Family involvement, corporate governance and dividends in Turkey

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 602-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pinar Sener ◽  
Elif Akben Selcuk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Involvement ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Family Management ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dividend Payments

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between dividends and family involvement as well as corporate governance characteristics among Turkish public firms. Design/methodology/approach Using panel data on Turkish firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul 100 index for 2006–2014, three models are estimated. For the first two models, where the dependent variables are the dividend payout ratio and dividend yield, respectively, tobit regressions are run. The last model, which employs a dividend dummy as the dependent variable, is estimated with logistic regression. Findings There is a positive and concave relationship between family ownership and dividends. The existence of a family chairman reduces dividends. There is a positive association between board size and dividends and this relationship is weaker for firms with higher levels of family ownership. Finally, the ratio of independent directors on the board is negatively associated with dividends. Practical implications The findings imply that firms with substantial family ownership and active family participation in management are more likely to send a negative signal to minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. In addition, minority shareholders should pay attention to the board structure of firms in which they invest. Originality/value This study is one of the few to analyze the nonlinear relationship between family ownership and dividend payments as well as the role of family management in a developing country. Second, it investigates the role of board characteristics in explaining dividend payment decisions.

Determinants of voluntary formation of risk management committees

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 649-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nkoko Blessy Sekome ◽  
Tesfaye Taddesse Lemma
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the nexus between firm-specific attributes and a company’s decision to setup a separate risk management committee (RMC) as a sub-committee of the board within the context of an emerging economy, South Africa. Design/methodology/approach – The authors analyse data extracted from audited annual financial reports of 181 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) by using logistic regression technique. Findings – The results show a strong positive relationship between the existence of a separate RMC and board independence, board size, firm size and industry type. However, the authors fail to find support for the hypotheses that independent board chairman, auditor reputation, reporting risk and financial leverage have an influence on a firm’s decision to establish RMC as a separately standing committee in the board structure. The findings signify the role of costs associated with information asymmetry, agency, upkeep of a standalone RMC, damage to the reputation of directors and industry-specific idiosyncrasies on a firm’s decision to form a separate RMC. Research limitations/implications – As in most empirical studies, this study focuses on listed firms. Nonetheless, future studies that focus on non-listed firms could add additional insights to the literature. Investigating the role of firm-specific governance attributes other than those considered in the present study (e.g. gender of directors, ownership structure, etc.) could further enhance the understanding of antecedents of risk-management practices. Practical implications – The findings have practical implications for the investment community in assessing the quality of risk management practices of companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, the results provide insights that are potentially useful to the King Committee and other corporate governance regulators in South Africa in their effort to improve corporate governance practices. Originality/value – The present study focuses on firms drawn from an emerging economy which has profound economic, institutional, political and cultural differences compared to advanced economies, which have received a disproportionately higher share of attention in prior studies. Thus, the study contributes additional insights to the literature on corporate risk management from the perspective of an emerging economy.

What drives board committee structure? Evidence from an emerging market

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Ali Uyar ◽  
Cemil Kuzey ◽  
Merve Kilic
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Committees

Purpose Board committees enable boards to function effectively, as committees improve the quality of corporate governance by fulfilling specific, assigned tasks. This study aims to explore how board structure, CEO duality and audit quality are associated with board committee structure in the context of an emerging market, namely, Turkey. Design/methodology/approach The sample consisted of 122 firms listed on the Industrial Index of Borsa Istanbul for the years between 2012 and 2014, inclusive, and this yielded 366 firm-year observations. To test the hypotheses, the panel data analysis method was used, which enabled the elimination of certain problems, such as multicollinearity and estimation bias, as well as specification of the time-variant association between the predictor variables and the output variable. Findings Board size, board independence and firm size had a positive association with the number and size of board committees, whereas CEO duality had a negative association with the number and size of board committees. Moreover, the appointment of female members on audit and corporate governance committees was more frequent in firms that had a high proportion of women on their boards. Finally, audit quality was positively associated with the existence of risk committee, the overall diversity of board committees and the diversity of corporate governance committees. Research limitations/implications The study is not free from limitations. It covers the time span between 2012 and 2014; thus, readers should be cautious about generalizing these results longitudinally, as a different time periods could possibly yield different results. The second limitation concerns the fact that only industrial firms were sampled; thus, these findings may not be valid in other sectors. Practical implications The paper shifts the attention of researchers from overall board structure to board committee structure. The results of the study provide insights for policymakers, boards and shareholders. Policymakers can formulate boards and committees by considering these findings. Boards can benefit from the conclusions of this study in shaping their own structure and sub-committee structures. Current and potential shareholders may find the results of the study instructive in making investment decisions. Originality/value This study investigates the factors associated with the structure of overall and specific board committees. Additionally, while most prior research on board committees has sampled firms that are domiciled in developed countries, this study examines the subject in an emerging country context, namely Turkey. Moreover, this study adds to the literature by examining the association between audit quality and board committee structure, which has been largely neglected in prior literature.

Family firms, board structure and firm performance: evidence from top Indian firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 699-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Rathish Bhatt ◽  
Sujoy Bhattacharya
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Family Management ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Given the prevalence of family-run businesses in India, this paper aims to empirically investigate the impact of family firms on the relationship between firm performance and board characteristics. The effectiveness of board characteristics such as independent directors, chairman independence, role duality, non-executive directors, board busyness, board size, board meetings and board attendance are studied in the Indian context. Design/methodology/approach The sample consists of top-listed firms in India for the period 2002 to 2012. Board index was constructed to capture the governance quality of the firm. The authors also study the relationship between board structure and firm performance by segregating the sample based on family management, family ownership and family representative directors. Random effects model was used for the regression analysis in the study. Findings The authors find a negative effect of board structure on firm performance in family firms compared to non-family firms. Contrary to the most Western literature, family management was not found to significantly affect firm performance as compared to that of professionally managed firms. In the subset analysis of family firms, higher proportion of family ownership and family representative directors did not show any significant impact on the firm performance. Having a higher proportion of independent directors, larger board size or an independent chairman does not appear to improve this insignificant relationship between family firms and firm performance. Also, in family firms, no significant difference in performance is noticed before and during recession period. Originality/value The study uses a self-defined corporate governance index to measure the governance parameters, specifically the board characteristics. The results documented in this study adds to the debate on the generalizability of the findings in Western governance studies in emerging markets like India with unique institutional development background.

Family control and ownership monitoring in Stakeholder-oriented corporate governance

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1712-1728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hideaki Sakawa ◽  
Naoki Watanabel
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Firm Profitability

Purpose Principal–principal conflicts between family shareholders and other shareholders have been investigated in emerging economies, but fewer studies have examined the effect of concentrated ownership on firm profitability and dividend payout in stakeholder-oriented systems. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether family control leads to principal–principal conflicts resulting in wealth expropriation of minority shareholders by family owners in stakeholder-oriented systems. Design/methodology/approach This study uses large listed firms of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in Japan during 2007–2016. Using 14,991 firm year observations, the authors analyze the effect of family control on dividend payout and firm performance to test the possibility of exploitation by family owners. Findings The authors find that family board members do not exploit minority shareholders and rather behave as stewards of the firm. The authors also find that foreign shareholders interact with family control to increase firm profitability, suggesting that foreign shareholders enhance the role of family board members as stewards. Originality/value Existing research on principal–principal conflicts tends to examine expropriation by family board members in emerging markets. This research reveals that family board members behave like stewards in the presence of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, foreign shareholders strengthen the stewardship role of family controlled firms.

scholarly journals Relationship between gray directors and executive compensation in Indian firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Prasad ◽  
K. Sankaran ◽  
Nandan Prabhu
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Empirical Relationship ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Practices

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017. Findings Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country. Research limitations/implications The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary. Originality/value Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism: The Moderating Role of Family Ownership

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Nishtiman Mohammed ◽  
Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail ◽  
Noor Afza Amran
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Study Objective ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Impact

This study objective is to investigate the influence of board characteristics and audit committee characteristics on accounting conservatism with respect to the influence of family ownership in Turkey. The findings explained that clients’ demand for accounting conservatism improved because of board characteristics (e.g. board size, independence & women on board) and the audit committee characteristics (e.g. audit committee independence and audit committee expertise). Hence, the family ownership undermines the impact of board characteristics and the audit committee characteristics to demand accounting conservatism, which will be unfavorable outcome for the minority shareholders. Thus, this study suggests that regulators should increase law enforcement to improve corporate governance in Turkey to accommodate the unique characteristics of family ownership and offer a protected environment for minority shareholders.

Does family matter? The moderating role of family involvement on the relationship between CSR and firm performance

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jihwan Yeon ◽  
Michael S. Lin ◽  
Seoki Lee ◽  
Amit Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Involvement ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Founding Family ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Moderating Role

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the moderating role of family involvement on the corporate social responsibility (CSR)-firm performance (FP) relationship in the US hospitality industry. Building on agency theory, this study examines how family ownership, management and board control influence the relationship between CSR and FP. Design/methodology/approach To examine the moderating effect of family ownership, family management and family board control, this study adopts the two-way fixed-effects model and performs a panel regression analysis with robust standard errors. The sample period spans 1994–2018 and 565 firm-year observations are included. Findings This study finds that the impact of CSR on FP is positively moderated by the extent of a firm’s family member involvement. In specific, all three aspects of corporate governance (i.e. ownership, management and board control) positively moderate the relationship between CSR and FP. Research limitations/implications Findings of this study yield several recommendations for hospitality managers, including shaping strategic decisions for implementing CSR, by providing a unique perspective that the involvement of founding family members can be helpful in enhancing firm value through CSR activities. Originality/value This study sheds light on the further understanding of the CSR-FP link in the hospitality literature. In addition, this study provides practical guidelines for hospitality firms in the context of CSR by revealing possible advantages of strengthened founding family involvement.

scholarly journals Limiting role of resource dependence: an examination of director interlocks, board meetings and family ownership

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Sukumara Panicker ◽  
Rajesh Srinivas Upadhyayula
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Resource Provisioning ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis paper attempts to examine the activity and involvement of board of directors in internationalization activities of firms in emerging markets, by evaluating the resource provisioning roles of interlocks provided by board of directors, and the frequency of board meetings. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of board involvement is contingent upon the levels of family ownership in firms since family ownership could impact the firm’s ability to utilize the presence of different types of board members.Design/methodology/approachThe authors test our hypotheses on a sample of listed Indian companies, extracted from the Prowess database published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a database of the financial performance of Indian companies. On a panel of 3,133 firm years of 605 unique Indian firms with foreign investments, over a time period of 2006–2017, the authors apply different estimation techniques.FindingsThe results demonstrate that both board meeting frequency and director interlocks are instrumental in supporting internationalization activities in emerging market firms. However, family ownership moderates the role of insider and independent interlocks on internationalization investments in different ways; the authors find that interlocks provided by independent directors support internationalization activities in family firms, whereas those provided by insider directors do not. Further, the study also finds that board meetings are less effective in internationalization of family firms.Practical implicationsThe authors conclude that family firms aiming at international diversification require to develop more connected and networked independent directors to enable internationalization in firms. While independent director interlocks enhance the international investments, it is also useful to know that board meetings are ineffective in utilizing the resources in family firms. This points to the possibility that family firms should device mechanisms to integrate family meetings with board meetings so that they can utilize the within-family processes to aid in their internationalization decisions.Originality/valueThe study contributes to resource dependence theory by understanding its limiting role in family firms. Theoretically, it helps delineate the limiting resource provision role of the insider directors vis-à-vis independent directors. The authors argue that the resource provision role of insider director interlocks does not effectively help in internationalization in comparison to independent director interlocks in family-dominated firms. Consequently, the study shows the limiting role of resource provision and utilization by family-owned firms in comparison to non-family-owned firms.

Corporate governance practices and capital structure decisions: the moderating effect of gender diversity

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 939-964
Author(s):  
Mohammad A.A Zaid ◽  
Man Wang ◽  
Sara T.F. Abuhijleh ◽  
Ayman Issa ◽  
Mohammed W.A. Saleh ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Motivated by the agency theory, this study aims to empirically examine the nexus between board attributes and a firm’s financing decisions of non-financial listed firms in Palestine and how the previous relationship is moderated and shaped by the level of gender diversity. Design/methodology/approach Multiple regression analysis on a panel data was used. Further, we applied three different approaches of static panel data “pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect.” Fixed-effects estimator was selected as the optimal and most appropriate model. In addition, to control for the potential endogeneity problem and to profoundly analyze the study data, the authors perform the one-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Dynamic panel GMM specification was superior in generating robust findings. Findings The findings clearly unveil that all explanatory variables in the study model have a significant influence on the firm’s financing decisions. Moreover, the results report that the impact of board size and board independence are more positive under conditions of a high level of gender diversity, whereas the influence of CEO duality on the firm’s leverage level turned from negative to positive. In a nutshell, gender diversity moderates the effect of board structure on a firm’s financing decisions. Research limitations/implications This study was restricted to one institutional context (Palestine); therefore, the results reflect the attributes of the Palestinian business environment. In this vein, it is possible to generate different findings in other countries, particularly in developed markets. Practical implications The findings of this study can draw responsible parties and policymakers’ attention in developing countries to introduce and contextualize new mechanisms that can lead to better monitoring process and help firms in attracting better resources and establishing an optimal capital structure. For instance, entities should mandate a minimum quota for the proportion of women incorporation in boardrooms. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence on the moderating role of gender diversity on the effect of board structure on firm’s financing decisions, something that was predominantly neglected by the earlier studies and has not yet examined by ancestors. Thereby, to protrude nuanced understanding of this novel and unprecedented idea, this study thoroughly bridges this research gap and contributes practically and theoretically to the existing corporate governance–capital structure literature.

scholarly journals Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1292-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Keay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Content Type ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory. Findings While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory. Practical implications The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach. Originality/value While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

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