Skeptical theism and Skepticism About the External World and Past

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 55-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Law
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
The Past ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Evidential Problem Of Evil

AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.

Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

A Geachian Cure for Morally Paralyzed Skeptical Theists

2017 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Christopher Tomaszewski ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Simple Solution ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Famous Argument ◽  
Evidential Problem Of Evil

Skeptical theism is a popular response to the evidential problem of evil, but it has recently been accused of proving too much. If skeptical theism is true, its detractors claim, then we not only have no good reason for thinking that God’s reasons for action should be available to creatures like us, but we also have no good reason for thinking that the reasons which govern how we ought to act should be available to creatures like us. And given this ignorance, we would be morally paralyzed, unable to decide what we ought to do in ordinary situations that call for a moral decision. In this paper, I present a simple solution to this problem of moral paralysis by drawing on Peter Geach’s now famous argument for the attributivity of “good.”

scholarly journals The “Whence” of Evil and How the Demiurge Can Alleviate Our Suffering

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Viktor Ilievski
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Successful Strategy ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Plausible Answer ◽  
Argument From Evil

Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper—the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato’s approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedānta-sūtra II.1.32–36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato’s demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.

A Cross-Cultural Approach to the Problem of Evil

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayon Maharaj
Keyword(s):  
Mystical Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Other ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Cultural Approach ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
The One

This chapter adopts a cross-cultural approach to the problem of evil by bringing Sri Ramakrishna into conversation with recent analytic philosophers. Maharaj begins by exploring the philosophical resonances between Sri Ramakrishna’s skeptical theism and William Alston’s skeptical theist refutation of William Rowe’s argument from evil. On the one hand, Maharaj draws on Alston’s skeptical theist response to Rowe as a means of developing and defending Sri Ramakrishna’s own skeptical theist position. On the other, Maharaj argues that Alston’s failure to consider Indian karma-based theodicies significantly weakens his argument. Maharaj then brings Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy into dialogue with Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy. Hick’s convincing arguments for the necessity of evil in a soul-making environment lend support to Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy. However, Maharaj also identifies major weaknesses in Hick’s soul-making theodicy, which stem from Hick’s assumption of a one-life-only paradigm and his neglect of mystical experience. On this basis, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystically grounded saint-making theodicy, which presupposes the doctrines of karma and rebirth, has significant advantages over Hick’s theodicy.

A Phenomenological Approach to Skeptical Theism

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-126
Author(s):  
Steven Nemes
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Phenomenological Point

"The purpose of the present essay is to present a version of the evidential argument from evil and to propose a ‘skeptical theistic’ response from a phenomenological point of view. In a word, the problem with the evidential argument from evil is that it attempts to put forth as justified an interpretation of the moral significance of historical events which actually exceeds the limits of human knowledge and which is based on a misinterpretation of experience. The essay also corrects certain analytic-philosophical notions regarding the nature of appearance, terminating with a discussion of the familiar critiques of analytic skeptical theism and the question of whether the belief in the existence of God might not be affected by the apparent skepticism implied by the phenomenological approach to knowledge in general. Keywords: existence of God, argument from evil, skeptical theism, phenomenology, analytic philosophy "

scholarly journals Organic Unities

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Graham Floyd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Organic Unities ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Metaphysical Claim

The principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral value.  It states that the value of the whole is not equal to the summation of its parts.  Even though this principle has a major impact on moral theory, it has been neglected in the consideration of the problem of God and evil.  I claim that the theist can utilize the principle of organic unities to undermine the problem of evil.  First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral value.  Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil.  Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co-exist with evil and that the atheologian lacks rational warrant appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence.  As a result, both problems fail.

Argument from Chance

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Theistic Argument ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Small Probabilities

In the article, first I present the atheistic argument from pointless evil and the argument from chance. The essence of the argument from chance consists in the incompatibility of the existence of purposeless events and the existence of a God who planned the universe to the last detail. Second, I would like to show that there is a relation between the evidential argument from evil and the argument from chance. An analysis of the theistic argument from small probabilities is a helpful starting point for the presentation of how the two arguments are related.

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