The privatisation process and evolving share ownership structure of Mainland China's leading state‐owned enterprises

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul B. McGuinness
2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 744-759
Author(s):  
Dong H. Kim

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore whether share ownership structure plays a role in determining the ex-day pricing of dividends. If share ownership structure, specifically the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals vs institutions, has an effect on the ex-dividend day stock price behavior, the ex-day premium is expected to be different for firms with different ownership structures. Design/methodology/approach To investigate whether the ex-day pricing of dividends is affected by the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals vs institutions, the author look into the ex-day premium. The ex-day premium is calculated by dividing the difference between the closing price on the cum-dividend day and the closing price on the ex-dividend day by the amount of the dividend. Findings Consistent with both the tax-based theory and the dynamic trading clientele theory, the author find that the ex-day premium decreases with the level of individual ownership. Consistent with the short-term trading theory, the author also find that the ex-day premium increases with the degree of investor heterogeneity, defined as the product of the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individual investors and the proportion held by institutional investors. Originality/value The author believe that this study contributes to the literature by providing useful evidence that share ownership structure affects the ex-day pricing of dividends, and thus this study will be of interest to the readers of managerial finance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Surayya Surayya ◽  
Juliana Kadang

This study aims to determine the effect of managerial and public ownership structures on profitability at the Foreign Exchange National Private Commercial Banks (BUSN), determine the effect of managerial and public ownership structures on firm value at Foreign Exchange National Private Commercial Banks (BUSN), and determine the effect of profitability on firm value in Foreign Exchange National Private Commercial Banks (BUSN). This research method uses descriptive quantitative as a type of research. The population is 35 banking companies, while the sample is 17 banking companies whose financial statements are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The date were collected through secondary data in the form of documents, namely financial reports for 2016 - 2018. The data analysis technique uses multiple regression analysis. The results showed that there was no influence of managerial share ownership structure on profitability and firm value. Furthermore, there is a significant effect of public share ownership structure on profitability while firm value has no significant effect. The implication is that managerial roles and participation are needed in this case the share ownership structure in order to increase the profitability and value of banking companies such as other companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.


Author(s):  
Jenny Fu

The share ownership structure of listed companies in China lends support to the research findings of the recent “concentrated share ownership” thesis. However, due to its particular economic, political and legal contexts, the Chinese share ownership structure has its own characteristics. Instead of rich families or banks as seen elsewhere, publicly traded corporations in China are typically controlled by their state-owned founder/sponsor enterprises. Based on an examination of the state of ownership and control in listed companies in China and a brief review of the relevant literature, this paper suggests a corporate group contextual-based approach to understand corporate governance in China. For that purpose, some major issues for future research are also outlined.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asjeet S. Lamba ◽  
Geof Stapledon

Diffuse share ownership is not as pronounced in the U.S. as many would assume. This has led to a body of research examining large shareholders, or blockholders. Issues addressed include whether firms with a blockholder perform better or worse than widely-held firms; whether firms with a blockholder pay their executives differently to widely-held firms; and whether the presence of a blockholder increases or decreases the incidence takeovers. Another issue, which this paper explores, is what motivates block share ownership. Bebchuk (1999a, 1999b) develops a model which predicts that a firm is more likely to have a controlling blockholder if the anticipated private benefits of control at that firm are comparatively large. This paper examines the factors associated with ownership structure among publicly traded Australian firms. Our results indicate that private benefits of control are a significant factor in explaining the differences in ownership structure among Australian firms. As importantly, we also find that the relationship between the existence of a blockholder and private benefits of control is endogenous. That is, the presence of a controlling blockholder strongly influences the prevalence of these private benefits of control.


Organizacija ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-92
Author(s):  
Olaf Kranz ◽  
Thomas Steger ◽  
Ronald Hartz

Abstract Background and purpose: Although employee share ownership (ESO) deserves of a long tradition, we still know little about employees’ perspectives about ESO. The lack of knowledge about the employees’ attitudes towards ESO is discursively filled in the ESO debate. This paper challenges that deficit by carrying out a semantic analysis of the literature with the aim to identify the various actor constructions used implicitly in the ESO discourse. Design/Methodology/Approach: We conduct a semantic analysis of the ESO discourse. To unfold the order of this discourse we draw on the distinction between surface and underlying structure of communication in the sense of Michel Foucault. We interpret some semantic lead differences, a term coined by Niklas Luhmann, to constitute the underlying structure of communication. Results: We can identify six different streams on the ESO discourse’s surface level each defined by the ends pursued. The discourse’s underlying structure is made up of the distinctions production-consumption, capital-labour, and ownership-control that also determine the actor models implicitly in use. Conclusion: We can identify five different actor models implicit in the ESO discourse. While the CEE discourse differs on the surface level in as far as it is more concerned with questions of political legitimation of the privatisation process than with questions of economic efficiency, thus introducing political distinctions in the discourse rather missing in the west, it shares the underlying semantic lead differences with the Western discourse as well as the actor models anchored in those differences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
ABDUL LATIF ◽  
MUHAMMAD TAHIR KHAN ◽  
MUHAMMAD NISAR KHAN

This article focus on one of important corporate decision that can have a great impact on the sentiments of the investor’s i.e. corporate dividend policy. This study investigates the determinants of the corporate dividend policy in the context of agency relation. The analysis of the study has based on the random sample of eighty firms from the listed companies in Pakistan, for the period of eight years ranging from 2003 to 2012. Stepwise multiple regressions have used to investigate for the relationship of ownership variables with the dividend payouts. The empirical results suggested that there has a negative relationship between the dividend payouts and managerial share ownership and thus these are alternative tools that can be used to minimize the agency problem. And also where there has positive relationship between the institutional suggested that the higher has their shareholdings the higher will be the firm dividend payouts that will leads to less availability of the cash flows with the opportunities managers to expropriate the shareholders wealth.


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