scholarly journals Perspectival Skeptical Theism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-264
Author(s):  
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge ◽  

Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 55-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Law

AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-126
Author(s):  
Steven Nemes

"The purpose of the present essay is to present a version of the evidential argument from evil and to propose a ‘skeptical theistic’ response from a phenomenological point of view. In a word, the problem with the evidential argument from evil is that it attempts to put forth as justified an interpretation of the moral significance of historical events which actually exceeds the limits of human knowledge and which is based on a misinterpretation of experience. The essay also corrects certain analytic-philosophical notions regarding the nature of appearance, terminating with a discussion of the familiar critiques of analytic skeptical theism and the question of whether the belief in the existence of God might not be affected by the apparent skepticism implied by the phenomenological approach to knowledge in general. Keywords: existence of God, argument from evil, skeptical theism, phenomenology, analytic philosophy "


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dariusz Łukasiewicz

In the article, first I present the atheistic argument from pointless evil and the argument from chance. The essence of the argument from chance consists in the incompatibility of the existence of purposeless events and the existence of a God who planned the universe to the last detail. Second, I would like to show that there is a relation between the evidential argument from evil and the argument from chance. An analysis of the theistic argument from small probabilities is a helpful starting point for the presentation of how the two arguments are related.


Author(s):  
Mohammad Karimi

Dental and oral health is an important part that plays a significant role in the quality of life of people in our society, especially children, but due to insufficient attention, tooth decay in the world is increasing every year. Promoting oral hygiene requires the people's easy access to primary oral health care and the use of these services should be classified.


Author(s):  
Rosemary Foot

Like the study of China itself, theorists of power transition have lately experienced a resurgence of interest in their arguments. As China has emerged as the world’s second-largest economy, with the second-largest military budget, and has become more assertive internationally under a seemingly more powerful president, the picture painted is one of growing morbidity: war between China, the putative rising dissatisfied power, and the United States, the declining hegemon, has allegedly become highly probable. This chapter critiques these arguments and highlights the restraints on conflict that generally are given insufficient attention in power transition approaches that deal with the Sino-American relationship. The chapter argues that historical awareness among leaders, state agency, and complex economic trends that are central to the understanding of this hybrid world order, together with the domestic preoccupations of these two central protagonists, are factors that work to inhibit the outbreak of war.


Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.


Author(s):  
Richard McKirahan

David Sedley recently complained that despite the enormous amount of work on Parmenides in the past generation, the details of Parmenides' arguments have received insufficient attention. It is universally recognized that Parmenides' introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount importance. It is also recognized that the arguments of fragment B8 are closely related. At the beginning of B8, Parmenides asserts that what-is has several attributes; he offers a series of proofs that what-is indeed has those attributes. This article undertakes a close analysis of fragment B8, teasing out the structure of the arguments, and showing what parts of the traditional and new interpretations of Parmenides those arguments do (or do not) support. It presents some surprising conclusions and opens up spaces for new interpretations.


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