Controlling shareholders and the effect of diversification on firm value: evidence from Indonesian listed firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-383
Author(s):  
Rayenda Khresna Brahmana ◽  
Doddy Setiawan ◽  
Chee Wooi Hooy

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the presence of controlling shareholder affects the value of diversification based on Indonesian listed firms. It further examines whether the degree of controlling ownership and the types of controlling ownership matter. Design/methodology/approach Panel data were used over the period 2006-2010 with dynamic generalised method-of-moments estimations and it defined diversification as industrial diversification, international diversification or diversification in both. A few different thresholds for the control rights of the largest shareholder are also set. Findings The results show that industrial diversification improves firm value but international diversification does not, while diversified in both strategies discounted firm value. The presence of a controlling shareholder is found to have a significant diversification discount, and the effect is nonlinear, where the entrenchment effect occurs around 20 to60 per cent threshold of controlling across all types of diversified firms. Last, foreign firms are found to enjoy more value from industrial diversification, but it takes an adverse turn when these involve both diversification strategies. Government firms do not seem to be different from family firms. Research limitations/implications The study shows the need to differentiate diversification strategies and account for non-linearity and ownership identity in modelling diversification value. Also, the degree of shareholders’ control can be a significant channel to address the agency issue on diversification value. Practical implications Under the backdrop of unique Indonesian corporate ownership, the presence of controlling owners is shown, and their ownership affects the value of diversification. The entrenchment effect however appears only at a certain range of ownership. This is a crucial guide for the shareholders to ensure an appropriate monitoring system is installed to maximize the shareholder’s value, especially in family firms. Originality/value The value of this paper is twofold. At first, the first empirical evidence on the diversification debate with Indonesian firms for its unique institutional setting is presented. Second, the standard modelling framework to investigate the types of ownership on diversification value is extended, which has rarely been covered in previous investigations.

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amrinder Khosa

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of board independence on firm valuation of group-affiliated firms in distinct Indian setting. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 317 listed firms comprising 1,350 firm-year observations for the period 2008-2012. The value-relevance model is used to examine the effect of board independence on market value of equity. Findings The distinct finding of an inverse relationship between board independence and firm value of group-affiliated firms in India illustrates that effective monitoring by outside directors is largely influenced by the institutional setting and ownership structure. This study does not find any evidence of different valuation when comparing non-family CEOs and family CEOs. Practical implications Independent directors play an important role to stop abusive use of related-party transactions in an environment where principal–principal conflict exists. The study’s findings will prove useful in determining whether one should rely merely on the independent status of outside directors or the influence of institutional setting on effective governance. Originality/value This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: it helps to gain a better understanding of business groups which are characterised by unique governance structures and the dominance of controlling families on the board, which makes the external governance mechanisms (i.e. independent directors and non-family CEOs) ineffective and it illustrates that effective monitoring by outside directors is largely influenced by the institutional setting and ownership structure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-127
Author(s):  
Ondřej Machek ◽  
Jiří Hnilica

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how the satisfaction with economic and non-economic goals achievement is related to the overall satisfaction with the business of the CEO-owner, and whether family involvement moderates this relationship. Design/methodology/approach Based on a survey among 323 CEO-owners of family and non-family businesses operating in the Czech Republic, the authors employ the OLS hierarchical regression analysis and test the moderating effects of family involvement on the relationship between the satisfaction with different goals attainment and the overall satisfaction with the business. Findings The main finding is that family and non-family CEO-owner’s satisfaction does not differ significantly when economic goals (profit maximisation, sales growth, increase in market share or firm value) and firm-oriented non-economic goals (satisfaction of employees, corporate reputation) are being achieved; both classes of goals increase the overall satisfaction with the firm and the family involvement does not strengthen this relationship. However, when it comes to external non-economic goals related to the society or environment, there is a significant and positive moderating effect of family involvement. Originality/value The study contributes to the family business literature. First, to date, most of the studies focused on family business goals have been qualitative, thus not allowing for generalisation of findings. Second, there is a lack of evidence on the ways in which family firms integrate their financial and non-financial goals. Third, the authors contribute to the literature on the determinants of personal satisfaction with the business for CEOs, which has been the focus on a relatively scarce number of studies.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Zhong ◽  
He Wan ◽  
Qiuping Peng

PurposeThe authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage moderates those effects.Design/methodology/approachEmploying fixed effects models, the authors test hypotheses based on Chinese listed company data from 2011 to 2017.FindingsControlling shareholders' stock pledges has a negative effect on strategic change. As the balance of power among shareholders and/or analyst coverage increases, it mitigates the effect of controlling shareholder stock pledges on strategic change. In particular, the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage weakened the relationship between controlling shareholder stock pledges and strategic change. Lastly, after distinguishing family from nonfamily firms, the authors discovered that these findings only held for family firms.Originality/valueThis study makes important contributions to strategic change, stock pledge and family firm literature, and also provides guidance on firms' strategic change practices.


2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Imen Derouiche ◽  
Majdi Hassen

The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show that the value of excess cash reserves is lower in family firms than in other firms, reflecting investors concern about the potential misuse of cash by controlling families. We also find that the value of excess cash is lower when controlling families are involved in management and when they maintain a grip on control, indicating that investors do not expect the efficient use of cash in these firms. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the extent to which excess cash contributes to firm value is lower when dominant shareholders are likely to expropriate firm resources. Overall, family control seems to be a key determinant of cash valuation when ownership is concentrated.


Significance China's securities market has grown dramatically, but the rules that underpin its functioning have failed to keep pace and have been poorly enforced because regulators and courts lacked resources and the issue was never a political priority. Insider trading, stock price manipulation and other fraud is relatively common. Impacts A wide range of sectors and institutions will need to adjust, including investors, listed firms, traders, law enforcers and courts. Foreign firms investing in China will benefit from better protection from financial fraud. China may send judges abroad to learn from other systems; Europe is a more likely destination than the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebenezer Agyemang Badu ◽  
Ebenezer Nyarko Assabil

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the connection between board composition and value relevance of financial information in Ghana.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a panel data of 144 firm-year observations of listed firms in Ghana.FindingsThe study finds that a higher fraction of independent directors is associated with lower firm value. The study further finds that board size is positively related to firm value, whereas duality is negatively associated with firm value.Practical implicationsThe practical implication of this paper is that investors and regulators should be mindful that specifying governance composition should not only be based on “so-called” codes of best practices but also the level of the country's or the sector's development and local institutional structures.Originality/valueThis study uses five different measurements of market share and considers the impact of the provision of the Code of Best Practices in Ghana.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chee Yoong Liew ◽  
S. Susela Devi

PurposeThis paper examines the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership concentration at low and very high level on a sample of Malaysian family and non-family firms.Design/methodology/approachFor hypotheses testing, panel data analysis using the fixed effects model (FEM) is used because the FEM can address any endogeneity problems effectively (Chi, 2005). The panel data regression is conducted on both family firms and non-family firms.FindingsWe find that there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms, operating in industries where these firms do not have absolute monopoly, and firm value. However, there is no evidence that this significant negative firm value effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, the significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship within family firms in such industries is evident only at low level of ownership concentration. Interestingly, at very high level of ownership concentration, this significant positive moderating effect becomes negative. There is no evidence that these significant moderating effects are stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms.Research limitations/implicationsThis research has focused only on family and non-family firms.Practical implicationsAn implication of this research is that there is a need for the capital market regulators to introduce appropriate policies to deter family firms from having a close relationship with domestic banks as well as monitor the number of domestic banks engaged by such firms. There may be policy implications for consideration by the Central Bank of Malaysia as well.Originality/valueThis research provides some insights to both academia and industry regarding the consequences of domestic banking relationship and different levels of concentrated ownership in family firms in an emerging market. These insights can help improve the corporate governance as well as ownership structure of Malaysian public-listed family firms which dominate the capital market. Our findings refute the argument by Peng and Jiang (2010) by demonstrating that corporate reputational effects may be a substitute for institutional deficiencies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Lari Dashtbayaz ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Toktam Safdel

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between internal controls weakness and financial reporting quality and the effect of family ownership on the mentioned relationship in Iranian listed firms.Design/methodology/approachIn this way, the authors included the number of 139 firms from 2013 to 2017, of which 28 were family firms. The hypotheses are analyzed based on panel data and means comparison.FindingsThe results illustrated that weakness in internal controls has a significant negative relationship with financial reporting quality. In other words, internal controls weakness decreases the quality of financial reporting quality. Moreover, the results showed that being familial does not affect the aforementioned relationship.Originality/valueConsequently, there is no suitable criteria to distinguish family firms and there is a need to take them into serious consideration because very few studies have been conducted focusing on this issue in Iran, as it is considered an argumentative subject to be discussed in the Iranian market.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruchi Moolchandani ◽  
Sujata Kar

PurposeThis paper examines whether family control exerts any influence on corporate cash holdings in Indian listed firms. It also examines how this accumulated cash of family firms impacts firm value.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses dynamic panel data regression estimated using two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) on S&P BSE 500 firms during 2009–2018 for testing the repercussions of family control on the cash levels of a firm. Further, fixed effects regression has been employed for the valuation analysis.FindingsEstimation results showed that family control negatively impacts cash holdings in Indian firms. Further, the cash accumulation by family firms adversely affects the market valuation of the firm. These findings signal a principal–principal (P-P) agency conflict in Indian family firms, i.e. friction between family owners and minority shareholders' interests. Minority shareholders fear that a part of the cash reserves will be used by family members for personal benefits. Thus, they discount cash reserves in family firms.Originality/valueThe study adds to the determinants of corporate cash holdings in emerging markets. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study from India investigating family control as a determinant of cash policy. It sheds light on the P-P agency conflict in Indian family firms. P-P agency conflict is less researched in cash holdings literature as opposed to the principal–agent managerial disputes. Also, the study uses a more comprehensive definition of family control rather than just considering the ownership as used in prior cash holding research.


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabete F. Simões Vieira

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the ownership of public firms is related to accounting and market performance, comparing family and non-family listed firms. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses regression analysis, considering a sample of Portuguese family and non-family firms (NFF) for the period between 1999 and 2010. Findings – Overall, the results show that family firms (FF) are older, are more indebted and have higher debt costs than NFF. However, they present lower levels of risk. The evidence suggests that FF outperform NFF when the author considers a market performance measure. The market performance of family-controlled firms is more sensitive to the crisis periods and age, compared to their counterparts. The empirical findings suggest that under economic adversity, the performance is especially compromised by the firms' age. Research limitations/implications – A limitation of this study is the small size of the sample, which derives from the small size of the Portuguese stock market, the Euronext Lisbon. Originality/value – This paper offers some insights on the ownership of public firms and firm performance by investigating a small European economy. The study also contributes to the stream of firm performance, considering new independent variables as determinants of firm performance, such as operational risk. Finally, the study examines the interaction between ownership and performance under both steady and adverse economic conditions, giving the opportunity to analyze whether firm performance differs according to market conditions.


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