Marriage Market Counterfactuals Using Matching Models

Economica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud Dupuy ◽  
Simon Weber
Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori

This chapter considers two examples of applications of matching models under transferable utility (TU). The first example deals with the legalization of abortion by virtue of Roe v. Wade and the feminist claim that it empowered all women. The second example deals with the discrepancy between male and female demand for higher education over the last decades. After providing an overview of Roe v. Wade and how it resulted in female empowerment, the chapter describes the model that takes into account preferences and budget constraints, stable matching on the marriage market, and changes in birth control technology. It then examines gender differences in the demand for higher education using the CIW (Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss) model, with a focus on equilibrium, preferences for singlehood, comparative statics, empirical implementation, and the Low model showing that higher education results in a deterministic drop in fertility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 547-578
Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori

This article reviews recent developments in the literature on marriage markets. A particular emphasis is put on frameworks based either on frictionless matching models with transfers or on search models.


Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori

This chapter considers some extensions of matching models under transferable utility (TU). It begins with a discussion of preinvestment, in which agents deliberately invest in education, and the stock of human capital that characterizes them when entering the marriage market is therefore (at least partly) endogenous. It is safe to assume that agents, when deciding their investment, take into account, among other things, its impact on the marriage market. An alternative argument is that agents are likely to invest too much. The chapter proceeds by analyzing the relevance of TU to risk sharing, multidimensional matching, and the roommate matching problem, taking into account the existence of a stable matching and the cloned bipartite problem. Finally, it describes the basic model of divorce and remarriage, focusing on compensations in the Becker-Coase theorem as well as violations of the theorem.


Author(s):  
Martin Ganco ◽  
Florence Honoré ◽  
Joseph Raffiee

This chapter provides a review of the scholarly literature on entrepreneurial teams and team formation. It pays special attention to two emerging areas of research that present many promising opportunities for future work. First, the chapter discusses the role of resource transfer in the context of start-up firms. It argues that an understanding of the antecedents and consequences of the founding process would be significantly advanced by more explicit theorizing and effort to empirically identify the specific types of resources entrepreneurial team members bring to start-up firms. It highlights one recent advancement in this space—work that has focused on a team’s ability to transfer customer and client relationships from the parent to start-up firms—and provides an outline of open research questions in this realm. Second, the chapter provides a primer on a recent methodological advancement—the use of two-sided assortative matching models—that can be applied to entrepreneurial team assembly to alleviate ongoing concerns that team formation is fundamentally an endogenous process. It demonstrates how these models can be applied using a wide variety of founder, cofounder, and early team member attributes, including an individual’s ability to transfer customer relationships. Importantly, it proposes that synergies emerging from the use of two-sided assortative matching models to study a broader set of team member attributes that include resource transfer will open promising new avenues for future research.


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