Research on Supply Chain Emergency Coordination Strategies under Asymmetric Market Demand Disruptions and Price Sensitivity Coefficient Disruptions

Author(s):  
Meiyan Li ◽  
Changjiang Liu ◽  
Xiaona Liu
Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jie Jian ◽  
Huipeng Li ◽  
Nian Zhang ◽  
Jiafu Su

The increasing homogeneous product market has made more competition among companies to focus on improving customers’ experience. In order to get more competitive advantages, companies often launch discount products to attract consumers. However, stimulated by discount products, the perception of anticipated regret is becoming stronger, which is an inevitable issue in front of companies with price discount strategy. Considering the impact of anticipated regret for discount products, this paper quantitatively describes the utility functions and deduces the demand functions of original price products and discount products. The theoretical analysis and numerical simulation are used to analyze centralized and decentralized models of supply chain for discount products. On its basis, the revenue-sharing contract is designed to optimize the profits of supply chain. This paper finds that the price of products increases first and then decreases with the increase of regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity. When the regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity are lower, companies in the supply chain can adopt the “skimming pricing” strategy in order to obtain more profits. When the regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity increase, companies in the supply chain can adopt “penetrating pricing” strategies to stimulate market demand. For high regret consumers, manufacturers can adopt a “commitment advertising” strategy to promise price and quality, and retailers can adopt a “prestige pricing” strategy to reduce consumer perception of regret. In response to products with higher differences in consumer acceptance, manufacturers can adopt a “differentiated customization” strategy to meet different types of consumer demand and retailers can adopt a “differential pricing” strategy for precise marketing.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saidjahon Hayrutdinov ◽  
Mahmoud S. R. Saeed ◽  
Azamat Rajapov

The study proposes a supply chain contractual coordination model based on the product lifecycle information sharing effort and consumers' price sensitivity to a product with the Blockchain system. This paper examined the following five scenarios: (1) centralized supply chain with Blockchain system-based product lifecycle information sharing investment; (2) Stackelberg leader retailer processed and invested Blockchain system scenario; (3) retailer processed the Blockchain system cost-sharing scenario; (4) retailer processed Blockchain system investment through bargaining the revenue-sharing model; (5) Blockchain system investment under the cost and revenue-sharing contract. The study used the game theory reverse induction method to compare the Nash equilibrium solutions under different decision-making scenarios and discussed the chain member’s constraint condition of Blockchain system investment. We simulated and analysed the products’ lifecycle information sharing effort cost factor, the influence of price sensitivity coefficient, and expected profits of the supplier and retailer. The study results show that the product lifecycle information sharing effort under the Blockchain system increases the profit of the whole chain and decreases with the increase of customer’s price sensitivity coefficient.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang

This paper studies the impact of different forecasting techniques on the inventory bullwhip effect in two parallel supply chains with the competition effect, which is in contrast to the situation of a single product in a serial supply chain. In particular, this paper constructs two parallel supply chains, each of which includes one manufacturer and one retailer. Moreover, the market demand is impacted by the self-price sensitivity coefficient, the cross-price sensitivity coefficient, the market share, and the demand shock. We then assumed that the retailer can forecast market demand by using different forecasting techniques (i.e., the moving average technique (MA), the exponential smoothing technique (ES), and the minimum mean square error technique (MMSE)). We constructed the quantity model of the bullwhip effect and the inventory bullwhip effect. Finally, we analyzed the impact of different forecasting techniques and market share on the inventory bullwhip effect. We analyzed the conditions under which the retailers should choose different types of forecasting techniques on the basis of the inventory bullwhip effect. The results show that the MMSE forecasting technique can reduce the lead-time demand forecast error to the largest extent, and the inventory bullwhip effect can obtain the lowest level using the MMSE method: retailer-1 can reduce the inventory bullwhip effect by using the MA technique, when the self-price sensitivity coefficient, the price autoregressive coefficient, and the probabilities associated with customers choosing retailer-1’s product are very low.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Jadidi

In this study, a dominant manufacturer wholesales a technological product to a retailer. In technology-related industries, the obsolescence of an existing product and/or the appearance of a new product decrease the attractiveness of the existing product. This study also assumes that the market demand is stochastic and price-sensitive, where this price-sensitivity increases by time. Hence, retailers need to decline the retail price during the product life cycle to alleviate the effect of time on the demand. Here, two models/cases are considered. In the first model, the retailer decreases the retail price at midlife without any compensation from the manufacturer. In the second model, the manufacturer gives rebate to the retailer when the retailer declines the retail price at midlife. In addition, the performance of the proposed models is numerically compared with wholesale-price-only and the buyback policies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Jadidi

In this study, a dominant manufacturer wholesales a technological product to a retailer. In technology-related industries, the obsolescence of an existing product and/or the appearance of a new product decrease the attractiveness of the existing product. This study also assumes that the market demand is stochastic and price-sensitive, where this price-sensitivity increases by time. Hence, retailers need to decline the retail price during the product life cycle to alleviate the effect of time on the demand. Here, two models/cases are considered. In the first model, the retailer decreases the retail price at midlife without any compensation from the manufacturer. In the second model, the manufacturer gives rebate to the retailer when the retailer declines the retail price at midlife. In addition, the performance of the proposed models is numerically compared with wholesale-price-only and the buyback policies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (2) ◽  
pp. 412-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Weisi Zhang ◽  
Lihong Wei ◽  
Yu Xia ◽  
Shengyi Zhang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of renewable energy on the power supply chain and to study whether the renewable generator or the power grid that purchases power from the power spot market is better when the actual generation of renewable energy is insufficient. The authors want to compare and analyze the different power supply chain operation modes and discuss the optimal mode selection for renewable energy generator and power grid in different situations. Design/methodology/approach This paper studies the grid-led price competition game in the power supply chain, in which the power grid as a leader decides the price of transmission and distribution, and generators determine the power grid price. The renewable energy power generator and the traditional energy power generator conduct a price competition game; on the other hand, the power grid and power generators conduct Stackelberg games. The authors analyze the power supply of single power generator and two power generators, respectively, and research on the situation that the renewable energy cannot be fully recharged when the actual power generation is insufficient. Findings The study finds that both renewable and traditional power grid prices decline as price sensitivity coefficient of demand and installed capacity of renewable energy generators increase. Power grid premium decreases as the price sensitivity coefficient of demand increases, but rises as the installed capacity of renewable energy generator increases. When there is a shortage of power, if the installed capacity of renewable energy is relatively small and price sensitivity coefficient of demand is relatively large, the grid purchases the power from power spot market and shares cost with renewable energy generators, leading to higher expected profits of the renewable energy generators. On the contrary, the renewable energy generators prefer to make up power shortage themselves. For the power grid, purchasing the power by the renewable energy generators when there is a power shortage can bring more utility to the power grid when the installed capacity of renewable energy is lower and the demand price sensitivity coefficient is higher. When the installed capacity of renewable energy is high and the price sensitivity coefficient of demand is moderate, or the installed capacity of renewable energy is moderate and the demand price sensitivity coefficient is high, a generator that simultaneously possesses two kinds of energy source will bring more utility to the power grid. If the installed capacity of renewable energy and the demand price sensitivity coefficient both are small or the installed capacity of renewable energy and the price sensitivity coefficient of demand both are large, the power grid prefers to purchase the power by itself when there is a power shortage. Practical implications The goal of our paper analysis is to explore the implications of the theoretical model and address the series of research questions regarding the impact of the renewable energy on the power supply chain. The results of this study have key implications for reality. This paper sheds light on the power supply chain operation mode selection, which can potentially be used for the renewable energy generators to choose their operating mode and can also help traditional energy generators and power grid enterprises maximize their utility. This paper also has some references for the government to formulate the corresponding renewable energy development policy. Originality/value This paper studies the power operation mode under the uncertainty of supply and demand, and compares the advantages and disadvantages of renewable energy generator that makes up the shortage or the power grid purchases the power from power spot market then shares cost with the renewable energy generator. This paper analyzes the power grid-led coordination problem in a power supply chain, compares and analyzes the price competition game model of single power generator and dual power generators, and compares the different risk preferences of power grid.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Lan Bai ◽  
Runqing Zhang

Abstract The COVID-19 outbreak has exposed deficiencies in the supply chain of FAPs, which have also increased their vulnerability. As the COVID-19 epidemic continues to develop, the effective supply of FAPs during the epidemic prevention and control period has become a key part of the response to the epidemic in metropolitan areas. Based on the game theory, this study constructed a three-level supply chain consisting of suppliers, TPL service providers and retailers to guarantee the supply of FAPs in metropolises in the context of COVID-19 epidemic. By Stackelberg principle game theory, the optimal epidemic prevention effort level, preservation effort level, wholesale price, retail price and optimal profit result in the supply chain dominated by supplier and retailer are respectively solved. In this study, in addition to the characteristics of FAPs such as easy loss and perishable, COVID-19 epidemic factors such as virus infection coefficient and epidemic prevention efforts were fully integrated into the model to ensure the effective supply of FAPs in metropolitan areas. The main research conclusions are as follows. (i) In the context of COVID-19, compared with the wholesale prices of FAPs, the level of preservation efforts and epidemic prevention efforts will have a greater impact on the retail prices of FAPs in metropolitan areas. (ii) When the supplier is in the dominant position, the sensitivity coefficient of the quality assurance effort level is positively correlated with the optimal profit of the supplier. Compared with other members, they have stronger control ability and decision-making ability, so that their profits are greater than those of other members. (ii) Compared with suppliers who are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, when FAPs retailers are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, TPL service providers have a higher level of epidemic prevention efforts and preservation efforts for FAPs. At the same time, the quality effort level, market demand and retail price are all greater under the retailer-led guarantee. (iv) The profit of FAPs retailers is affected by the sensitivity coefficient of preservation effort level, epidemic prevention effort level and dominant guarantee status.The COVID-19 outbreak has exposed deficiencies in the supply chain of FAPs, which have also increased their vulnerability. As the COVID-19 epidemic continues to develop, the effective supply of FAPs during the epidemic prevention and control period has become a key part of the response to the epidemic in metropolitan areas. Based on the game theory, this study constructed a three-level supply chain consisting of suppliers, TPL service providers and retailers to guarantee the supply of FAPs in metropolises in the context of COVID-19 epidemic. By Stackelberg principle game theory, the optimal epidemic prevention effort level, preservation effort level, wholesale price, retail price and optimal profit result in the supply chain dominated by supplier and retailer are respectively solved. In this study, in addition to the characteristics of FAPs such as easy loss and perishable, COVID-19 epidemic factors such as virus infection coefficient and epidemic prevention efforts were fully integrated into the model to ensure the effective supply of FAPs in metropolitan areas. The main research conclusions are as follows. (i) In the context of COVID-19, compared with the wholesale prices of FAPs, the level of preservation efforts and epidemic prevention efforts will have a greater impact on the retail prices of FAPs in metropolitan areas. (ii) When the supplier is in the dominant position, the sensitivity coefficient of the quality assurance effort level is positively correlated with the optimal profit of the supplier. Compared with other members, they have stronger control ability and decision-making ability, so that their profits are greater than those of other members. (ii) Compared with suppliers who are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, when FAPs retailers are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, TPL service providers have a higher level of epidemic prevention efforts and preservation efforts for FAPs. At the same time, the quality effort level, market demand and retail price are all greater under the retailer-led guarantee. (iv) The profit of FAPs retailers is affected by the sensitivity coefficient of preservation effort level, epidemic prevention effort level and dominant guarantee status.


Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zilong Song ◽  
Shiwei He ◽  
Baifeng An

This paper investigated, for the first time, the game and coordination of a dual-channel, three-layered, green fresh produce supply chain, with regard to its economic, social, and environmental performance. Considering that the market demand is dual-channel priced and sensitive to the degree of greenness and the freshness-level, four game models, under different scenarios have been established. These included a centralized scenario, a decentralized scenario, and two contractual scenarios. The equilibrium solutions under the four scenarios were characterized. From the perspective of a sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental performance of the supply chain was analyzed. To enhance the supply chain performance, two contract mechanisms were designed and the conditions for a multi-win outcome were obtained. Accordingly, many propositions and management implications were provided. The results showed that, (1) compared to the centralized supply chain case, the performance of the decentralized supply chain case is inferior; (2) in addition to increasing the concentration of the supply chain decisions, the two contracts proposed can effectively coordinate the green supply chain and improve its sustainable performance; and (3) the performance of the supply chain is positively driven by the consumers’ sensitivity to greenness degree and the freshness level of fresh produce. This paper fills a research gap and helps the participants of the channel recognize the operational decision principle of a complex green supply chain, in order to achieve a higher and a long-term sustainable-development performance.


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