ford ◽  
N Boddington ◽  
R Pebody ◽  
N Phin ◽  
Collective on behalf of the Incident Management Team
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
International Health ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Health ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Health Response ◽  
Health Organization

In May 2014, Public Health England was alerted to two separate laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection who transited through London Heathrow Airport while symptomatic on flights from Saudi Arabia to the United States of America. We present the rationale for the public health response to both incidents, and report results of contact tracing. Following a risk assessment, passengers seated two seats around the cases were prioritised for contact tracing and a proactive media approach was used to alert all passengers on the planes of their possible exposure in both incidents. In total, 64 United Kingdom (UK) residents were successfully contacted, 14 of whom were sat in the priority area two seats all around the case(s). Five passengers reported respiratory symptoms within 14 days of the flight, but all tested were negative for MERS-CoV. Details of non-UK residents were passed on to relevant World Health Organization International Health Regulation focal points for follow-up, and no further cases were reported back. Different approaches were used to manage contact tracing for each flight due to variations in the quality and timeliness of the passenger contact information provided by the airlines involved. No evidence of symptomatic onward transmission was found.

scholarly journals Epidemiology and public health response in early phase of COVID-19 pandemic, Veneto Region, Italy, 21 February to 2 April 2020

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (47) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Russo ◽  
Gisella Pitter ◽  
Filippo Da Re ◽  
Michele Tonon ◽  
Francesco Avossa ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Early Phase ◽  
Case Fatality ◽  
Case Finding ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Veneto Region ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Health Response ◽  
Italian Regions

Background Veneto was one of the Italian regions hit hardest by the early phase of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Aim This paper describes the public health response and epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in the Veneto Region from 21 February to 2 April 2020. Methods Information on the public health response was collected from regional health authorities’ official sources. Epidemiological data were extracted from a web-based regional surveillance system. The epidemic curve was represented by date of testing. Characteristics of hospitalised COVID-19 cases were described and compared to those never admitted to hospital. Age- and sex-stratified case-fatality ratios (CFRs) were calculated. Results Key elements of the regional public health response were thorough case-finding and contact tracing, home care for non-severe cases, creation of dedicated COVID-19 healthcare facilities and activation of sub-intensive care units for non-invasive ventilation. As at 2 April 2020, 91,345 individuals were tested for SARS-CoV-2 and 10,457 (11.4%) were positive. Testing and attack rates were 18.6 per 1,000 and 213.2 per 100,000 population, respectively. The epidemic peaked around 20 to 24 March, with case numbers declining thereafter. Hospitalised cases (n = 3,623; 34.6%) were older and more frequently male compared with never-hospitalised cases. The CFR was 5.6% overall, and was higher among males and people > 60 years of age. Conclusion In the Veneto Region, the strict social distancing measures imposed by the Italian government were supported by thorough case finding and contact tracing, as well as well-defined roles for different levels of care.

Tuberculosis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musarrat Afza ◽  
Marko Petrovic ◽  
Sam Ghebrehewet
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Mycobacterium Bovis ◽  
Health Management ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Case Definitions ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Health Response ◽  
Inflammatory Bowel

This chapter covers two case studies and scenarios: a case of pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) in a college student; and a case of laboratory-confirmed Mycobacterium bovis in an adult with inflammatory bowel disease. The pulmonary TB case resulted in a wider investigation and contact tracing as the case attended college while symptomatic. The Mycobacterium bovis resulted in wider workplace and hospital contact tracing through convening an Incident Control Team. Background information on the epidemiology and clinical features of TB and the public health response to TB in educational, healthcare, and occupational settings are discussed. Case definitions, and a detailed risk assessment, with clear description of close contacts, priority groups, and the required public health actions, are described. ‘Top tips’ are given, to provide practical tips for the reader to think through the public health management of TB, and ‘tools of the trade’ list the laboratory and epidemiological components of the investigation.

scholarly journals Coronavirus Disease 2019 Outbreak in a San Francisco Homeless Shelter

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Imbert ◽  
Patrick M Kinley ◽  
Ashley Scarborough ◽  
Caroline Cawley ◽  
Madeline Sankaran ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Outbreak Response ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Case Investigation ◽  
Symptom Screening ◽  
Health Response

Abstract We report the public health response to a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in a San Francisco shelter where 67% of residents and 17% of staff tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We describe the limited utility of case investigation, person-based contact tracing and symptom screening, and the benefits of mass testing in outbreak response.

scholarly journals Estimation of the Actual Incidence of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) in Emergent Hotspots: The Example of Hokkaido, Japan during February–March 2020

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 2392
Author(s):  
Andrei R. Akhmetzhanov ◽  
Kenji Mizumoto ◽  
Sung-Mok Jung ◽  
Natalie M. Linton ◽  
Ryosuke Omori ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cumulative Incidence ◽  
Surveillance System ◽  
Negative Binomial ◽  
Actual Number ◽  
Public Health Response ◽  
The Public ◽  
Health Response ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Actual Incidence

Following the first report of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Sapporo city, Hokkaido Prefecture, Japan, on 14 February 2020, a surge of cases was observed in Hokkaido during February and March. As of 6 March, 90 cases were diagnosed in Hokkaido. Unfortunately, many infected persons may not have been recognized due to having mild or no symptoms during the initial months of the outbreak. We therefore aimed to predict the actual number of COVID-19 cases in (i) Hokkaido Prefecture and (ii) Sapporo city using data on cases diagnosed outside these areas. Two statistical frameworks involving a balance equation and an extrapolated linear regression model with a negative binomial link were used for deriving both estimates, respectively. The estimated cumulative incidence in Hokkaido as of 27 February was 2,297 cases (95% confidence interval (CI): 382–7091) based on data on travelers outbound from Hokkaido. The cumulative incidence in Sapporo city as of 28 February was estimated at 2233 cases (95% CI: 0–4893) based on the count of confirmed cases within Hokkaido. Both approaches resulted in similar estimates, indicating a higher incidence of infections in Hokkaido than were detected by the surveillance system. This quantification of the gap between detected and estimated cases helped to inform the public health response at the beginning of the pandemic and provided insight into the possible scope of undetected transmission for future assessments.

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