scholarly journals The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military-Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wei ◽  
Wang Chan
Keyword(s):  
Primary Standard ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Liquidated Damages ◽  
Government Incentives ◽  
The Military

The military-civilian collaborative innovation is an implementation path for most countries to develop strategic emerging industries. The satellite industry is an important area in strategic emerging industries. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we build an evolutionary game model of China’s satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation with military enterprises and civil enterprises as the main participators under the bounded rationality. Then we analyze the long-term evolution of the system and the factors influencing cooperative stability and perform numerical simulation using Matlab. Our research shows that the cooperative stability of China’s satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation is positively related to the cooperation revenue, liquidated damages, and government incentives and negatively related to basic income, R&D costs, information communication costs, technology secondary conversion costs, risk costs, and betrayal income. The reasonable income distribution coefficient is conducive to the cooperative stability, and we give a primary standard for government incentives. Finally, corresponding management implications are put forward.

scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Sustainable Cooperation Relationship of Collaborative Innovation Network in Strategic Emerging Industries

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwei Liu ◽  
Jianing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Research Institutes ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Cooperation Relationship

Strategic emerging industries (SEIs) represent the future direction of industrial developments and are crucial in stimulating the overall and long-term development for economy and society. The government plays a key role in promoting the development of SEIs. This paper, for the first time, investigates the cooperation relationship among innovation members, such as enterprises, universities and research institutes in a collaborative innovation network of strategic emerging industries under government intervention. A three-population evolutionary game theory approach was employed under different scenarios for the government acting as the stakeholder, considering the non-profit, definite fit as well as uncertain profit when incentive and punishment policies are adopted. A novel evolutionary game model of the cooperation relationship among collaborative innovation network members under government’s intervention is established. The results of the simulation experiments show that government’s intervention significantly influences the cooperation relationship between enterprises, universities and research institutes. When the sum of financial incentives and punishments is greater than the total additional cost (TAC), enterprises, universities and research institutes should pay for collaborative innovation. Moreover, government’s financial intervention can effectively promote the cooperation between enterprises, universities and research institutes.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hongsen Luo ◽  
Ying Gao ◽  
Fulei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Mass Communication ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Personalized Recommendation ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.

scholarly journals A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Co-Construction of an International Transport Corridor

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Yang Lei
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
International Transport ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

The construction and development of international transport corridors have become a means of cross-border space governance and promote the flexibility of international industrial chains and supply chains. Due to the uncertainty of cooperation, the development of international transport corridors entails a long-term and complex system of engineering. This paper evaluates a tripartite evolutionary game model on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors (including origin, transit, and destination countries) and analyzes the cooperation mechanism and influencing factors. The cooperative construction of international transport corridors is complex. Factors such as willingness to cooperate, transfer payments, sunk costs, and reputation have a positive impact on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, but excessive transfer payments hinder cooperation. To promote the construction of international transport corridors, all parties need to have a strong willingness to cooperate; otherwise, the cooperation agreement has a greater probability of becoming invalid. International transport corridors with good development prospects and benefits would accelerate construction progress with the active efforts of participating countries.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategies in “Main Manufacturer–Supplier” Mode Considering Technology Docking and Price Concluding under Competition Condition

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 1184
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Hehua Wang ◽  
Pei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Complex Products ◽  
Competition Condition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

This paper analyses the strategies of the substitutable suppliers competing to collaborate with a main manufacturer in “main manufacturer–supplier” (M-S) mode. In the research and development (R&D) of complex products, only one supplier can be chosen for one kind of part as a long-term collaboration partner with the manufacturer. The competition between substitutable suppliers focuses on the technology docking and price-concluding strategies. In this paper, one original supplier as the first-mover and one new supplier as the second-mover chose between the two strategies sequentially to compete for the collaborative preference of the manufacturer. We also took the delay cost brought by strategy changing into the consideration of the risks, which the suppliers and the manufacturer should prepare to share. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can conclude that the initial costs have little impact on suppliers’ making decisions, while the initial prices are correlated with both suppliers’ decision making. Results also show that hesitation and fluctuation periods exist in suppliers’ decision making, which have a relationship with existing strategy conditions, initial prices, and the cost caused by modifying the part. These results provide practical and reasonable managerial implications for M-S collaboration.

The Imperial Army Project

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas E. Delaney
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
British Empire ◽  
Second World War ◽  
World War ◽  
Archival Research ◽  
Military Cooperation ◽  
High Point ◽  
The Military ◽  
Second World

How did British authorities manage to secure the commitment of large dominion and Indian armies that could plan, fight, shoot, communicate, and sustain themselves, in concert with the British Army and with each other, during the era of the two world wars? This is the primary line of inquiry for this study, which begs a couple of supporting questions. What did the British want from the dominion and Indian armies and how did they go about trying to get it? How successful were they in the end? Answering these questions requires a long-term perspective—one that begins with efforts to fix the armies of the British Empire in the aftermath of their desultory performance in South Africa (1899–1903) and follows through to the high point of imperial military cooperation during the Second World War. Based on multi-archival research conducted in six different countries on four continents, Douglas E. Delaney argues that the military compatibility of the British Empire armies was the product of a deliberate and enduring imperial army project, one that aimed at ‘Lego-piecing’ the armies of the empire, while, at the same time, accommodating the burgeoning autonomy of the dominions and even India. At its core, this book is really about how a military coalition worked.

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