Demand information sharing in a two‐echelon supply chain with a risk‐averse retailer: retail price decision versus retail quantity decision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Haining Sun ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Kangjie Jin ◽  
Minyan Ping
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Price Decision ◽  
Demand Information

scholarly journals Information Sharing and Channel Construction of Supply Chain under Asymmetric Demand Information

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Wu ◽  
Qingshan Kong ◽  
Jian-gang Shi ◽  
Hamid Reza Karimi ◽  
Wei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Management Theory ◽  
Force Model ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Structure Characteristics ◽  
Demand Information

Information sharing and marketing channel building have become an important problem of supply chain management theory and practice. The research of information sharing focused on traditional channel of supply chain between upstream and downstream enterprises; however, the research ignores the behavior of information sharing with potential entrants and composite structure characteristics about traditional marketing channel with the direct channel. This paper uses the model to research the effects brought about sharing demand information with potential entrants and building marketing channel, which reveals information sharing and channel building mechanism in the supply chain. The study found that the five-force model of Porter regards potential entrants only as a threat that is one-sided. When the channel competitiveness meets certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will share demand information with potential entrants. Building composite marketing channel is the manufacturer's absolute dominant strategy. Channel construction will increase the entry barriers for potential entrants and weaken the effect of double marginalization; meanwhile, the performance of supply chain will be augmented.

scholarly journals Simulation Research on Information-Sharing Value of Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xiaheng Zhang ◽  
Zekai Lin ◽  
Lin Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Simulation Research ◽  
Incentive Effect ◽  
Actual Evaluation ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

In the two-stage supply chain model, the incentive effect to the supplier’s sharing of demand information and performance evaluation and the effect of various parameters on the incentive effect of the supply chain are studied through a multiagent simulation model constructed for the purpose. It is found that the incentive coefficient of demand information-sharing degree, the number of selected suppliers, the order allocation coefficient, and the order proportion are positively related to the incentive effect of demand information sharing. So, the greater the demand information sharing is, the greater the impact of these parameters on the incentive effect is. Based on the demand information sharing, the supplier performance evaluation rules are shared, and when the actual evaluation rules are inconsistent with the supplier’s expectations, the incentive effect is further enhanced. Other parameters do not affect the incentive effect of demand information sharing and performance evaluation rule sharing.

Coordination of elderly healthcare service supply chain with information asymmetry: Designs of option contracts under different demand distribution statuses

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1291-1307
Author(s):  
Jun Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Healthcare Service ◽  
Demand Distribution ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Continuous Demand ◽  
Elderly Healthcare

This paper studies the issue of demand information asymmetry in an elderly healthcare service (EHS) system represented by a two-echelon elderly healthcare service supply chain (EHSSC) comprising an elderly service integrator (ESI) and a service provider (ESP). The goal of the ESI is to decide on how much service capacity is required for placing orders to the ESP, who directly serves the customers. Considering discrete and continuous demand distribution statuses, a centralised model with symmetric demand information and decentralised models with asymmetric demand information are developed to analyse the optimal ordering decisions and discuss the influence of information asymmetry. Furthermore, option contracts are applied to help coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric demand information based on different demand distribution statuses. Optimal option contract menus are designed for the ESP to promote the information sharing. Results show that the option contract can coordinate the EHSSC with asymmetric demand information under both discrete and continuous demand distribution statuses. The exercise price will be higher under lower demand information than that under higher demand information and the transfer payment will be less under lower demand information than that under higher demand information. Moreover, although the ESI has demand information superiority and can make use of opportunistic behaviour to maximise its own profit, the ESP as the leader can design the option contract to incentive the ESI to achieve true information sharing, and even obtain nearly all of the channel profit.

scholarly journals Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingru Wang ◽  
Zhiyuan Zhen ◽  
Qiang Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
High Signal ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Retail Competition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Demand Information

We consider ex post demand information sharing and leakage in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers competing in quantities. The incumbent retailer has an advantage to acquire information about the market at a cost. If he invests in information acquisition, he privately acquires a signal about the market demand. We examine the incumbent’s incentive of information acquisition and sharing, and the upstream supplier’s information leakage strategy. We confirm that the incumbent’s information acquisition and sharing decisions depend on whether the information acquisition is observable. When it is observable, the incumbent fully shares his private signals even though the shared high signal may hurt him. However, when it is unobservable, the incumbent can share the favorable signal (low signal) and withhold the unfavorable signal (high signal). Moreover, we also find that the supplier will always leak the signal to the entrant no matter what signal she acquires. In addition, we demonstrate under the information sharing and leakage strategy, it may benefit the whole supply chain when the retail competition intensity is not very large.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH CVaR CRITERION

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEI YANG ◽  
MINGHUI XU ◽  
GANG YU ◽  
HANQIN ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Mild Conditions ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
Buy Back

We study the coordination of supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. Different from the downside risk setting, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated with the revenue-sharing, buy-back, two-part tariff and quantity flexibility contracts. Furthermore the revenue-sharing contracts are still equivalent to the buy-back contracts when the retail price is fixed. At the same time, it is shown that the risk-averse retailer of the coordinated supply chain can increase its profit by raising its risk-averse degree under mild conditions.

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