Abstract
Stand improvement (SI) has been widely accepted as an effective forest management tool. Yet most studies on its economic feasibility for nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) landowners are outdated and focus on the single stand level. The objective of this study was to conduct an economic assessment of SI’s effects and feasibility in hardwood stands for a case study in the White River Basin in Indiana. It is shown that SI could make these forests more productive and sustainable than the prevalent “hands-off” practice by enhancing the timber value of the residual stand (TV), generating regular timber income, and to some degree, reversing the decline in oak dominance. On average, a 25% increment in the TV could be achieved. Although costly for some NIPFs, once combined with voluntary financial incentive programs, SI could meet landowners’ demands for low-cost, high-return investment options. In particular, participation in the Environmental Quality Incentive Program could, on average, increase the net present value of timber income from thinning activities by nearly $1,600 per hectare over the course of 30 years. The spatial analysis revealed that there existed considerable spatial heterogeneity in SI benefits and impacts, suggesting that public incentive programs should be spatially targeted to achieve greater efficiency.
Study Implications
This study found that stand improvement (SI) could significantly improve the timber value of forestland in the central hardwood region. Participation in voluntary conservation programs, such as the Environmental Quality Incentive Program, could alleviate part of the SI cost thus making it an attractive investment opportunity for private landowners. For the study region, the White River Basin in Indiana, the results suggested that there existed substantial variations in SI’s effectiveness across space. This implied that program administrators of voluntary incentives could improve the efficiency of public funds allocation by considering this spatial variation when evaluating landowners’ applications for incentives.
The Effect of Phase 2 of the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration on Incentive Payments to Hospitals Caring for Disadvantaged Patients
