Long Term Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pricing in Electricity Market

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

scholarly journals A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Co-Construction of an International Transport Corridor

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Yang Lei
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
International Transport ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

The construction and development of international transport corridors have become a means of cross-border space governance and promote the flexibility of international industrial chains and supply chains. Due to the uncertainty of cooperation, the development of international transport corridors entails a long-term and complex system of engineering. This paper evaluates a tripartite evolutionary game model on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors (including origin, transit, and destination countries) and analyzes the cooperation mechanism and influencing factors. The cooperative construction of international transport corridors is complex. Factors such as willingness to cooperate, transfer payments, sunk costs, and reputation have a positive impact on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, but excessive transfer payments hinder cooperation. To promote the construction of international transport corridors, all parties need to have a strong willingness to cooperate; otherwise, the cooperation agreement has a greater probability of becoming invalid. International transport corridors with good development prospects and benefits would accelerate construction progress with the active efforts of participating countries.

scholarly journals The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military-Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wei ◽  
Wang Chan
Keyword(s):  
Primary Standard ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Liquidated Damages ◽  
Government Incentives ◽  
The Military

The military-civilian collaborative innovation is an implementation path for most countries to develop strategic emerging industries. The satellite industry is an important area in strategic emerging industries. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we build an evolutionary game model of China’s satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation with military enterprises and civil enterprises as the main participators under the bounded rationality. Then we analyze the long-term evolution of the system and the factors influencing cooperative stability and perform numerical simulation using Matlab. Our research shows that the cooperative stability of China’s satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation is positively related to the cooperation revenue, liquidated damages, and government incentives and negatively related to basic income, R&D costs, information communication costs, technology secondary conversion costs, risk costs, and betrayal income. The reasonable income distribution coefficient is conducive to the cooperative stability, and we give a primary standard for government incentives. Finally, corresponding management implications are put forward.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategies in “Main Manufacturer–Supplier” Mode Considering Technology Docking and Price Concluding under Competition Condition

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 1184
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Hehua Wang ◽  
Pei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Complex Products ◽  
Competition Condition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

This paper analyses the strategies of the substitutable suppliers competing to collaborate with a main manufacturer in “main manufacturer–supplier” (M-S) mode. In the research and development (R&D) of complex products, only one supplier can be chosen for one kind of part as a long-term collaboration partner with the manufacturer. The competition between substitutable suppliers focuses on the technology docking and price-concluding strategies. In this paper, one original supplier as the first-mover and one new supplier as the second-mover chose between the two strategies sequentially to compete for the collaborative preference of the manufacturer. We also took the delay cost brought by strategy changing into the consideration of the risks, which the suppliers and the manufacturer should prepare to share. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can conclude that the initial costs have little impact on suppliers’ making decisions, while the initial prices are correlated with both suppliers’ decision making. Results also show that hesitation and fluctuation periods exist in suppliers’ decision making, which have a relationship with existing strategy conditions, initial prices, and the cost caused by modifying the part. These results provide practical and reasonable managerial implications for M-S collaboration.

scholarly journals Clustering electricity market participants via FRM models

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Ayla Gülcü ◽  
Sedrettin Çalişkan
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Distance Metrics ◽  
Agglomerative Clustering ◽  
Timely Manner ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Clustering Techniques ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Cosine Distance ◽  
Collateral Mechanism

Collateral mechanism in the Electricity Market ensures the payments are executed on a timely manner; thus maintains the continuous cash flow. In order to value collaterals, Takasbank, the authorized central settlement bank, creates segments of the market participants by considering their short-term and long-term debt/credit information arising from all market activities. In this study, the data regarding participants’ daily and monthly debt payment and penalty behaviors is analyzed with the aim of discovering high-risk participants that fail to clear their debts on-time frequently. Different clustering techniques along with different distance metrics are considered to obtain the best clustering. Moreover, data preprocessing techniques along with Recency, Frequency, Monetary Value (RFM) scoring have been used to determine the best representation of the data. The results show that Agglomerative Clustering with cosine distance achieves the best separated clustering when the non-normalized dataset is used; this is also acknowledged by a domain expert.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document