The evolution of modern automobiles to higher levels of connectivity and automatism has also increased the need to focus on the mitigation of potential cybersecurity risks. Researchers have proven in recent years that attacks on in-vehicle networks of automotive vehicles are possible and the research community has investigated various cybersecurity mitigation techniques and intrusion detection systems which can be adopted in the automotive sector. In comparison to conventional intrusion detection systems in large fixed networks and ICT infrastructures in general, in-vehicle systems have limited computing capabilities and other constraints related to data transfer and the management of cryptographic systems. In addition, it is important that attacks are detected in a short time-frame as cybersecurity attacks in vehicles can lead to safety hazards. This paper proposes an approach for intrusion detection of cybersecurity attacks in in-vehicle networks, which takes in consideration the constraints listed above. The approach is based on the application of an information entropy-based method based on a sliding window, which is quite efficient from time point of view, it does not require the implementation of complex cryptographic systems and it still provides a very high detection accuracy. Different entropy measures are used in the evaluation: Shannon Entropy, Renyi Entropy, Sample Entropy, Approximate Entropy, Permutation Entropy, Dispersion and Fuzzy Entropy. This paper evaluates the impact of the different hyperparameters present in the definition of entropy measures on a very large public data set of CAN-bus traffic with millions of CAN-bus messages with four different types of attacks: Denial of Service, Fuzzy Attack and two spoofing attacks related to RPM and Gear information. The sliding window approach in combination with entropy measures can detect attacks in a time-efficient way and with great accuracy for specific choices of the hyperparameters and entropy measures.
A CAN-Bus Lightweight Authentication Scheme