scholarly journals A supply chain-oriented perspective to prevent future COVID-19: Mathematical model and experience of guaranteeing quality and safety of fresh agricultural products

Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Lan Bai ◽  
Runqing Zhang

Abstract The COVID-19 outbreak has exposed deficiencies in the supply chain of FAPs, which have also increased their vulnerability. As the COVID-19 epidemic continues to develop, the effective supply of FAPs during the epidemic prevention and control period has become a key part of the response to the epidemic in metropolitan areas. Based on the game theory, this study constructed a three-level supply chain consisting of suppliers, TPL service providers and retailers to guarantee the supply of FAPs in metropolises in the context of COVID-19 epidemic. By Stackelberg principle game theory, the optimal epidemic prevention effort level, preservation effort level, wholesale price, retail price and optimal profit result in the supply chain dominated by supplier and retailer are respectively solved. In this study, in addition to the characteristics of FAPs such as easy loss and perishable, COVID-19 epidemic factors such as virus infection coefficient and epidemic prevention efforts were fully integrated into the model to ensure the effective supply of FAPs in metropolitan areas. The main research conclusions are as follows. (i) In the context of COVID-19, compared with the wholesale prices of FAPs, the level of preservation efforts and epidemic prevention efforts will have a greater impact on the retail prices of FAPs in metropolitan areas. (ii) When the supplier is in the dominant position, the sensitivity coefficient of the quality assurance effort level is positively correlated with the optimal profit of the supplier. Compared with other members, they have stronger control ability and decision-making ability, so that their profits are greater than those of other members. (ii) Compared with suppliers who are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, when FAPs retailers are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, TPL service providers have a higher level of epidemic prevention efforts and preservation efforts for FAPs. At the same time, the quality effort level, market demand and retail price are all greater under the retailer-led guarantee. (iv) The profit of FAPs retailers is affected by the sensitivity coefficient of preservation effort level, epidemic prevention effort level and dominant guarantee status.The COVID-19 outbreak has exposed deficiencies in the supply chain of FAPs, which have also increased their vulnerability. As the COVID-19 epidemic continues to develop, the effective supply of FAPs during the epidemic prevention and control period has become a key part of the response to the epidemic in metropolitan areas. Based on the game theory, this study constructed a three-level supply chain consisting of suppliers, TPL service providers and retailers to guarantee the supply of FAPs in metropolises in the context of COVID-19 epidemic. By Stackelberg principle game theory, the optimal epidemic prevention effort level, preservation effort level, wholesale price, retail price and optimal profit result in the supply chain dominated by supplier and retailer are respectively solved. In this study, in addition to the characteristics of FAPs such as easy loss and perishable, COVID-19 epidemic factors such as virus infection coefficient and epidemic prevention efforts were fully integrated into the model to ensure the effective supply of FAPs in metropolitan areas. The main research conclusions are as follows. (i) In the context of COVID-19, compared with the wholesale prices of FAPs, the level of preservation efforts and epidemic prevention efforts will have a greater impact on the retail prices of FAPs in metropolitan areas. (ii) When the supplier is in the dominant position, the sensitivity coefficient of the quality assurance effort level is positively correlated with the optimal profit of the supplier. Compared with other members, they have stronger control ability and decision-making ability, so that their profits are greater than those of other members. (ii) Compared with suppliers who are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, when FAPs retailers are in the leading position of guarantee and supply, TPL service providers have a higher level of epidemic prevention efforts and preservation efforts for FAPs. At the same time, the quality effort level, market demand and retail price are all greater under the retailer-led guarantee. (iv) The profit of FAPs retailers is affected by the sensitivity coefficient of preservation effort level, epidemic prevention effort level and dominant guarantee status.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ziyu Liu ◽  
Yaping Li

In order to explore the impact of different decision-making methods on the profits of various entities in the supply chain of the community e-commerce platform, this paper adopts the method of the Stackelberg game. For the community e-commerce platform supply chain composed of suppliers, community e-commerce platforms, and grid station service providers, considering the degree of supplier value cocreation efforts, this paper studies the optimal decisions under centralized decision-making, supplier-led decentralized decision-making, and community e-commerce platform-led decentralized decision-making, respectively. The results show that the supply chain obtains the highest profit in centralized decision-making; under decentralized decision-making, the dominant party will get higher profits; and the supplier value cocreation sensitivity coefficient is positively correlated with sales price, value cocreation effort level, and total supply chain value. The results are helpful to improve the competitiveness of the community e-commerce platform supply chain in the market and are of great significance to the long-term development of the community e-commerce industry.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1937-1965
Author(s):  
Razieh Shoeleh ◽  
Mehdi Seifbarghy ◽  
Davar Pishva

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is one of the well-known mechanisms for coordination of supply chains. Vertical co-op advertising is a financial agreement in which a member of the chain pays certain percentage (i.e. cooperation rate) of a subsequent member’s advertisement cost. Since increasing the number of echelons and decision variables in supply chain problems increase the modelling and computational complexity, most researchers study vertical co-op advertising in a two-level supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer. This paper investigates the problem by considering price and quality levels as additional decision variables in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one retailer. The ultimate goal is to show supply chain managers the importance of product quality as well the role of local advertisement in positively influencing market demand on top of the traditional approach of speed and efficiency optimization. Using game theory approach, power of the manufacturer is assumed to be higher than or equal to those of others in the chain. Five different relationships between players are considered in five non-cooperative games (named as G1–G5) and equilibrium solutions are extracted for each. The results show that the manufacturer prefers to play Stackelberg with the retailer and the supplier rather than be in conflict with them in Nash game. Such preference can lead manufacturer towards high quality and cost-efficient product/service via efficient advertisement in our complex network of business firms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Daning Xing

Taking the dual-channel supply chain embedded by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper studies the optimal decisions of each decision maker under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode led by the retailer. Based on the decentralized decision-making mode, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed to realize the interest coordination, in which the bargaining power of all participants is fully considered. The results show that, under the decentralized decision-making mode, the profit of FLSP increases first and then decreases as the sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level increases, while the profits of other decision makers and the supply chain system decrease with the increase of sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level. The relative size of the price sensitivity coefficient of online and offline channel has an inconsistent impact on the profit of FLSP, while it has a consistent impact on the profits of other decision makers. The profit of FLSP fluctuates greatly with changes in the sensitivity coefficient, and it is difficult to be guaranteed in the entire supply chain system. On this basis, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed. The results show that, after the introduction of bargaining power coefficient of the Nash negotiation model, the variation coefficient of the profits of all decision makers is smaller after coordination, and the profit growth rates are more uniform.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jie Jian ◽  
Huipeng Li ◽  
Nian Zhang ◽  
Jiafu Su

The increasing homogeneous product market has made more competition among companies to focus on improving customers’ experience. In order to get more competitive advantages, companies often launch discount products to attract consumers. However, stimulated by discount products, the perception of anticipated regret is becoming stronger, which is an inevitable issue in front of companies with price discount strategy. Considering the impact of anticipated regret for discount products, this paper quantitatively describes the utility functions and deduces the demand functions of original price products and discount products. The theoretical analysis and numerical simulation are used to analyze centralized and decentralized models of supply chain for discount products. On its basis, the revenue-sharing contract is designed to optimize the profits of supply chain. This paper finds that the price of products increases first and then decreases with the increase of regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity. When the regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity are lower, companies in the supply chain can adopt the “skimming pricing” strategy in order to obtain more profits. When the regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity increase, companies in the supply chain can adopt “penetrating pricing” strategies to stimulate market demand. For high regret consumers, manufacturers can adopt a “commitment advertising” strategy to promise price and quality, and retailers can adopt a “prestige pricing” strategy to reduce consumer perception of regret. In response to products with higher differences in consumer acceptance, manufacturers can adopt a “differentiated customization” strategy to meet different types of consumer demand and retailers can adopt a “differential pricing” strategy for precise marketing.


2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-207
Author(s):  
Weijia Ding ◽  
Liyun Wu

Based on the game theory, the service sensitivity coefficient is introduced to construct four marketing game models, which include a single flagship store, a single self-operated store, a direct sales-flagship store, and a direct sales-self-operated store, in combination with numerical analysis methods to analyze manufacturers and e-commerce platforms in different situations. The study found that the service levels affected the profit of each entity in the supply chain. The service levels of self-operated stores were higher than those of the flagship stores, and the opening of direct sales channels had a stimulating effect on the service levels of e-commerce platforms to a certain extent. In consideration of the service levels and the ability to build direct sales channels, the direct sales-flagship store marketing model is the best choice for manufacturers whereas e-commerce platforms are more inclined to open self-operated stores. However, the opening of manufacturers’ direct sales channels is not necessarily beneficial to e-commerce platforms.


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